On the Dirty Rags of the Cold War

They try to convince us that the location of the U.S. base in Poland, where the antimissile defensive measures of strategic missile interceptors are placed, does not threaten Russian nuclear potential. Allegedly, because of technical reasons, these missiles cannot intercept Russian heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles. Various kinds of pictures, mathematical models and technocratic language are used to describe these complex things. Nevertheless, I cannot even answer the simplest of questions. If missile threats toward the European continent can theoretically come only from the southern direction, why is the military infrastructure of the U.S. antimissile defense is placed on the northern territories of Europe? That is, on territory close to northwest borders of the Russian Federation, next to Kaliningrad, which is right next to the Russian strategic nuclear bases? No one can give us a clear answer. And when we say, “Give us, at least, a legal guarantee that this system will not be directed against us,” we are told that there is a great conflict between Democrats and Republicans. They try to explain to us the domestic politics of the U.S. We are not interested in such explanations. What is important for us is that the United States is the initiator of this project and they should ensure security for all involved partners throughout the development of the given project. This cannot simply be the minimum level of security, since the U.S. has accepted that there is an overlap between defensive and offensive strategic armaments.

The definition of non-directed position is not one party simply tapping on the other party’s shoulder and promising: “Be not afraid, we will not hurt you.” The definition of non-directed position is quite specific, a legal category under which falls a number of technical criteria. This includes the speed of missile-interceptors, the range of their capacity, the quantity and the location of bases. This is the essence of non-directed position and not something that one simply promises to another. Therefore we want the agreement to be signed and the criteria of the non-directed position defined carefully; the technical criteria of the antimissile defense system should be included, along with Russian access to its verification, that is, Russia should have the opportunity to verify that information if necessary. And all this should be bound under a legal contract. This is what we want and nothing more.

We have offered the following alternative, since Russia is geographically located along the way of various possible trajectories of missiles from the south toward Europe. Russia also possesses unique technological reserves with its own antimissile defense. That is, Russia itself is capable of destroying ballistic targets. We said, “Let’s agree on the thorough integration of our means of antimissile defense.” If this scheme is not acceptable by some far-fetched, I believe, political reason then there is another scheme of cooperation; that is of the setting up of two independent antimissile systems of Russia and NATO. Our clear requirement from such a NATO system, however, would be that it should not creep into our area of responsibilities. If they want to cover those countries that belong to NATO or countries that want to be under the antimissile umbrella of NATO then let it be so. But if Russia does not want to be covered by such a security umbrella then we should not be made to do so. This is the requirement that we have pointed out to our partners, in the clearest of ways. Otherwise we will arrive at a situation where one comes home and finds a foreign bodyguard in your bedroom, allegedly sent for your own security. Who would like that? Therefore, we offer other alternatives. The Russian delegation is acting as flexibly and intelligently as possible by involving professional experts in this area. But if all alternatives will be rejected, we will take that Iran is just an excuse and the main purpose of this NATO set-up to balance against the Russian missile nuclear potential, then we will undertake a third option — a military-technical response by Russia, which nobody will like, except us.

We understand that a severe political struggle is taking place in U.S. domestic politics, which affects, in some sense, a potential antimissile defense project with Russia. It will become an issue, a domestic political clash between future candidates in the presidential campaigns. The American government is limited, to a certain degree, in its ability to negotiate with Russia by internal political struggles. We understand that very well. But once again I would like to say, with our deepest respect for the U.S., we have our own history, we have our own political system, our own parliament, our own government, our own public opinion and so forth. Thus, if we are invited by someone to participate in something we would like to know what is involved and where we are invited to. But if it turns out that, in fact, there was no invitation but simply an attempt to play the Russian card in U.S. domestic politics, we would not like that. We are not some small country, we are a great power — Russia. So we are to be spoken to with respect if you want us to talk with you with respect in return. This is the essence of our consultation.

I am definitely against any kind of arms race. We will not be able to sustain it, the United States will not be able to sustain it, nor will the NATO countries be able to sustain it. Today all states are cutting their military budgets and no one needs an extra headache. Therefore we must distinguish the noise and the boiling nerves of the negotiations from the cold rationality required in the negotiations of such issues. Secondly, my goal is to collect as much useful information as possible in order to give the Russian leadership an objective picture of what is happening in the negotiations with the United States and NATO. The Russian government will make the final decision on this account. In general, I would not dramatize the situation and say that we do not have any sort of opportunity for collaboration. We just have to approach this issue very pragmatically, to try to understand the strengths of the various partners as well as their internal weaknesses and so on. Therefore we must make the most out of what can be agreed on and such ideas are being discussed by our respective military departments. In the situation where anti-Russian deployments could take place, I believe we should create a military-technical answer without much noise and dust. It should be a neat and smart answer which would eliminate the possibility of any negative consequences of the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system in Europe. I think that Russia will most likely go in this direction. I would like to mention again that we are interested in cooperation, we see our partners with both their strengths and weaknesses and we respect them, both their dignity and their paranoia.

Generally speaking, it is not our business to interfere in the internal affairs of the United States. Let them decide what they want from the Russian Federation. Do they want to have in Russia a friend, ally and partner or continue stamping on the dirty rags of the Cold War? Let them decide. After all it is a serious benefit for American national security and the American people to have such a huge and powerful ally. To have such friend in the United States is a big advantage for Russia as well. Those who do not understand this do not have the right to call themselves patriots. Any Russophobes and opponents of cooperation with Russia, be they in the Senate, the House of Representatives, the political elite or the military elite in the U.S., they cannot be called patriots. American patriotism is fully consistent with good, constructive relations with Russia. We are obliged to unite our interests and as a result, the whole world will be a safer place.

(The author is the permanent representative of the Russian Federation to NATO.)