Impromptu Withdrawal

The United States wants to get out of Afghanistan but is making serious mistakes. The NATO attack on Pakistani army border positions is inexcusable. There’s no apparent strategy for dealing with Pakistan. Even moderate Afghans despair because America’s haphazard actions are making things worse for them.

The mission in Afghanistan is now at a point where everything that’s been accomplished over the years could be eradicated within weeks. In this phase of the controlled withdrawal, one mistake is enough to cause major damage. Now that mistake has been made — an ISAF air attack on a Pakistani army base killed at least 24 soldiers. Never have allied forces caused so many military casualties among friendly forces.

In military jargon, these are termed “friendly fire” incidents, a term designed to trivialize and excuse them. But this time, no excuse is necessary and not just because relations between Pakistan and the U.S. have cooled. The attack can’t be dismissed that lightly. Apart from any imaginable worsening of ties between the two countries, the attack shows that even America has no idea what it wants to accomplish in Afghanistan — and, above all, how it intends to end its engagement there.

There are at least three separate ideologies in Washington on the subject of the right withdrawal strategy: The first is favored by the State Department and envisions a political solution in Afghanistan, while the Pentagon wants to see the Taliban wiped out militarily. The third camp is looking to find the right combination of military might and politics. It’s unclear where President Obama stands on the issue; the White House is vacillating. All three solutions also have support in Afghanistan itself.

Developing a strategy is impossible under these conditions. Negotiations with the Taliban will not come about, Pakistan’s worries and threats will continue to grow, and moderate Pakistanis are giving up because the wayward actions of their foreign allies are only making an already complicated issue even worse. Even among the 50 nations, confusion reigns because a withdrawal, naturally, needs to be coordinated. Whatever decisions the U.S. makes affect every soldier from Albania to the United Arab Emirates. Germany bears the full brunt of the problem because Bundeswehr troops support the U.S. in northern Afghanistan, for example, by providing for the transportation of casualties.

The most important goal of any withdrawal must be to avoid chaos and anarchy, and give the new Afghan government maximum control over its own territory. Instead of zeroing in on this goal, the U.S. is frittering away any deal on Pakistan’s influence and wasting valuable time rather than negotiating with the Taliban. They’re only playing into the hand of every second- and third-rate participant hoping for their chance in what will be a completely new order for Afghanistan. That’s what arouses desires and foments unrest. But a plan is nowhere to be seen.