Why Does the US Support Ma Ying-Jeou’s Re-election?

Published in Zaobao
(Singapore) on 20 January 2012
by Chih-yu Shih (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Peixin Lin. Edited by Louis Standish.
Washington’s Taiwan policy is confusing; on the surface, it maintains neutrality, yet sometimes it seems to support the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and sometimes it seems to support the Kuomintang (KMT). In the 2012 Taiwan presidential elections, no matter how much Washington denies or masks it, observers are certain that Washington’s support for the KMT is obvious.

Why? At the core of Washington’s support is its support for the 1992 consensus. Paal, former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, a semi-official ambassador, came to Taiwan on the eve of the elections. He praised the 1992 consensus in the media and also points out that even if the DPP prevails, Washington would immediately send a representative to Taiwan to ensure that the new government finds methods to maintain status quo as established by the 1992 consensus.

The U.S. academic class has long been troubled by the Taiwan problem, with both extremes represented. Earlier on, some commentators raised the question of what the U.S. should do if China and Taiwan move toward unified development. Their worry, as written on paper, was palpable. After Ma was elected as president, there is the worry that both sides were becoming too close. Yet, the DPP’s possible comeback elicited a Chen Shui-bian nightmare; hence there was even an abandon-Taiwan camp. The laziness betrayed by the desire to have an easy time in the future with one act (abandoning Taiwan) unexpectedly stimulated a thousand people who previously seemed neutral to openly oppose China and Taiwan becoming too close.

Those who raise the abandon-Taiwan strategy and those who oppose the strategy both have reasons to agree with Washington’s support for Ma. The former supports Washington’s support for Ma because Ma’s China policy aids U.S.-Sino interactions, which are no longer restricted by the Taiwan issue. The outcome is similar to that which would arise from abandoning Taiwan, and Taiwan would retain peace and prosperity, so, why not?

However, those who are against abandoning Taiwan also have reasons to support Ma’s re-election; Tsai Ing-wen is critical of the 1992 consensus and the institutional measures put in place to facilitate interactions between China and Taiwan. Hence, the stalemate in U.S.-Sino relationship would possibly be re-enacted, which is not beneficial for Taiwan and also devalues Taiwan as a strategic chess piece of the U.S. From the viewpoint of those who are against abandoning Taiwan, the fight between Ma and Tsai could be said to be choosing the lesser of two evils.

Nonetheless, when taking the whole picture into account, the logic behind Washington’s support for Ma’s re-election is more consistent with the logic of the abandon-Taiwan strategy. In the past, Washington used Taiwan as a strategic counterweight chess piece in dealing with China. On the one hand, Taipei was willing, Washington could exert control from behind the curtains and Beijing could not cross Washington. On the other hand, Washington’s position on Taiwan vacillated between loose and tight stances, equivalent to restraining Beijing’s flexibility in going against or disobeying Washington.

Fates have changed. Beijing is now essential to all discussions of global governance. Containing China is neither possible nor appropriate. On the other hand, the main premise behind Washington’s China policy is to resolve conflicts and work together with Beijing. In other words, including China in the global system is beneficial and compared with checking and balancing China’s growth, at least strategically, it is hard to determine which is more important.

That is, Washington no longer just has to consider Beijing’s U.S. policy, but also Beijing’s policy toward global governance. There are two basic motivations behind wanting to include Beijing into the core of global governance: Firstly, it is to enable Beijing to feel at ease towards global governance and be willing to participate and not be skeptical or resisting. Secondly, it is to convince Beijing to actively invest and lessen the cost of global governance, increasing the global capacity to govern.

Washington should influence Beijing’s policy towards global governance

Beijing has greater influence over the Third World than Europe or the U.S. Every time Beijing participates or withdraws, its decision immediately influences the will to participate of Third World nations. Therefore, if Washington wants to respond to Beijing’s desire for global hegemony, it should focus on Beijing’s policy toward global governance, not be fixated on Beijing’s U.S. policy and use the global structure to ensnare Beijing.

Even as Taiwan as a strategic chess piece to irritate Beijing is useful — not only does Taipei desire it, Beijing’s reaction is also predictable — the Taiwan issue fails as a tool to convince Beijing to enter and totally accept a system of global governance to replace a system of national sovereignty. Moreover, once entered into the global governance framework, wouldn’t the similarly-entrenched Taipei benefit from greater security? This point is exactly how the DPP thinks.

Putting the Taiwan problem onto the agenda would increase Beijing’s protectiveness toward its sovereignty and would cause Beijing to be rapidly numb toward the global governance system. If Washington thinks that balancing powers is more suitable as a normative framework than global governance, then the Taiwan problem cannot be allowed to upset the balance. This is why even if Obama does not abandon Taiwan, the logic is close to those who support an abandon-Taiwan strategy.

Washington is still uncertain about its own theoretical standpoint. The realist balance of power point of view continues to dominate the theory world and think tanks, but support for global governance is also sweeping across universities’ and the government’s agendas. Washington’s Taiwan policy is arising from the dialogues of whether to manage or to restrict in a system of checks and balances, whether to break or maintain sovereignty and such.

As a result, Washington’s attitude towards Taiwan’s independence vacillates. On one hand, Washington’s wishes Taiwan to maintain certain form of independence, keeping Taiwan’s future open and flexible, and on the other hand, it is afraid that this sort of openness and flexibility could incubate extremist actions.

Taiwan’s electoral system has been in place for years and is orderly; the electoral process is already legitimized from the voters’ point of view. More importantly, voters’ views on Taiwan’s China policy are solidified into two uncompromising camps: One side is greatly sympathetic toward Taiwan’s independence, and so requires regular and symbolic confrontation policy; the other side supports a policy of steady reconciliation, favoring the pragmatic policy of pacifying Beijing by granting concessions. These two sides have reached a stalemate, ensuring the difficulty in developing an extremist policy.

It is impossible to maintain such a good situation under the condition of continued rule by one side. As long as Washington continues to struggle between the ideologies of global governance and of balancing powers, it would sooner or later want the DPP to take power; since it cannot resolve its own strategic decision, it would want to achieve equilibrium through Taiwan’s vacillating China policy. If the DPP continues to strengthen its global governance discourse, then it could more or less resolve severe concerns of those who support global governance.

Thus, if Washington is tending toward global governance, the KMT’s reconciliation strategy will still be Washington’s long-term darling. However, due to confusing world events, even if there are continuous calls for global governance, some instinctive need for balance of powers will still surface from time to time. This is why Washington would still support the DPP later on.

The writer is a professor in the politics department in National Taiwan University.


华府对台政策扑朔迷离,表面维持中立,但时而似乎支持民进党,时而似乎又支持国民党。在2012年台湾大选中,无论华府如何否认或掩饰,各界认定白宫支持国民党则甚为明显。

  何以故?华府的支持,以凸显对九二共识的支持为核心。前驻台北在台协会的半官方大使包道格,在此番选举前夕来台,面对媒题大事赞扬九二共识,并指出,即使民进党胜选,华府也会立刻派前代表来台,确保新政府找到方法来维系与九二共识一样的局面。

  长期以来,美国学界对于台湾问题颇感困扰,两个极端都有。早期有论者质疑,当两岸若往统一发展之际,美国应该怎么办?担忧之情跃然纸上。后来马英九上任,则引起两岸过于接近的紧张。然而,民进党可能卷土重来的可能性,却引发陈水扁梦魇,于是便有弃台论之说。这种企图一劳永逸的理论怠惰,不料刺激一干原本看似中立人士突然现形,他们明确反对两岸过于亲近。

  华府支持马英九连任的决定,弃台论者有同意的理由,反对弃台论者也有同意的理由。弃台论者会支持华府支持马英九是因为,马英九的两岸政策有助于华府与北京之间的互动,不再受台湾问题的掣肘。如此与弃台的效果一致,而台湾又能保持繁荣和平,何乐不为?

  但是,反对弃台论者也有理由支持马英九连任,因为蔡英文对九二共识采取批判,对两岸关系进入制度性的安排有所排斥,因此或可能导致华府与北京共治两岸关系的窘境重演,则对台湾更为不利,也对台湾作为华府战略棋子的价值产生贬抑。对于反对弃台论者而言,马蔡二人之争,可说是两害相权取其轻。

  不过,从整体考量来看,此番华府支持马英九连任,其逻辑仍然是与弃台论者的逻辑较为接近。过去,华府运用台湾作为制衡北京的战略棋子,一方面是台北方面自愿,则华府大可在幕后操控,北京不能怪罪华府;另一方面是华府在台湾问题上松松紧紧的立场,等于制约了北京在其他方面对华府采取对抗或忤逆的弹性。

  物换星移,北京如今已经是几乎所有全球治理议程上所不可或缺的要角,遏制中国既不可能,也不恰当,反而是如何与北京折冲合作,才是华府考量其对中国政策的主要前提。换言之,将中国纳入全球治理体系,有所贡献,比制衡中国崛起,起码在战略上,两者的重要性难分轩轾。

  亦即,华府要考虑的不再只是北京的对美政策,而更是北京对全球治理的政策。将北京纳入全球治理体系的中心思维,有两个基本点:一是让北京对于全球治理感到安心,愿意参与,而不抱持怀疑或抵制态度;二是说服北京积极投入,减轻全球治理的成本,增加全球治理的能量。

华府应影响北京的全球政策

  尤其是北京对第三世界的信用超过欧美政府对第三世界的信用,每每北京参加或退出的决定,立即影响第三世界国家配合全球治理的意愿。故华府若要因应北京在全球争霸,应着眼于影响北京的全球政策,而非执着于北京的对美政策,用全球架构套牢北京。

  台湾问题作为华府制造北京困扰的战术棋子,固然好用,不但台北求之不得,北京必然跳脚的反应也可以预期。然而,台湾问题作为华府说服北京共襄盛举,接受全球治理体系取代主权国家体系,则必是莫大的败笔。何况,进入全球治理框架后,同样参与其中的台北,不是更获保障吗?而这点,正好是民进党的思维。

  台湾问题搬上议程的结果,必然会急遽提升北京对主权体系的高度保护,以及对全球治理体系的迅速麻木。假如华府认为全球治理比诸权力均衡而言,后者更适合做为规范中国崛起的架构,则就不能容许台湾问题搅局。就是这一点,奥巴马纵使不采弃台论,其逻辑亦与弃台论雷同。

  华府对于自己面对世局的理论角度尚不确定,现实主义的权力均衡观点继续专擅在理论界与智库,但是全球治理的提倡却也不惶多让地席卷大学与政府的议程。华府对台湾的政策的依据,就在其对华政策到底应采治理或制衡,应破除主权疆域或坚守主权疆域等等的对立思维中,摸索辩证。

  影响所及,对台湾独立的态度也就出现摇摆不定,既希望台湾保持某种独立性,对台湾未来维持开放与弹性,又害怕这样的开放与弹性可能纵容了某种终极的方案出炉。

  台湾的选举制度运行有年,井然有序,选民对选举程序已经形成颠扑不破的认同。更重要的,选民对于台湾的大陆政策也凝固成不可妥协的两块:一块是高度同情台湾独立,因而需要定期性的、象征性的对抗政策;另一块是维持平稳的和解政策,以怀柔北京颜面需要为务实的选项。这两块的僵持不下,确保极端政策的难以出现。

  这样的好康状态,不可能在一方固定执政的情况下永久维系下去,故只要华府继续纠缠在自己对全球治理与权力均衡的两难中,便迟早会希望民进党有朝一日执政,把华府自己解决不了的战略选择,在台湾摇摆不定的大陆政策中得到平衡。民进党若持续强化其全球治理论述,多少可化解治理派的重度疑虑。

  所以,要是华府日益趋向于全球治理,则国民党的和解政策终将成为华府的长期宠儿。但是,由于世局纷乱,尽管对全球治理体系的呼唤不会间断,某种本能性的权力制衡需要仍会不定期冒出,这则是华府尔后还会支持民进党的契机所在。

  作者是台湾大学政治系教授
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