Why Does the US Support Ma Ying-Jeou’s Re-election?
Published in Zaobao
(Singapore) on 20 January 2012
by Chih-yu Shih (link to original)
Washington’s Taiwan policy is confusing; on the surface, it maintains neutrality, yet sometimes it seems to support the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and sometimes it seems to support the Kuomintang (KMT). In the 2012 Taiwan presidential elections, no matter how much Washington denies or masks it, observers are certain that Washington’s support for the KMT is obvious.
Why? At the core of Washington’s support is its support for the 1992 consensus. Paal, former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, a semi-official ambassador, came to Taiwan on the eve of the elections. He praised the 1992 consensus in the media and also points out that even if the DPP prevails, Washington would immediately send a representative to Taiwan to ensure that the new government finds methods to maintain status quo as established by the 1992 consensus.
The U.S. academic class has long been troubled by the Taiwan problem, with both extremes represented. Earlier on, some commentators raised the question of what the U.S. should do if China and Taiwan move toward unified development. Their worry, as written on paper, was palpable. After Ma was elected as president, there is the worry that both sides were becoming too close. Yet, the DPP’s possible comeback elicited a Chen Shui-bian nightmare; hence there was even an abandon-Taiwan camp. The laziness betrayed by the desire to have an easy time in the future with one act (abandoning Taiwan) unexpectedly stimulated a thousand people who previously seemed neutral to openly oppose China and Taiwan becoming too close.
Those who raise the abandon-Taiwan strategy and those who oppose the strategy both have reasons to agree with Washington’s support for Ma. The former supports Washington’s support for Ma because Ma’s China policy aids U.S.-Sino interactions, which are no longer restricted by the Taiwan issue. The outcome is similar to that which would arise from abandoning Taiwan, and Taiwan would retain peace and prosperity, so, why not?
However, those who are against abandoning Taiwan also have reasons to support Ma’s re-election; Tsai Ing-wen is critical of the 1992 consensus and the institutional measures put in place to facilitate interactions between China and Taiwan. Hence, the stalemate in U.S.-Sino relationship would possibly be re-enacted, which is not beneficial for Taiwan and also devalues Taiwan as a strategic chess piece of the U.S. From the viewpoint of those who are against abandoning Taiwan, the fight between Ma and Tsai could be said to be choosing the lesser of two evils.
Nonetheless, when taking the whole picture into account, the logic behind Washington’s support for Ma’s re-election is more consistent with the logic of the abandon-Taiwan strategy. In the past, Washington used Taiwan as a strategic counterweight chess piece in dealing with China. On the one hand, Taipei was willing, Washington could exert control from behind the curtains and Beijing could not cross Washington. On the other hand, Washington’s position on Taiwan vacillated between loose and tight stances, equivalent to restraining Beijing’s flexibility in going against or disobeying Washington.
Fates have changed. Beijing is now essential to all discussions of global governance. Containing China is neither possible nor appropriate. On the other hand, the main premise behind Washington’s China policy is to resolve conflicts and work together with Beijing. In other words, including China in the global system is beneficial and compared with checking and balancing China’s growth, at least strategically, it is hard to determine which is more important.
That is, Washington no longer just has to consider Beijing’s U.S. policy, but also Beijing’s policy toward global governance. There are two basic motivations behind wanting to include Beijing into the core of global governance: Firstly, it is to enable Beijing to feel at ease towards global governance and be willing to participate and not be skeptical or resisting. Secondly, it is to convince Beijing to actively invest and lessen the cost of global governance, increasing the global capacity to govern.
Washington should influence Beijing’s policy towards global governance
Beijing has greater influence over the Third World than Europe or the U.S. Every time Beijing participates or withdraws, its decision immediately influences the will to participate of Third World nations. Therefore, if Washington wants to respond to Beijing’s desire for global hegemony, it should focus on Beijing’s policy toward global governance, not be fixated on Beijing’s U.S. policy and use the global structure to ensnare Beijing.
Even as Taiwan as a strategic chess piece to irritate Beijing is useful — not only does Taipei desire it, Beijing’s reaction is also predictable — the Taiwan issue fails as a tool to convince Beijing to enter and totally accept a system of global governance to replace a system of national sovereignty. Moreover, once entered into the global governance framework, wouldn’t the similarly-entrenched Taipei benefit from greater security? This point is exactly how the DPP thinks.
Putting the Taiwan problem onto the agenda would increase Beijing’s protectiveness toward its sovereignty and would cause Beijing to be rapidly numb toward the global governance system. If Washington thinks that balancing powers is more suitable as a normative framework than global governance, then the Taiwan problem cannot be allowed to upset the balance. This is why even if Obama does not abandon Taiwan, the logic is close to those who support an abandon-Taiwan strategy.
Washington is still uncertain about its own theoretical standpoint. The realist balance of power point of view continues to dominate the theory world and think tanks, but support for global governance is also sweeping across universities’ and the government’s agendas. Washington’s Taiwan policy is arising from the dialogues of whether to manage or to restrict in a system of checks and balances, whether to break or maintain sovereignty and such.
As a result, Washington’s attitude towards Taiwan’s independence vacillates. On one hand, Washington’s wishes Taiwan to maintain certain form of independence, keeping Taiwan’s future open and flexible, and on the other hand, it is afraid that this sort of openness and flexibility could incubate extremist actions.
Taiwan’s electoral system has been in place for years and is orderly; the electoral process is already legitimized from the voters’ point of view. More importantly, voters’ views on Taiwan’s China policy are solidified into two uncompromising camps: One side is greatly sympathetic toward Taiwan’s independence, and so requires regular and symbolic confrontation policy; the other side supports a policy of steady reconciliation, favoring the pragmatic policy of pacifying Beijing by granting concessions. These two sides have reached a stalemate, ensuring the difficulty in developing an extremist policy.
It is impossible to maintain such a good situation under the condition of continued rule by one side. As long as Washington continues to struggle between the ideologies of global governance and of balancing powers, it would sooner or later want the DPP to take power; since it cannot resolve its own strategic decision, it would want to achieve equilibrium through Taiwan’s vacillating China policy. If the DPP continues to strengthen its global governance discourse, then it could more or less resolve severe concerns of those who support global governance.
Thus, if Washington is tending toward global governance, the KMT’s reconciliation strategy will still be Washington’s long-term darling. However, due to confusing world events, even if there are continuous calls for global governance, some instinctive need for balance of powers will still surface from time to time. This is why Washington would still support the DPP later on.
The writer is a professor in the politics department in National Taiwan University.
Why? At the core of Washington’s support is its support for the 1992 consensus. Paal, former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, a semi-official ambassador, came to Taiwan on the eve of the elections. He praised the 1992 consensus in the media and also points out that even if the DPP prevails, Washington would immediately send a representative to Taiwan to ensure that the new government finds methods to maintain status quo as established by the 1992 consensus.
The U.S. academic class has long been troubled by the Taiwan problem, with both extremes represented. Earlier on, some commentators raised the question of what the U.S. should do if China and Taiwan move toward unified development. Their worry, as written on paper, was palpable. After Ma was elected as president, there is the worry that both sides were becoming too close. Yet, the DPP’s possible comeback elicited a Chen Shui-bian nightmare; hence there was even an abandon-Taiwan camp. The laziness betrayed by the desire to have an easy time in the future with one act (abandoning Taiwan) unexpectedly stimulated a thousand people who previously seemed neutral to openly oppose China and Taiwan becoming too close.
Those who raise the abandon-Taiwan strategy and those who oppose the strategy both have reasons to agree with Washington’s support for Ma. The former supports Washington’s support for Ma because Ma’s China policy aids U.S.-Sino interactions, which are no longer restricted by the Taiwan issue. The outcome is similar to that which would arise from abandoning Taiwan, and Taiwan would retain peace and prosperity, so, why not?
However, those who are against abandoning Taiwan also have reasons to support Ma’s re-election; Tsai Ing-wen is critical of the 1992 consensus and the institutional measures put in place to facilitate interactions between China and Taiwan. Hence, the stalemate in U.S.-Sino relationship would possibly be re-enacted, which is not beneficial for Taiwan and also devalues Taiwan as a strategic chess piece of the U.S. From the viewpoint of those who are against abandoning Taiwan, the fight between Ma and Tsai could be said to be choosing the lesser of two evils.
Nonetheless, when taking the whole picture into account, the logic behind Washington’s support for Ma’s re-election is more consistent with the logic of the abandon-Taiwan strategy. In the past, Washington used Taiwan as a strategic counterweight chess piece in dealing with China. On the one hand, Taipei was willing, Washington could exert control from behind the curtains and Beijing could not cross Washington. On the other hand, Washington’s position on Taiwan vacillated between loose and tight stances, equivalent to restraining Beijing’s flexibility in going against or disobeying Washington.
Fates have changed. Beijing is now essential to all discussions of global governance. Containing China is neither possible nor appropriate. On the other hand, the main premise behind Washington’s China policy is to resolve conflicts and work together with Beijing. In other words, including China in the global system is beneficial and compared with checking and balancing China’s growth, at least strategically, it is hard to determine which is more important.
That is, Washington no longer just has to consider Beijing’s U.S. policy, but also Beijing’s policy toward global governance. There are two basic motivations behind wanting to include Beijing into the core of global governance: Firstly, it is to enable Beijing to feel at ease towards global governance and be willing to participate and not be skeptical or resisting. Secondly, it is to convince Beijing to actively invest and lessen the cost of global governance, increasing the global capacity to govern.
Washington should influence Beijing’s policy towards global governance
Beijing has greater influence over the Third World than Europe or the U.S. Every time Beijing participates or withdraws, its decision immediately influences the will to participate of Third World nations. Therefore, if Washington wants to respond to Beijing’s desire for global hegemony, it should focus on Beijing’s policy toward global governance, not be fixated on Beijing’s U.S. policy and use the global structure to ensnare Beijing.
Even as Taiwan as a strategic chess piece to irritate Beijing is useful — not only does Taipei desire it, Beijing’s reaction is also predictable — the Taiwan issue fails as a tool to convince Beijing to enter and totally accept a system of global governance to replace a system of national sovereignty. Moreover, once entered into the global governance framework, wouldn’t the similarly-entrenched Taipei benefit from greater security? This point is exactly how the DPP thinks.
Putting the Taiwan problem onto the agenda would increase Beijing’s protectiveness toward its sovereignty and would cause Beijing to be rapidly numb toward the global governance system. If Washington thinks that balancing powers is more suitable as a normative framework than global governance, then the Taiwan problem cannot be allowed to upset the balance. This is why even if Obama does not abandon Taiwan, the logic is close to those who support an abandon-Taiwan strategy.
Washington is still uncertain about its own theoretical standpoint. The realist balance of power point of view continues to dominate the theory world and think tanks, but support for global governance is also sweeping across universities’ and the government’s agendas. Washington’s Taiwan policy is arising from the dialogues of whether to manage or to restrict in a system of checks and balances, whether to break or maintain sovereignty and such.
As a result, Washington’s attitude towards Taiwan’s independence vacillates. On one hand, Washington’s wishes Taiwan to maintain certain form of independence, keeping Taiwan’s future open and flexible, and on the other hand, it is afraid that this sort of openness and flexibility could incubate extremist actions.
Taiwan’s electoral system has been in place for years and is orderly; the electoral process is already legitimized from the voters’ point of view. More importantly, voters’ views on Taiwan’s China policy are solidified into two uncompromising camps: One side is greatly sympathetic toward Taiwan’s independence, and so requires regular and symbolic confrontation policy; the other side supports a policy of steady reconciliation, favoring the pragmatic policy of pacifying Beijing by granting concessions. These two sides have reached a stalemate, ensuring the difficulty in developing an extremist policy.
It is impossible to maintain such a good situation under the condition of continued rule by one side. As long as Washington continues to struggle between the ideologies of global governance and of balancing powers, it would sooner or later want the DPP to take power; since it cannot resolve its own strategic decision, it would want to achieve equilibrium through Taiwan’s vacillating China policy. If the DPP continues to strengthen its global governance discourse, then it could more or less resolve severe concerns of those who support global governance.
Thus, if Washington is tending toward global governance, the KMT’s reconciliation strategy will still be Washington’s long-term darling. However, due to confusing world events, even if there are continuous calls for global governance, some instinctive need for balance of powers will still surface from time to time. This is why Washington would still support the DPP later on.
The writer is a professor in the politics department in National Taiwan University.
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