The Syrian Crisis and the New World Order

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War constituted a critical turning point in the history of the global order toward unipolar American rule. In the more than two decades during which this giant was sitting on the throne of the unipolar system, several events took place that were significant and pivotal turning points in the history of this positioning. Among the most important was the “war on terror,” started by former U.S. President George W. Bush after the 9/11 attacks, and the subsequent policies (muscle flexing) implemented by U.S. leaders and their military all over the world, especially in the Middle East, from Afghanistan to Iraq. The second and maybe more important event was the autumn wave, today called “the Arab Spring,” that was experienced by a few Arab countries.

It is possible to link and compare what the global order witnessed during the Cold War and the developments and changes it is witnessing today. The impact of these two situations can be perceived as a gateway signaling changes in the structure of this order. It is true that Bush Jr.’s war on “terrorism” was supposed to be the crown jewel in America’s positioning as the unipolar power. However, we shouldn’t neglect to mention the significant change that happened on the other side, namely the arrival to power of the (strong) president, Vladimir Putin, in Russia and his quest to bring back Russia's days of glory. Certainly, the second event — “the Arab Spring” — is a real measure of success of Putin’s policy to restore Russia’s position on the Soviet-era throne in order to prevent the American giant from maintaining its unipolar position or even to change the rules of the game for the new leading players.

Observers can find the link between what is happening in our region today and the war by proxy seen during the Cold War. Remember the Cuban missile crisis (for example) in the 1960s and compare it to today’s congestion of fleets and battleships off the Arabian coast, mainly in the waters of the Mediterranean Sea — clearly the harbingers of change. Characteristics of the change can be described by dividing key countries into three tiers.

First-tier countries: We can call them the “countries at the top of the pyramid” of the world order. This category includes countries ranging from the “giant” unipolar power (America) to countries (like Russia and China) that are not very stable in their position but have started to move up and develop, in an attempt to compete with the United States and reduce the gap in their positions or even to surpass them.

Second-tier countries: These are “aspiring countries,” which include regional powers — like several European states, India, Brazil and others — as well as blocs and organizations that play a prominent role in trade and international relations.

Third-tier countries: “Reactionary countries” are those of great geostrategic importance but are going through periods of instability or transition, or through various degrees of crises — creating an opening through which countries in the first and the second tiers can go in and meddle in these trends through their proxies.

Several changes can be seen in the interaction of these three tiers that are creating conditions for a Russian comeback, and which coincide with the burnout and exhaustion that are becoming apparent in the American pole. Economic indicators and the financial crisis that is sweeping through the West have created a gateway through which Russia has chosen to put forward its “filling the vacuum policy.” The filling the vacuum policy was originally introduced by Eisenhower in the 1950s after the tripartite aggression on Egypt, in order to fill the position left by France and the United Kingdom in the Middle East. We can see that Russians are reusing it today to exploit the French, British and overall European reading of indications that America is in decline and their quest to fill the gap left by [America] to play a bigger role in the region, imagining it as a way out of the growing financial crisis.

From this perspective, Russia’s position not to oppose NATO engagement in Libya can be well understood. Russia doesn’t want to be the sole contender to the United States. So long as it is possible to enter more players to this competition, [Russia] will be able to achieve more than one goal with just one move. NATO engagement in Libya meant more players in the region; even though they were allies mindful of America's interests, they were “aspiring” countries, not able to ignore their own interests and aspirations. The second goal was to sink [NATO], which is in dire straits financially, in the campaign — to link it to the financial crisis growing worse by the day in the eurozone. European economists’ claims that the current financial crisis is more dangerous than the one in 2008 and their predictions of an approaching eurozone collapse are good indicators that there is a link between the bill for the Libyan intervention being larger than the West expected and the ambitions of the West. This point has registered with the clever Russians. In addition to its main goal was a serious message, which was to provide China with tangible proof that there are countries (aspiring and greedy) that have started to move toward controlling oil and other sources of wealth, especially in the virgin African continent. Therefore, China cannot limit itself to being a spectator of these movements and threats.

After the beginning of military activities in Libya, Russia accused NATO of abusing international authority and tasks entrusted to it. It revealed the real role of “aspiring” Western countries racing to establish a bigger role for themselves by changing political features of the Middle East region. When China received this message, the interaction devolved to the point of “confrontation.” A lot of unresolved issues were raised, like the Iranian nuclear program issue among others — all of them connected to the scene in which the title and final word is the crisis in Syria. Through these issues and the connections between them, the tiers and key participants in the world order can announce its new positioning or expose the decline of their rival’s position through a number of indicators:

Indicator 1: The Role of Israel

Israel (chief ally of the United States) was created to be America's spearhead and weapon in the region, in order to prove its continuing role or to cover signs of regressing influence. This role is envisaged in Israel's inflaming statements, which amounted to a threat of war against Iran. These “trapping” statements were indicators of America's retreat. Americans realized that playing with this double-edged weapon can also hurt them, so it was necessary for them to review the costs of Israel's threats to realize that they wouldn’t be able to pay the bill for a war against Iran with their ally in the region. The U.S. decided to send a message to its ally (previously its enemy), informing [Israel] about the withdrawal of its battleships from the Strait of Hormuz as a result of the Iranian threat.

Although we cannot exclude the possibility of Israel involving the “world” in an unpredictable war, the chances of it have dropped significantly. It looks like America's message reached its ally, appearing in the corridors of power and many Israeli media headlines. One of them says: “Israel is ready to accept a nuclear Iran.” Haaretz newspaper also wrote: “Israel and America canceled their joint military training in face of Iranian anger.”

Indicator 2: The First Double Veto (Russian and Chinese)

… which put an end to the planned Security Council resolution against Syria (at the end of last year). It is true that, to many, this veto was the obvious Russian comeback. However, it was also important for China, or “the rising giant”— in contrast to a declining America — as it is called by American researchers and politicians who for years have promoted a policy of appeasement, and even of giving “gifts,” in order to avoid inflaming China’s anxiety and to curb the speed of its development. But unexpectedly, the veto means China is entering the door through which Americans wanted it to escape. And this spells confrontation.

Indicator 3: Based on Consequences of Indicator 2

This is the apparent shifting of international blocs in the Security Council so that they can play a more active role within its corridors after the failure of many proposals for the Council's reform, in particular increasing state representation following the rise in the number of member countries in the U.N. body (the 193 members of the U.N. are represented by only 15 countries on the Security Council, including five permanent members). But as any amendment in procedural matters (tasks) require the approval of at least nine countries in the Security Council, including the five permanent members, it goes without saying that these permanent members have not and will not agree to any change in the United Nations Charter that would reduce their advantages in this international body — and thus the emergence of the group called BRICS (China, Russia, South Africa, India and Brazil) constituting five seats on the Council last year. The first four of them remain [on the Council] this year, including two permanent members with veto power. The emergence of this bloc first manifested itself in their rejection of the previous draft resolution against Syria. Then there is a possibility of this bloc eventually evolving into a balancing power in the Security Council against the will of the American-Western administration, and the U.S. unipolar power losing one of the most important facets of its strength: turning the Security Council into a platform for legitimizing its actions, as well as giving it mandate to maintain its dominance and serve its interests under numerous slogans (humanitarian intervention, proactive wars, spreading democracy, fighting terrorism, etc.).

Indicator 4: The Taliban's New Role

It is no secret that one of America's goals is to move the center and weight of Arab leadership to the “dwarf” countries, mainly to Qatar, so they can play the role of America's agent. The most important and dangerous element in this support, however, is the latest announcement of opening an office of “the Taliban” movement in Qatar. We understand that this announcement and the timing of the collapse of the main front of the movement led by Osama bin Laden provide an opportunity for new currents and leaders within the movement to develop, which the United States will be able to negotiate and make alliances with. To achieve that it will use its Qatari ally; there has even been talk of the Saudis aspiring to play the role of turning the Taliban’s compass against Russia (this would reestablish the Taliban’s historical role, which was created by the U.S. to face the Soviet Union). In taking this step, the U.S. is acknowledging its withdrawal from, and the decline of its role in, the region. It is therefore possible to anticipate the creation of an agent in face of apparent Russian advancement.

Indicator 5: Bilateral Cooperation Between Syria and Russia in Solving the Crisis

The Syrian government’s mechanism for the management and resolution of crisis was characterized by skillful choice, firmness and assurance in selecting the right time to initiate the Corrective Movement based on the internal-level reform package, in order to play a policy of “firm flexibility” in the regional and international level. By sticking to its firm positions and using its flexibility, it was able to absorb any pressure and deal with it positively, re-injecting it instead toward stability and its goal of resolving the crisis. It reminds us of Syria's firm stance on [getting] amendments in the Arab League protocol [for it to be] consistent with the principles of Syrian sovereignty. And Syria's flexibility in allowing into the country the [Arab] League’s observer mission startled those who don’t know Syria's way of thinking. The close cooperation between Syria and Russia was apparent when Minister of Foreign Affairs Walid al-Moallem explained that we had answered to the “wishes” of our Russian friends and let the observers come.

This cooperation, flexibility and strategic thinking resulted in an observer mission report different from what was expected by the Arabs. It expressly acknowledges that Syria has suffered from armed gangs, militarization of the movements, incitement and media falsehoods. Although Western-Arab goals were exposed, they continued their quest. They stopped the work of the [Arab League Ministerial] Committee and threw the Syrian issue back to the Security Council. The Arab [League] not only prohibited the presence of the head of the observer mission (al-Dabi) in the Security Council discussions, they also tore his report to pieces and chose from it only the fragments serving its purposes. Nevertheless, their plan came back and bumped up against the double veto (Russian-Chinese) forming an impervious wall against a second round of deliberations in the presence of the Arab League secretary general.
Finally, despite the high tones of the statements and behavior that followed the last veto, ranging from withdrawal of ambassadors to the call to coordinate efforts under the name of a new international organization (Friends of Syria), as well as increased sanctions and attempts to isolate Syria, it became obvious that these mobilizations arose from the realm of stubbornness alone. The West tacitly conceded its failure in Syria; the continuing escalation against it comes from the inability to admit failure so as not to reflect negatively in the coming elections for many Western countries and leaders, especially for the French President Sarkozy and the American Obama.

It is significant that after the recent veto, the West realized that Russian aspirations to re-establish balance among the players in the global order and to break America’s unipolar, hegemonic power in the interest of a comeback (for Russia and China) have paid off. The harbingers of change are now clear, as announced by President Putin openly saying: “We are facing the process of radical transformation of the world order. The phenomenon of unipolarity is over.”