When American Candidates Engage in “Horse Trading”

The rise of Rick Santorum marks a turning point in the campaign for the Republican nomination. After the primaries in Michigan and Arizona on Feb. 28, it will be easier to determine whether the former senator poses a threat to Mitt Romney, even though recent surveys suggest that he is now leading on the national level.

This struggle reminds us of some truths about the nature of political processes. Take the debate concerning the Bush administration’s establishment of conditions for the quality of public education as a prerequisite for states continuing to receive federal education subsidies. In a country where autonomy and local democracy hold historic value, opposition to government intervention in public education, which is regulated locally according to the laws of each state, arouses understandable emotions. Montesquieu said it best: “It is necessary that by the arrangement of things power stop power.”

Yet Santorum voted in favor of the aforementioned federal intervention. When Romney reproached him for it, he declared that the law violated his principles, but that “when you’re part of the team, sometimes you take one for the team for the leader.” For the same reason, Santorum has not expressed opposition to federal subsidies for family planning, which he nonetheless condemns for moral reasons.

Political Bargaining

In this way, Santorum is devoted to that which all politicians practice, that which Public Choice economists label “political bargaining,” “horse trading” or “vote swapping.” The politician sells his vote for certain of his colleagues’ propositions in return for their vote on his own projects. Politicians do business orally: “I will give you my vote today, you give me yours tomorrow.”

Romney used the same tactics as governor of Massachusetts, endorsing “non-conservative” measures in order to ensure that others he deemed more important were adopted.

One Objective: Election

One could demonstrate that this political bargaining often leads to the adoption of policies whose advantages are clearly inferior to the costs, which are hidden by their distribution among a large number of individuals. When reviewing adopted policies, it becomes apparent that nobody voted for the complete package. In other words, the political competition does not have the efficiency of the economic competition. It is a banality which should sometimes be remembered.

Not Romney, Santorum nor Newt Gingrich, of those left, is worrying; the sole objective of each is to be elected. A report by an independent think tank estimates that the program of any one of the three candidates would increase the budget deficit. Ron Paul, in his opinion, knows that he will not be elected, which allows him to refrain from playing these dangerous political games.

Pierre Lemieux is an associate professor of the University of Quebec at Outaouais, author of “One Crisis May Hide Another.”