The “Breaking Point” of Karzai

There is a moment in every war when incidents caused by frustration or loss of faith in the mission turn a “good” war into a “bad” one, even in the eyes of those who initially supported the conflict. This happened with the photos of Abu Ghraib in Iraq, just like it had happened with the much more serious case of the My Lai Massacre in Vietnam at the hands of “Charlie” company. In Afghanistan, soldiers urinating on corpses, the burning of the Koran and the slaughter of 16 people, mainly women and children, at the hands of a crazed soldier have pushed the patience of an Afghan government, already having difficulty justifying the presence of NATO to their people, to its limit. Hence, Karzai has, through defense secretary Leon Pannetta, demanded to the USA that NATO withdraw ahead of schedule. “The Afghan government is ready to take overall security responsibility,” he said out of political necessity, not because this has been established. Two of his brothers nearly died this same week.

Obama has already declared that the latest killing does not justify “any sudden, additional changes” to the withdrawal program. Another 23,000 soldiers will withdraw from Afghanistan towards the end of the summer, joining the 10, 000 who already left last year. The 68,000 remaining will leave at the end of 2014.

Obama’s previous arguments sound worthy of consideration. It is true that the war in Afghanistan, now ten years old, cannot be won. The original mission, to destabilize al-Qaida, was accomplished a while ago but has been replaced by others. But if the United States had left Iraq in 2006 when the photos of Abu Ghraib were published instead of in 2011, there would not have been the manageable chaos there is now. It may have turned into a free-for-all instead.

In Afghanistan, Obama aspires to something similar: establish a relatively orderly chaos, where the Taliban threat can be “manageable.” Marc Grossman, his special envoy, is in secret negotiations on his behalf with the Taliban, who are even considering allowing him to open an office in Kabul. Washington prefers to wager that the coexistence of the Afghan government with the Taliban will prevent another more deadly alliance with al-Qaida and its byproducts.

It’s possible that this option is reasonable. But as each day passes, the demoralization of the NATO soldiers leads to fresh incidents that threaten the intricate diplomatic work of Grossman and other Washington players’ strategy. On top of this, Karzai’s command of his country shows no sign of consolidating itself, even if the current withdrawal schedule is maintained.

Civilian casualties have been accumulating for years without anyone at the head of NATO seeming to notice. According to the UN, there has been an 8 percent rise in civilian casualties compared to the previous year, and 13,000 have died in the last six months, not counting those deaths caused by displacement and the hardship of war. It is true that the majority of victims have died at the hands of the Taliban, but the perception is that NATO’S unmanned air strikes, attacks on Taliban bases and these “exceptional” incidents have hit many more civilians than the enemy. The “breaking point” of Karzai, who is now part of the problem, shows this desperate reality.

It would do much to help relieve this tension and reduce civilian hatred towards NATO if Obama, without giving up on his strategy, carefully accelerates the withdrawal.