China left behind its low profile diplomacy forged over two decades by its leader, Deng Xiaoping, under the current Chinese leadership's growing sentiment that the power of the United States is in a long-term decline.
There have been four major structural changes in the international system since 2008 that will deeply impact the United States' relationship with China and the rest of the world.
First change (and the most significant): By overcoming the two financial crises of 1997/98 and 2008/09, China has emerged a "first class global power."
Second change: Despite its great power, the Unites States is heading for its descent.
Third change: the rise of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries.
Fourth change: The "model of Chinese development" (agreed upon in Beijing) emerged as a viable alternative to Western, neoliberal democracies.
The BRIC countries challenged Western dominance by coordinating their economies and diplomacy, which serve as a counterweight to the West, with the G-20 now replacing the G-8 as a more effective international structure.
Emerging economies and other Asian powers were left trapped between the two most probable scenarios to arise from the China-U.S. rivalry, or the competition to influence multilateral, global institutions and the India/Pacific region.
Chinese experts maintain that the United States is finding itself "on the wrong side of history." The United States' military superiority is undeniable, but it's a power that is declining over the long term, due to the country's financial mess, alarming deficit and unemployment levels, as well as a slow economic recovery and a polarization of domestic politics. Their intelligence and espionage services have come to believe that Chinese leadership thinks in terms of a long game with no real end or sum.
Several sources of distrust exist: different political traditions and value systems, an insufficient understanding of political processes and a reduced breach of power. Chinese experts have proposed various ideas to bridge the gap of distrust, avoiding any confrontation by making efforts toward "a closer commercial relationship and actions to deepen communication on military issues.”
An Indian analyst had the idea of establishing two trilateral structures for dialogue: China-Japan-U.S. and China-India-U.S. Note that Russia isn't listed but that Japan and India are. However, Japan has now become irrelevant to the conversation and its place should be occupied by Russia (which has an excellent relationship with India).
China is considered the winner in the long run if the U.S. economy and its domestic politics continue to be imbalanced. Nevertheless, the Chinese are betting that the United States will try a counter-attack to undermine and break up China's economic and military power.
Observe 2003 as a turning point (with the Anglo-Saxon duo's invasion of Iraq), when the GDP of the United States was eight times greater than China's. Without doubt, the beginning of the U.S.'s decline began in 2004, when the Anglo-Saxons met a humiliating defeat in Iraq. Now the question is: How many years will it take for China to replace the U.S. as the world's great economic power?
The IMF maintains that China will overtake the United States in 2016. China's vulnerability and, by extension, that of the BRIC countries, is why it will take the yen at least ten years to compete with the dollar, as the Global Reserve foresees (some suggest that it will happen in the next few years).
The United States spies on China with its planes, drones, ships and submarines, greatly irritating its army, and promotes human rights through a U.S.-sponsored NGO, symbolizing a form of Westernizing China and destabilizing the Communist Party.
There is alarm among the United States about the increase of Chinese counter-espionage and cyber-attacks launched by officials in Beijing aimed at capturing information of national interest. A seminar at Tsinhgua University discussed the progressive belief - on both parts - that "the two countries would be antagonists in 15 years," which would imply major military spending, forcing other countries to choose sides. In the worst case scenario, all of this could turn into an armed conflict, although not necessarily as a consequence of mutual antagonism.
The analyses point to the positioning of Russia as a determining factor in the global tectonic shift that is the new regional bipolarity between the sinking G-7 and the shining BRIC.
It's essential to understand the perception of India, which grows more and more independent of the BRIC countries, of the dynamic of the bilateral relationship between the two powers, given the country's influence in the Indian Ocean. Let's wait and see what the future will bring between the Asian colossus and the declining United States.
China dejó atrás su diplomacia de bajo perfil, formulada por su líder Deng Xiaoping durante dos décadas, bajo el creciente sentimiento del liderazgo chino de que el poder de Estados Unidos se encuentra en descenso a largo plazo.
Cuatro cambios estructurales mayores en el sistema internacional desde 2008, que impactarán profundamente su relación con China y el resto del mundo.
Primer cambio (el más significativo): tras haber sorteado las dos crisis financieras de 1997/98 y 2008/09, China emergió como “poder global de primer orden”.
Segundo cambio: pese a su gran poderío, Estados Unidos transita ya hacia su declive.
Tercer cambio: surgimiento de los BRICS (Brasil, Rusia, India y China).
Cuarto cambio: el “modelo de desarrollo chino” (consenso de Pekín) emergió como una alternativa viable a las democracias neoliberales de Occidente.
Los BRICS desafían el dominio occidental mediante su coordinación de políticas económicas y su diplomacia, que sirven de contrapeso, con el G-20 sustituyendo al G-8, como mecanismo internacional más efectivo.
Las economías emergentes y las potencias asiáticas quedaron atrapadas en medio de los dos más probables escenarios de la rivalidad entre China-Estados Unidos: la competencia para influir en las instituciones multilaterales globales y en la región India/Pacífico.
Las élites chinas estiman que Estados Unidos se encuentra “en el lado equivocado de la historia”. Es innegable la superioridad militar estadounidense, pero es una potencia declinante a largo plazo, debido a su desorden financiero, alarmante déficit y nivel de desempleo; lenta recuperación económica y una polarización política doméstica. Sus servicios de espionaje y otras fuentes oficiales han llegado a creer que el liderazgo chino “piensa en términos de un juego de suma-cero a largo plazo”.
Existen varias fuentes de desconfianza: diferentes tradiciones políticas y sistemas de valores; insuficiente comprensión de los procesos políticos, y disminución de la brecha del poder. Las élites chinas prescriben varias medidas para crear un puente sobre la brecha del recelo, evitando una ineluctable confrontación: “una relación comercial más íntima y medidas para profundizar la comunicación en temas militares”.
Le impactó la idea a un analista indio, de establecer dos mecanismos trilaterales de diálogo: China/Japón/EU y China/India/EU. Llama la atención que no aparezca Rusia y que coloquen a Japón e India. Empero, Japón se ha vuelto irrelevante y su lugar debía ocuparlo Rusia (con excelentes relaciones con India).
China se considera el vencedor en el largo plazo, si el sistema económico y político doméstico estadounidense persiste en sus desequilibrios. No obstante, los chinos juzgan que Estados Unidos tratará de contraatacar para socavar y desarticular el poderío económico y militar chino.
Como punto de inflexión fija 2003 (fecha de invasión de la dupla anglosajona a Irak), cuando el PIB de Estados Unidos era ocho veces mayor que el de China. Sin duda, el inicio de su decadencia se manifestó en 2004, cuando se conoció la humillante derrota del dúo anglosajón en Irak. Ahora la cuestión es: ¿en cuántos años China lo sustituirá como la mayor economía mundial?
Tanto las tendencias como la prospectiva del FMI, sostienen que China rebasará a Estados Unidos en 2016. La vulnerabilidad de China y, por extensión, de los BRICS, son las geofinanzas cuando al renminbi (yuan) le tomará al menos diez años equipararse al dólar como divisa de reserva global (algunos pregonan que ocurrirá en los próximos años).
Estados Unidos espía a China con sus aviones, portaviones, barcos y submarinos, irritando sobremanera a su ejército, promocionando los derechos humanos por ONG bajo su patrocinio que simbolizan una forma de occidentalizar a China y desestabilizar al Partido Comunista.
Hay alarma en Estados Unidos por el incremento del contraespionaje chino y sus ciberataques operados por las autoridades de Pekín, para recabar información de interés nacional. Comentaban en un seminario en la Universidad Tsinghua, que existe la progresiva creencia de ambas partes, de que “los dos países serían antagonistas en 15 años”, lo cual implicará mayor gasto militar, forzando a otros países a inclinarse por uno de ellos, cuando en el peor de los casos todo esto pudiera desembocar en un conflicto armado, aunque no necesariamente sea consecuencia del mutuo antagonismo.
Los análisis consideran que el posicionamiento de Rusia será determinante en la fractura tectónica global de la nueva bipolaridad transregional entre el decadente G-7 y los resplandecientes BRICS.
Es esencial conocer la percepción de los estrategas de India, miembro cada vez más desligado de los BRICS, sobre la dinámica de las relaciones bilaterales entre ambas potencias, dadas sus implicaciones en el océano Índico. Esperemos a ver cuáles serán las futuras relaciones entre el coloso asiático y el decadente Estados Unidos.
This post appeared on the front page as a direct link to the original article with the above link
.
Nostalgia for the good old days of the Cold War is rife among the US elite, and China holds out the promise of Cold War II. Unfortunately, an enfeebled UN won’t be able to keep it cold because the cynical use of veto power has rendered it irrelevant. And given that the US feels threatened by the fact that China’s military power is a whole 10 percent of America’s, the chances of violence are fairly high.
All one can really hope for is complete financial bankruptcy of the US — and Washington seems to be working very hard at achieving that. Of course, that would plunge us all into deeper levels of misery, but not as deep as another big-power war.
Nostalgia for the good old days of the Cold War is rife among the US elite, and China holds out the promise of Cold War II. Unfortunately, an enfeebled UN won’t be able to keep it cold because the cynical use of veto power has rendered it irrelevant. And given that the US feels threatened by the fact that China’s military power is a whole 10 percent of America’s, the chances of violence are fairly high.
All one can really hope for is complete financial bankruptcy of the US — and Washington seems to be working very hard at achieving that. Of course, that would plunge us all into deeper levels of misery, but not as deep as another big-power war.
Have a nice day.