Iran and Political Rationality
Published in die Zeit
(Germany) on 9 May 2012
by Ulrich Ladurner (link to original)
In preparing for war, one first has to demonize the enemy. That's exactly what's happening with Iran. “The madmen in Teheran,” “The axis of evil,” a “terrorist regime.” These are but a few of the pejoratives that the West uses to characterize Iran. The main theme: The Iranian regime is not only unpredictable, it's downright insane.
But the truth is the exact opposite: The Iranian government not only acts rationally, it is also acting predictably.
Iran's goals — as well as its foreign policy — can be described in one sentence: Those in power want to remain in power and expand Iran's influence in the region. One might, and with good reason, find that problematical; one can also try to counter the Iranian policies. But it can't be said that their policies are irrational. Nor are they illegitimate. Iran behaves like every other nation; it tries to gain influence in its immediate region and anywhere else success of gaining influence looks possible. And, like all the others, it seeks recognition on the international stage.
The problem is the resources that Iran chooses to use. These resources also include nuclear weapons — insofar as Iran's decision to build them goes — something that at present is still only speculation.
But even the nuclear bomb has a function that serves Iranian policy: Preservation of power and winning influence. An atomic bomb serves the purpose of protecting Iran from attack rather than enabling it to attack others. Its value — if value is the proper term here — lies in deterrence rather than in first-strike capability.
Every nuclear nation claims that its nuclear arsenal exists as the ultimate deterrence and not as an offensive weapon. Whether it's the United States, France, India, Pakistan or Israel — all of them have nuclear weapons for self-defense only. That's probably the right assumption.
But that rationale shouldn't apply equally to Iran? Why not? How is that possible? Why should Iran be singled out for exclusion from the logic of deterrence? The answer: Because Iran's government is insane.
So the circle is closed. And that's how one prepares for war.
But the truth is the exact opposite: The Iranian government not only acts rationally, it is also acting predictably.
Iran's goals — as well as its foreign policy — can be described in one sentence: Those in power want to remain in power and expand Iran's influence in the region. One might, and with good reason, find that problematical; one can also try to counter the Iranian policies. But it can't be said that their policies are irrational. Nor are they illegitimate. Iran behaves like every other nation; it tries to gain influence in its immediate region and anywhere else success of gaining influence looks possible. And, like all the others, it seeks recognition on the international stage.
The problem is the resources that Iran chooses to use. These resources also include nuclear weapons — insofar as Iran's decision to build them goes — something that at present is still only speculation.
But even the nuclear bomb has a function that serves Iranian policy: Preservation of power and winning influence. An atomic bomb serves the purpose of protecting Iran from attack rather than enabling it to attack others. Its value — if value is the proper term here — lies in deterrence rather than in first-strike capability.
Every nuclear nation claims that its nuclear arsenal exists as the ultimate deterrence and not as an offensive weapon. Whether it's the United States, France, India, Pakistan or Israel — all of them have nuclear weapons for self-defense only. That's probably the right assumption.
But that rationale shouldn't apply equally to Iran? Why not? How is that possible? Why should Iran be singled out for exclusion from the logic of deterrence? The answer: Because Iran's government is insane.
So the circle is closed. And that's how one prepares for war.