Discussing US Arms Sales to Taiwan

In the beginning of May, a U.S. senator made public a letter from the White House indicating that the Obama administration was willing to seriously consider selling new fighters to Taiwan (which is upgrading to the F16 C/D from the current F16 A/B). The move sparked discussion within Taiwan and drew the attention of international media, with some even believing that the U.S.-Taiwan or U.S.-China relationship may be undergoing subtle changes. In fact, these views are somewhat excessive, and at variance with reality.

First, this is not the first time that America has brought up the issue of arms sales to Taiwan. In 2010, the Obama administration announced various arms sales to Taiwan amounting to $6.4 billion; it only drew widespread attention this time because the administration stated that it may consider selling more advanced fighters. Whether this is some sort of trial balloon or déjà vu from the Bush senior era — a move based on U.S. domestic politics, namely the securing of votes prior to the upcoming general election in November — remains to be seen.

Taiwan Will Not Take It at Face Value

Next, at least looking at the information currently available, in the past the U.S. has told Taiwan not to repeatedly bring up the letter of offer and acceptance for buying F16 C/D fighters. Washington made it clear that it would not sell advanced weaponry to Taiwan, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also indicated on several occasions that selling such advanced aircraft to Taiwan was a serious matter that would inevitably bring a strong backlash from Beijing. Taiwan’s military also made related assessments in the past, stating “it isn’t as if we have no choice but to buy what the U.S. offers.”

Accordingly, even if Taiwan presently still wishes to buy new fighters, it must cut through a considerable amount of red tape both internally and externally, and as such will not be able to complete the purchase for some time. Based on the Taiwanese military’s internal calculations, the costs of purchasing all new fighters would be immense, while if it were to only refit its aircraft by upgrading the F16 A/B fighters which it already owns, it would achieve 80 percent of the F16 C/D’s fighting capability while cutting expenses down to less than half of the first option. Additionally, the amount of fighters that could be used would thus exceed the newly-bought ones. It seems as if the Taiwanese military already has its own ideas about the sale.

Furthermore, looking at the views of former AIT Director Douglas Paal, although he is of the opinion that the White House’s letter is not entirely without justification, he does not believe that the U.S. has chosen a realistic course of action. He estimates that the U.S. will not sell F16 C/D fighters to Taiwan anytime this year. Moreover, Congressional assistants who know of the exchanges between members of Congress and the White House and have recently visited Taiwan largely believe that although the letter should have passed through the highest levels of the White House, the rest of the world will most likely not take it seriously, as it has no possibility of being realized.

As for this, everyone must understand that concerning the present state of U.S. arm sales to Taiwan, regardless of whether it is for a psychological sense of security or concrete defense capabilities, Taiwan will be certain to make its purchases selectively; regardless of whether it is for the enormous benefits to its defense industry firms, its internal affairs, international reputation, or the requirements of balancing cross-strait relations, the U.S. will also sell selectively; and regardless of whether it is for national prestige or its positions on policy, China will inevitably and unequivocally oppose it to the last, but the strength of its reaction will be determined by the type of weapons that are sold.

China, the US and Taiwan Have Their Own Positions and Demands

Speaking of this, we have, on the one hand, seen the U.S. back Japan and the Philippines on disputes in the East and South China Seas in its desire to balance development in Asia, as well as willingly risk accusations of interfering in internal affairs by assisting civil rights lawyer Chen Guangcheng, and then seriously consider upping arms sales to Taiwan. On the other hand, however, the U.S. has once more begun strategic and economic dialogue with mainland China, inviting China’s Minister of Defense, Liang Guanglie, for a visit, again amply demonstrating that the U.S. places great importance on its cooperative relationship with the mainland. China has demonstrated the same. Both sides have carefully formulated plans.

Simply put, the trilateral relationship between China, the U.S. and Taiwan in one respect continually improves relations (between China and Taiwan), strengthens high-level interaction and various types of cooperation (between the U.S. and China) and encourages dialogue, avoids confrontation and continues the rapprochement (amongst the three). All three sides know that cooperation is mutually beneficial and conflict will be good for no party involved, but meanwhile, there has been friction from cooperation, fighting from the friction and compromises from the fighting. Although everyone has their own positions and points upon which they insist, they all know what the bottom line is and will not allow the situation to escalate out of hand.

Here, we return to the source of the problem. According to mainland scholar Huang Renwei’s theory, there exist several different views within current U.S. policy and lines of thought on Taiwan. One advocates actively using Taiwan to contain mainland China, its proponents being political realists and neoconservative hawks. The second supports maintaining the status quo while the power to resolve the current situation rests with the U.S.; the supporters of this view can, for the time being, be labeled moderates blowing with the prevailing winds. The third proposes abandoning Taiwan — the aptly-named “abandon Taiwan theory” — but there still exist preconditions before this would be done.

The former believes that China’s rise cannot be stopped or reversed, but because of the CCP’s particular political and economic systems and ideologies, as well as lack of transparency in its policies and strategic intent, even if the U.S. should not use Cold War modes of thought in managing bilateral relations and is unable to check China’s growth, it still must adopt preventative measures and use Taiwan to curb, or at least balance out the growth of mainland China.

The second is of the opinion that mainland China’s growth and vigor is admittedly an undeniable reality, but Taiwan has already become a successful example of the U.S.’s advocacy of Western liberal democracy, and America thus cannot neglect Taiwan’s security and simply allow Beijing to do as it pleases. This would not conform with America’s founding philosophy, and would also damage America’s international reputation. As cross-strait relations are still improving, they believe that the U.S. has no need at this juncture to confuse matters by changing its existing cross-strait policies.

The latter believes that following the growth of the CCP’s political and economic capabilities, the ratio of power between the U.S. and China is changing. The strategic direction in which the mainland is developing is unclear, nationalism is on the rise and Taiwan’s military strength has long since stood at a disadvantage to China. Because the danger still exists of America being drawn into a possible war in the Taiwan Strait, rather than allowing America to become involved in that conflict, Washington must prepare for the worst and reevaluate its current policies on Taiwan from a new strategic vantage point.

In the author’s opinion, even if there are differing views within the U.S., in the foreseeable future, the U.S. cannot, and will not fall out with China; similarly, America will not give up using Taiwan to counterbalance China, so a betrayal of Taiwan is even more of an impossibility. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are a political problem. America’s objective is still to maximize upon its own interests. Selling or not selling, and what time it sells what kind of weapons are all the results of political planning; China and Taiwan have little room to stick their noses in.

From Taiwan’s perspective, although cross-strait relations have continuously improved and the previously badly damaged foundation of mutual trust between the U.S. and Taiwan has already recovered, it is completely understandable that Ma Ying-jeou cannot leave the future of Taiwan in the hands of others (no matter whether it is China or the U.S.), when their words lack certainty and are prone to change. The Ma administration should be glad to see the international community (not just America) encourage cross-strait dialogue and a peaceful solution to the dispute, but he will absolutely not neglect Taiwan’s security and interests; the rest of the world should make no mistake about that.

The author is a professor at the Graduate Institute of Sun Yat-Senism, Chinese Culture University in Taiwan.