Damascus and the Harbingers of US-Russian Cooperation

The Russian “diplomatic machine” has made two important achievements. These achievements could be described as a “breakthrough” in the field of international politics, focused on the Syrian crisis first and foremost. These accomplishments are the result of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s first foreign trip after his return to the Kremlin, during which he succeeded in winning German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s support regarding the Syrian crisis. This has widened the rift in the French and German positions, as Paris has tended to adopt tougher, more radical options. They even are considering a “surgical military” operation to deal with the Syrian crisis.

The second achievement, and the most important achievement by all meanings and standards, is the establishment of a Russia-U.S. partnership in dealing with the Syrian issue. After this achievement, it is almost certain that Washington and Moscow have decided to work together on this issue. Furthermore, teams are working on generating the appearance of cooperation as reported by U.S. sources. In the middle of this there is the sudden change in Mrs. Hillary Clinton’s position: She no longer believes that the “stepping down of Assad” is a necessary condition for solving the political crisis. Then as a result of this solution, the Russians have confirmed that Moscow doesn’t support the Assad regime. At the same time, Russia is working to prevent Syria from sliding back into chaos and the civil war that Putin warned was emerging.

The “shocking” irony comes from Damascus this time. The capitals of international decision-making are more and more approaching the situation from the standpoint of the Syrian president’s ally in the international arena. This was made clear in the Syrian president’s first speech in more than six months. In these statements he said there will not be an eventual political solution to the Syrian crisis, mainly because the crisis is neither political nor internal.

There is a war being waged against and by Syria, a project of disorder, “international intervention” and terrorist gangs. Thus, the scene on the ground in Syria is being minimized as just another branch of the war on terrorism in Syria and a Syrian war on terrorism. It was a really disappointing speech and reflects the “secession” of the regime from the reality of the crisis in its country. He is deciding to proceed with his choice of military security “at all costs.” More importantly, are the patients being slain at the hands of the surgeon?!

It is unfortunate indeed that the Syrian president appeared “convinced” in his speech that what was taken from the proceedings is a “farce” and as “formal” as a constitutional amendment, the legislative elections of the “pre-Arab Spring” style or the issuance of laws that limit political parties. The proceedings are the “pinnacle” of the political reform process and democratic transformation demanded by the Syrian people, who are also still looking forward to it. He has given them thousands of martyrs, wounded and prisoners and displaced people in their homeland and the temporary diaspora. It is unfortunate and tragic that this is President Assad. After more than 10,000 people were killed, he returned to the demands of the Syrian revolution in its early days. The amendment was to article VIII of the constitution, but the amendment also contained a new and restrictive law for political parties. All of this took place without a signal from him, and he was too late in responding to the peaceful calls for revolution before it turned to “arms.” That which he offers today can be summarized by the words spoken in the context of the Arab revolts in Tunisia and Egypt: “too little too late.”

The wager is that the Syrian president’s speech before parliament has been recorded as more than a step backwards in describing the system and how to deal with it. This discourse denies the existence of basic politics — the regime has rejected the internal Syrian crisis — and it is ignoring political resolution and has denied the initiative of Kofi Annan in form and substance. Assad is reneging on his commitments and the six-point plan, a political move par excellence. The situation will remain this way as long as militants and terrorists are accused of receiving money and arms from abroad. Today he broadened his accusations against the peaceful protestors, who have been going out into the street for just 2,000 Syrian pounds. The result is that no one in Syria belongs to the opposition, and that everyone is the opposition, whether peaceful or armed. They are clients, and they are hired to intervene in the battle against the regime by those who accuse the regime. They support terrorism and sow discord while targeting the Syrian state and the nation. However, the regime is still talking about a “national dialogue” and “open doors” to nowhere. No one takes him seriously any longer.

This is a supposedly logical analysis, that the regime is a “happy” ally, based on the Russian successes in the international arena as well as the attitudes and practices it is advancing. What is the master of the Kremlin doing to confront a broader international coalition against the regime in Damascus, especially considering what we are seeing on the ground and the statements and positions we are hearing from Assad, suggestive or otherwise? He has even gone in the opposite direction in these regards. Does the regime relate at all to what is going on around it, in front of it, and directly under its feet? Or is it that the regime fears an “international consensus” on a political solution to the crisis in Syria as the fears of a “military intervention scenario” become more likely? Does Damascus feel encouraged by the Russian-American convergence, or does it fear the loss of margins to maneuver between the international poles? How does Damascus feel about the harbingers of Russian-American final rapprochement? Will Damascus include them in the context of “gains” and “successes” and consider it as an “opportunity” out of the impasse? Or is it where Damascus sees the makings of a new “challenge” and it will vow under the pressure to provide the political benefits that it has long sought to avoid?

These questions and issues may seem strange in form, but they are very realistic in content, especially if the regime is to ensure this compatibility. It will be very demanding of Damascus. Assad will not strengthen soon enough to escape between the fissures and hollows of international dispute. After Assad becomes an effective ally and a “sincere friend,” he can be the guarantor for the proper implementation of his obligations to reach a “consensus” and meet its requirements. He must also supervise the safe implementation of his obligations on the ground.