“Al-Qaida” American Spring

Press and intelligence reports about the deal between al-Qaida, the House of Saud and Qatar to transfer members of al-Qaida from Yemen to Syria, have not received much political and media attention, despite their mention in major international press, albeit shy and brief.

Meanwhile, reports that talk about mobilizing members of al-Qaida from the Pakistani-Afghani border to Syria are being completely ignored.

Although divergent interpretations of this deliberate political disregard range from the far right to the far left, the topic of such a deal comes with a significant share of questions for the American side, which handled the issue with an eerie silence and disregard that raises many questions about the variant colors of U.S. strategy in combating terrorism.

It is natural for the U.S. to have this twisted approach toward the region, and any observer from outside the U.S. could present dozens of explanations for such policy. On the other hand, it may not be so simple to see this at home in the U.S. Even the American analysts find the motives and reasons behind the behavior of President Obama’s administration hard to understand. This is due to the fact that eleven years have passed, during which the U.S. rhetoric against al-Qaida and terrorism has taken its toll on the American mind to the extent of obsession.

American anger, whether in politics, media or the military, toward any party with links to al-Qaida, was the most prominent feature of the U.S strategy carried out by both Republicans and Democrats. Moreover, the American administration used this anger as a cover to declare its indignation at anyone who opposes its policy — it became the ready-made charge against any state or party that disagrees with U.S. policy, even when it comes to the perils of the ozone hole.

Therefore, it seems logical to question the disregard for such reports, especially since the declared U.S. policy toward the presence of al-Qaida in any place seems like a red line that cannot be compromised. It got to the point that the U.S. had to refrain, ostensibly, from supporting many movements under the pretext of suspicion of a connection to al-Qaida. Thus, the Obama administration’s support for militants in Syria seemed alien — even its reluctance in the beginning was set aside when Susan Rice declared America’s continued support for terrorists despite the clamor she provoked among American politicians. The issue became substance for accusations exchanged between Republicans and Democrats in the electoral race.

This leads us to ask today about the organized “jihadi” terrorism from Afghanistan to Morocco that has its stings converging at Turkish airports and the accessibility granted to terrorists at border-crossings and other airports.

The indifference demonstrated by the U.S., which replaced the usual anger toward any act linked to al-Qaida, has become noteworthy in recent months. This indifference becomes more remarkable when combined with the complete silence of the U.S. toward the declared coalition between its Saudi ally and al-Qaida. This makes U.S motives very dubious, especially when coupled with reports about the heightened presence of U.S. intelligence along the Turkish border, with a mission that is not limited to monitoring the situation, but also instructing terrorists and facilitating their safe passage.

All these conclusions and other possibilities are legitimate, especially when considering the origins of al-Qaida and how it was initially financed. The house of Saud has, exclusively, provided the financial, political, religious and media support for al-Qaida. This support is emboldened specifically with the new political role of Bandar bin Sultan after becoming the head of Saudi intelligence. Bandar’s relationship with al-Qaida dates back to the early years of the emergence of the terrorist network, when he was its “High Commissioner” liaison at the U.S. However, the attacks of September 11 clipped the relationship and diminished its coverage in the media, except on rare occasions. Nevertheless, the American administration was aware that the relationship was not completely dead, and it was rekindled in the last two years. That became very evident after the America reconciliation with the Islamists, following the killing of bin Laden, in an undeclared settlement to open a new page with al-Qaida. Thus, the American silence, indifference, or condoning of the new deal between the Saudis and al-Qaida should logically follow.

Moreover, the United States was not alone in exhibiting such indifference and avoidance — it was preceded by European and Arab countries. The U.S. gave the green light to facilitate the border crossing of al-Qaida elements from different countries, while a number of European countries released the terrorists in their custody and provided them with passports.

Al-Qaida has regained its “spring” with an advanced American approval, full authority from the Saudis and a new management team. This “spring” comes with a new alliance that goes beyond the secrets of the old one in the past decade and with an equation that is based on a nostalgia that is not limited to the return of the old alliance, but also includes many Islamist organizations that were, in essence, an American idea funded by Gulf countries.

However, it is impossible to provide an explanation or answer to the questions of the U.S. citizen in the midst of the current electoral race: After more than a decade of waging war against al-Qaida and employing all political, financial and media resources to fight it, what has changed or developed to make the U.S. close the war file and allow the Saudi ally to recruit terrorists for the network?!

In the time of the Arab Spring, with its turmoil and contradictions, it is natural for al-Qaida’s “spring” to be similar to a spring coming from the frost of terrorism, Wahhabism and religious fanaticism. Especially that it has American imprints all over it and petro-dollars to fund it. Add to that a declared alliance between Wahhabism, the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaida, evident by virtue of the intense coverage by Saudi TV on topics like the convergence and commonality of ideas, approaches, behaviors and politics of the Salafis and the Brotherhood!!