Obama Slowed American Decline

Tonight [Oct. 22], finally, is the last televised debate between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney. It is not meant to be about Big Bird (the Sesame Street bird whose wings Mitt Romney wants to clip) or the “binders full of women” (which are still used by Romney to promote the weaker sex) but on the Iranian atomic bomb, al-Qaida or the Chinese threat. Be sure to note how many times the White House candidates are going to promise a new American “leadership.” In preparation, Justin Vaïsse, French researcher at Brookings and author of a reference book on Obama’s foreign politics, says that the context of this debate is one concerning the relative decline of the United States.

The base of your book is indeed American decline?

Since his inauguration at the beginning of 2009, the acknowledgement of decline is one that Obama has been forced to make. The decline was a relative one, simply based on the fact of the elevation of other world powers. With economic growth of over 10 percent (or even 7.5 percent this year) in China and of 1 to 3 percent in the United States, mathematics tell us that America is in decline, in relative terms, once again. The big question is whether or not the decline in power in the international arena was accelerated or slowed by politics. Under Bush, the phenomenon was precipitated by a bad choice of foreign politics. Under Obama, the phenomenon is rather slowed: While spending less, he succeeded in repositioning America and slowing the erosion of this world power.

Whatever happens in Iran, Israel or especially Syria, is the dominant impression today that American diplomacy is powerless?

Yes and no. If we were in the 1990s, at the height of its strength, we could also talk about the powerlessness of the United States to regulate the problems in the Balkans or the process of peace in the Middle East. A year ago, concerning operations in Libya, we could have highlighted that the United States still had work to do. As for Syria, one must instead understand why Obama didn’t want to intervene. Several factors should be taken into account, including election plans and not wanting to be caught up in another war in the Middle East, so that he could devote himself to other regions (it’s the famous “pivot” toward Asia). The idea at the time was that the anti-Assad forces would have taken it anyway. The acknowledgement was made that the intervention would be dangerous and politically costly, for a result that would be more or less the same. Therefore, it was a careful decision not to intervene, and we see the disastrous consequences today. One could say that an intervention would have inevitably led to happier results.

If Obama is re-elected, can we expect more interventionist American politics in Syria or in Mali?

In Syria, it’s probable. Between nothing at all (actual politics) and imposing an aerial exclusion zone that would have some very high costs, there are intermediary options that can help to tip the balance on the side of moderate rebels. The main problem, however, is that we begin to walk a tightrope. We put his credibility at stake and there is a risk of a domino effect. As for Mali, it’s really minor for the United States. It is striking to see that Obama hardly takes any credit for the Libyan operation. Even before the drama at the consulate in Benghazi, he wasn’t praised for having the “scalp” of Gadhafi like he was for bin Laden. And yet, the intervention in Libya was a remarkable success, which didn’t cost more than about $900 million. The support for an intervention in Mali would go under the radar.

Will a re-elected Obama set to start the process of peace in Palestine?

We indeed hear that he could use his renewed presidency to put pressure on the process. But we could also believe that he is not going to act. He has already been burned. If Netanyahu wins his election (anticipated in January 2013) I don’t see what Obama could do in this situation. He doesn’t really have any options. I think instead that he will concentrate on his “pivot” agenda concerning American strength toward Asia. Obama’s big idea is to reformulate American leadership in order to adapt to the world today. For this, he must stop wars in the Middle East.

And if Romney is elected, what awaits him?

With Romney, the difficulty is identifying who he is. His positions on foreign policy, like on other subjects, have varied. In June 2011, during the Republican primary debates, he said that he would leave Afghanistan as quickly as military generals deemed possible. Today, he reproaches Obama for being too hasty. As of 2011, Romney put himself on a neoconservative track, saying he wants to talk adamantly about Russia and China. The world that he envisions as well is rather like Bush’s, in that it’s the world of 2003 and 2004, not the one of today where new powers are emerging. That said, when we go into detail, there is often very little difference between what Romney and Obama are advocating with regard to issues like Syria or Iran. Romney’s foreign policy team is essentially made up of hawks, but also of realists like Robert Zoellick. Ultimately, the team gives an impression of disorganization and amateurism. Romney failed the foreign policy sequence of his campaign; his international tour was marked by a series of gaffes. He also reacted too quickly to the attack in Benghazi; during his second debate, he managed to lose his attack against Obama on this subject, even though Obama was an easy target.

Contrary to Obama, Romney knows Europe well. He lived in France for over a year, but he is also a specialist in “Europe-bashing.” What can you deduce from that?

France for him was a mission like Guatemala or Laos could have been. His Mormon religion gave him a more open and international education, but he seems to have also been locked up in a bubble composed of his family and his community. Nevertheless, if he really is elected, I think he would get along with François Hollande. Both of them are pragmatic.