With Kerry in Office, China-US Relations May Change Direction

Published in China Times
(Taiwan) on 13 March 2013
by Zhou Zhongfei (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Christine Chou. Edited by Bora Mici.
Before Hillary Clinton left office, the wording of the U.S.'s Asia-Pacific strategy vis-à-vis China expressed a state of mutual hostility. The old policy of ambiguity had disappeared.

In the blink of an eye, newly appointed Secretary of State John Kerry has taken office. Will the U.S. readjust its policy toward Asia? Where will China-U.S. relations go from here?

Going back in history, from the end of World War I and World War II, Cold War détente and the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the U.S. to the end of the Cold War and the international fight against terrorism, adjustments in U.S. foreign policy during these historical turning points are examples of the importance of trade relations overcoming geopolitical factors.

A number of observations follow on the U.S.'s rebalancing strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.

First, the U.S. economy seems to be improving while Europe’s still has not recovered. During the second half of 2012, conflict between China and Japan intensified in East Asia. With its strategic Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement in 2011, the U.S. launched what participants in the Asian economy see as the highest degree of trade liberalization. The move indicates that the U.S. has not shifted from its stance that "the economic health of the [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] region is vitally important to America's continued prosperity." Rather, the TPP simply highlights the U.S. leadership position in the region.

Second, the adjustment of U.S. foreign policy in Asia is taking place during a global economic downturn. Western economies face an uncertain future while India, China and other emerging economies are developing rapidly. On the one hand, globalization and multipolarization are still the main global trends, and the West retains its dominant position. On the other hand, a structure might emerge where two markets exist side by side in the world economy. For the time being, global gross domestic product shares of developed and emerging-market countries have shifted from a ratio of 60-to-40 to 50-to-50.

Third, the current shift in U.S. Asia-Pacific policy differs from the late stages of the Cold War. Then, the Soviet navy substantially expanded its combat capabilities in the Pacific Ocean, threatening U.S. Asia-Pacific military interests and leading to an alliance with China to counter the Soviet Union. It is also different from the early days of the end of the Cold War when the U.S. implemented a strategy to achieve hegemony in response to the so-called China threat. For now, the U.S. must aim to reduce the scale of its army and its military presence in Europe, strengthen the new military strategy of its allies in the Asia-Pacific region and continue to assume responsibility for maintaining security and prosperity in the region, leading the task of balancing power within Asia. In reality, a sharp opposition emerges between the U.S. maintaining its position of global leadership and its less-than-satisfactory influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Fourth, as they develop according to this trend, U.S.-China relations will become increasingly multifaceted and complex. Beyond the widely acknowledged bilateral dependence, how should the U.S. respond to the fact that China’s prosperity has brought changes to economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region? How should the U.S. negotiate between allies and East Asian competitors, such as China and Japan and the interests of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. These issues present the new diplomatic challenges of Kerry’s term.

Protecting the security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region remains at the core of U.S. foreign policy in Asia; it is not simply about changing its stance on China. Kerry still faces a fundamental contradiction: the urgency of adjusting the Asia-Pacific strategy with limited U.S. capabilities.

Considering its economic and political need to maintain growth momentum, the U.S. has experienced rapid trade developments in East Asia. As the Obama administration carries out its rebalancing strategy toward security and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. may place more emphasis on trade and investment with relatively lower security considerations.

The tense security environment on both sides of the Taiwan Strait has lessened recently. More than ever, U.S. participation in East Asian regional economic cooperation requires improved cross-strait relations.

The author is a researcher at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies.


凱瑞上任 中美關係或有轉向
2013-03-13 01:24 旺報 【周忠菲】

 在希拉蕊離職前,美國亞太戰略中涉及中國的措辭,無不劍拔弩張,往日的「模糊」政策也不見了蹤跡。轉眼間,新任國務卿凱瑞走馬上任。美國的亞洲平衡戰略會不會出現「再一次調整」?中美關係將何去何從?

 回顧歷史,從一戰和二戰後的美國、冷戰期間的「美蘇緩和」與中美建交、到冷戰結束和國際反恐,美國對外戰略調整在這些重大轉捩點上都出現過重視經貿關係超過地緣政治因素的例證。對此引申,可對美國亞洲再平衡戰略做如下觀察:

 其一,目前美國經濟出現好轉,歐洲經濟仍未完全復甦。2012年下半年以來,東亞地區出現中日衝突加劇的現象。從參與亞洲經濟的角度看,2011年美國推出了看起來貿易自由化程度最高的「跨太平洋經濟戰略夥伴關係」(TPP)。這表明美國並沒有改變其過去主張「APEC地區的經濟健康對美國的持續繁榮至關重要」的立場,只是TPP更加突出美國的領導地位。

 其二,這次美國亞洲政策調整是在世界經濟下滑、西方經濟前景不明、印度和中國等新興經濟體發展更快的背景下產生的。一方面,全球化與多極化仍是世界主流趨勢,西方仍有主導地位;另一方面,世界經濟有可能出現兩個市場並立的格局。目前發達國家與新興市場國家占世界GDP的對比已經從過去的60:40變化為50:50。

 其三,美國這次亞太政策調整不同於冷戰中後期蘇聯海軍在太平洋遠洋戰鬥力大幅提升,美國亞太軍事利益受威脅後進行的聯華制蘇戰略調整。也不同於冷戰結束初期,美國為實現單級霸權戰略目標,應對所謂「中國威脅」進行的調整。美國這次調整,既要實現縮減陸軍規模,減少在歐洲的軍事存在,強化盟國在亞太地區的軍事存在的「新軍事戰略」,又要繼續承擔維護亞太地區的「安全與繁榮」,統領「亞洲內部權力平衡」的任務。事實上,維持美國的全球領導地位與美國在亞太地區的力不從心之間,呈現尖銳對立。

 其四,受此趨勢影響,美國與中國的關係將越來越具有多重性與複合性。除了眾所周知的雙邊相互依存關係外,美國究竟應該如何正確應對中國發展帶來亞太經濟利益格局出現變化的現實?美國應該怎樣平衡其盟國與東亞競爭對手之間,例如中日之間的關係?包括如何平衡美國在海峽兩岸之間的利益關係等,這些問題對凱瑞任內而言,都是新的挑戰。

 美國亞洲戰略的核心仍然是維護亞太地區的「安全與繁榮」,並非單純「轉向中國」。凱瑞面臨的仍然是如何處理美國亞太戰略調整的緊迫性與美國能力受到限制這一基本矛盾。從美國保持經濟增長勢頭的經濟和政治需求看,美國在東亞地區區域內貿易發展迅速。歐巴馬的亞太戰略在「安全與繁榮」之間進行再平衡時,有可能朝更加重視區域內的貿易與投資,相對降低安全因素考慮的方向發展。

 如此,兩岸周邊安全環境壓力將減少,美國在參與東亞區域經濟合作上,更加需要借助兩岸關係。(作者為上海國際問題研究院研究員)
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