Washington and the al-Nusra Front?

Edited by Laurence Bouvard

 

The official entry of the United States into the conflict with the al-Nusra Front in Syria realizes three main facts on the ground:

1. By considering the al-Nusra Front a terrorist organization, America’s stance is now in total harmony with the official Syrian stance [i.e. of the regime]. It is the same as the stance the U.S. has, for years, taken on Hezbollah, which has brought the country nowhere.

2. It has created a rift in the ranks of the Syrian opposition movements between the friends and enemies of America, both inside and outside the country.

3. Now that the transfer of weapons to the al-Nusra Front and its allies is tantamount to supporting terrorism by America’s understanding of the term, the prospect of the opposition ending the conflict through military force on the battlefronts has been postponed. Hence, the position that Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries take on the U.S. stance is highly important — they are the only ones holding the keys to the operation rooms on the ground that can provide support with money and weapons and guarantee their transfer in an organized and suitable way.

The U.S. stance on the al-Nusra Front comes as a complement to what Senator Kerry began the day before yesterday when he called for a dialog between President Assad’s regime and its figures on the one hand, and the opposition on the other. It is as if it is back to square one on the question of how to deal with this regime and its crimes.

It seems that the history of confrontation between the al-Nusra Front and its sources of support in Iraq on the one hand, and the U.S. forces invading the country on the other, is a component of the United States’ decision to take a strict position on those who employ the principle of armed jihad as a necessity and a legal duty against the tyrant and those who support him. Furthermore, it seems that the U.S. will enter the al-Nusra Front’s political lexicon more as an administration that aids and supports President Bashar al-Assad’s regime of governance than an administration opposed to the organization itself!

This logic could have extremely negative repercussions for attempts to settle the conflict with military force or political negotiations, one of which may eventually put an end to the bloody problems inside Syria. Israel is a major player in this issue. I am convinced that the Israeli military intelligence services’ assessments of the reality inside Syria constitute the deciding factor in directing America’s policy on the country. The view of the Syrian military intelligence, which is highly experienced, on the situation inside the decision-making centers and on the battlefronts in the country seems to stress the following principle: The dangers of Dr. Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the difficulties presented by its survival are much smaller than the dangers presented by the government of hard-line Islamic movements that would follow its fall.

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