US Considered Tortures under Franco a Communist 'Fabrication'

The country that presented itself to the world as the staunchest defender of civil rights painted a generous and accommodating picture of the Franco dictatorship, with which it maintained friendly relations in exchange for military bases.

“It will be easier to make a new agreement [on the bases] with Spain if Franco remains in power. However, the transition is already in process in Spain, and it is likely that he will not be in power for much of the life of the new agreement.”

These words, written by the U.S. ambassador to Spain, Wells Stabler, to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in February 1975, are a faithful reflection of the laidback attitude the U.S. adopted during the years of the Franco dictatorship and the meager intervention of the U.S. during the transition to democracy.

Although several historians have written about Washington’s passive role toward the regime, more than 1.5 million of Kissinger’s declassified cables — compiled by WikiLeaks and accessed by Publico — not only confirm the theory, but also supply details of the “genuine” relationship of “friendship and admiration” between the U.S. and the dictatorship, as expressed in a number of the documents. After 10 years of research, Oxford University Professor Charles Powell concludes in his book “The American Friend” that successive North-American administrations “did little to weaken Franco,” taking a strategic line fixed on maintaining U.S. military bases in the peninsula.

In fact, a mere glance at the diplomatic exchanges between Madrid and Washington from 1973 to 1977 is enough to verify that military and trade agreements, as well as the possibility of Spain joining NATO, defined U.S. policy toward our country. Judging by the scant number of low-priority cables referring to them, repeated episodes of coercion, torture, execution and censorship under Franco’s regime mattered little to the nation that styled itself as the greatest defender of civil rights and freedoms.

An April 1974 exchange gives a good idea of how the U.S. looked the other way for years. In a confidential cable headed “Political Prisoners” and sent from the U.S. Department of State to several embassies around the world, the U.S. informs its diplomats of new legislation. It reads as follows:

“It is the sense of Congress that the president should deny any economic or military assistance to the government of any foreign country which practices the internment or imprisonment of that country’s citizens for political purposes.

“Embassies are requested to provide an assessment of how this legislation could affect assistance programs in their countries …

“If an embassy finds these practices to exist, it is requested to suggest appropriate U.S. action or representation to improve the situation, including comments on appropriateness and probable effect of denying economic and military assistance.”

However, Madrid’s reply to Washington limits itself to a matter-of-fact statement of existing legislation on these issues, neither going into detail of actual cases that could serve as examples nor making any recommendation or comment as to possible measures to be taken into account.

“Spain is signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its fundamental principles and civil liberties are reflected in organic law and the charter (‘Fuero’) of the Spanish people, which have constitutional status. Subsidiary legislation, such as Law of Associations, Press Law and Public Order Law, further affirm freedom of association, expression and assembly as absolute principles, but at the same time contain detailed provisions seriously circumscribing the exercise of these rights. The Penal Code further circumscribes the rights of association, expression and assembly and specifies penalties for infraction. The ‘Fuero’ itself also states conditions on the exercise of fundamental rights,” states the text, which palliates the conduct of the regime further on.

“It should be noted, however, that the government rarely prosecutes for purely private expressions of opinion that contravene laws and in recent years has shown increasing tolerance for strikes, which are a common occurrence …

“In the case of the Press Law, fine has become the most common form of sanction, although the law allows for jail sentences of up to six months for offenders who cannot or will not pay.”

This generous description of the political situation in Spain does not signify that the U.S. was unaware of its true nature. In a confidential cable on the Spanish human rights situation, issued from Madrid in July 1975, Stabler indicates:

“In 1973, for example, there were 2,700 indictments for political offenses. The number of persons serving sentences for politically-related offenses is estimated at about 700, although some sources allege the number may be as high as 2- to 3,000.”

However, in the same cable, the U.S. embassy gives an unmitigatedly accommodating account of other aspects of the dictatorship. For instance, it had this to say on the issue of police torture:

“The use of physical violence by the police and other authorities is prohibited by Spanish law and there are certain legal safeguards against it. Nevertheless, occasional allegations of the use of torture have been made …

“In a recent judicial case … there have been many accusations of torture, which, however, increasingly appear to have been fabrications, perhaps originating in communist propaganda apparatus.”

Asked about the independence of the Spanish judicial system, Stabler replies:

“The judiciary is acknowledged by both government critics and supporters as being the most independent sector of the Spanish administration. Examples of this independence abound. Spanish courts appear also to be showing somewhat greater lenience and flexibility.”

The long list of cables also details a number of concrete cases illustrating that the U.S. was content to remain on the sidelines of the thorny political issues of a dictatorship which, though in its dying throes, provoked strong criticism in neighboring countries such as France or Brussels.

On June 24, 1972, the police had arrested the 10 members considered to be the leadership of the Comisiones Obreras labor union, accused of illicit association and links with the Communist Party. The accused, among them Marcelino Camacho and Nicolas Sartorius, remained in jail for close to a year and a half until the trial, which had to be postponed for several hours, even then, as a result of the assassination of Carrero Blanco on Dec. 20, 1973.

On Dec. 14 of that year, in a cable sent to the secretary of state and other diplomatic headquarters, including Lisbon, Paris, London and Rome, U.S. Ambassador Horacio Rivero relates how two female relatives of the accused in the well-known case of the “Carabanchel Ten” applied to the U.S. embassy for support. The women, who were “briefly” attended by the labor attaché, “wished to merely inform them of facts and elicit sympathy for the human aspects of the case.” The embassy thanked them and responded with the following, according to the cable, “The United States, like other foreign governments, cannot become involved in the internal affairs of other countries.”

The U.S. lobbied other NATO countries for years for Spain to be admitted to the alliance, though Washington knew that the democratic transition was a prerequisite to Spain’s admission. All the same, Franco’s last days coincided with the potential loss of what most interested Washington: The U.S.’ agreement with Spain on military bases expired in December 1975. It was a matter of urgency to renew the agreement as soon as possible, given the several critical voices within the regime and an increasing opposition to American presence in the peninsula.

This interest largely explain why the U.S. played such an inconsequential role at such a crucial moment in history, finding shelter under the protection of a dictator who had given it a window onto the Mediterranean at the height of the Cold War and anti-Communist fever.

“You as a friend should understand that our adversaries can be under no illusions as to the determination of the United States to defend its own interests and to stand by our allies and friends.

“I know I can count on you and the Spanish people to work with my government constructively and cooperatively in the years ahead. I look forward to a continuance of the close, friendly relationship our two countries have enjoyed over the years,” wrote newly-elected President Gerald R. Ford in a secret message to Franco on Aug. 9, 1974.