The US Must Not Be Given Free Rein on North Korea
Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 25 April 2013
by Ding Gang (link to original)
The deteriorating North Korean nuclear quagmire is a clear indication that the U.S. is still orchestrating developments in the security environment of Northeast Asia. The U.S. seizing control over the North Korean issue has subsequently made China and other parts of the region subject to its whims.
A long-standing theory posits that events on the Korean Peninsula to this point have been guided solely by the hand of the U.S. This is true; however, the subtext is that problems must be traced to their source before they can be solved, and the U.S. must make concessions before tensions on the peninsula can be alleviated. Superficially, such a statement is merely a criticism of U.S. hegemony, but in reality, it puts the onus of resolving the issue entirely on the U.S.
And if the U.S. holds the reins on resolving this issue, the greater implication is that the security of Northeast Asia is reliant upon U.S. strategy. As long as the U.S. is unwilling to make concessions, North Korea will remain in a deadlock with the U.S., and while those two countries remain at an impasse, Japan and South Korea have no choice but to rely on the U.S. The North uses its hard-line stance toward the U.S. to manufacture tension and paralyze other nations, while at the same time putting itself in a better position in terms of regional security. Meanwhile, the U.S. uses its equally hard-line stance on the North to consolidate its military presence and standing as a leader in the region. To a certain extent Pyongyang has the ability to de-escalate the situation, but the power really lies in Washington’s hands.
That is perhaps the reason why the U.S. is in no hurry to improve relations with the North. When Washington feels that it should ease tensions, it issues a few placating statements; however, when it feels that a hard-line approach is preferable, it does so with complete abandon. Even if it gets to the point where Washington wishes to improve relations with the North, the U.S. is still able to devise stratagems that will preserve its command over strategy in the region.
In sum, challenges from the North have resulted in more frequent requests for U.S. military aid from its Asian allies and cemented the position of the U.S. as a leader. The longer the North locks horns with the U.S., the more reason the U.S. has to strengthen its military presence in East Asia and the Pacific. The standoff has even encouraged a few countries that have less of a stake in events on the peninsula to use U.S. strength to maintain their desired equilibrium.
Washington's Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy is primarily comprised of three parts: rallying support, setting rules and establishing frameworks. It originally incorporated a key point — that of expending less effort to control China while shifting more of the U.S.' burdens onto its allies. The optimal means of achieving this end is obviously to manufacture tension rather than take up arms itself in direct confrontation. Events on the peninsula and other prominent issues have provided the U.S. with sufficient space and pretext to implement its strategy.
Indeed, these events are solely the product of U.S. action; however, let us shift gears for a moment and consider paths toward de-nuclearization of the peninsula. For example, we could bring the U.S. and the North closer to the negotiating table of six-party talks rather than allowing the U.S. and the North to run rampant. We will most likely be unwilling to shoulder the considerable burden of the peninsula's problems; however, as this concerns the security of a region on China's doorstep, we do temporarily bear this burden from time to time. And the best means to rid ourselves of this burden is through the application of our own strength. Regardless of what steps are taken next on the Korean Peninsula, until we free ourselves from the path that the U.S. has chosen, we will remain under the yoke of U.S. leadership.
The author is a senior editor for People's Daily.
A long-standing theory posits that events on the Korean Peninsula to this point have been guided solely by the hand of the U.S. This is true; however, the subtext is that problems must be traced to their source before they can be solved, and the U.S. must make concessions before tensions on the peninsula can be alleviated. Superficially, such a statement is merely a criticism of U.S. hegemony, but in reality, it puts the onus of resolving the issue entirely on the U.S.
And if the U.S. holds the reins on resolving this issue, the greater implication is that the security of Northeast Asia is reliant upon U.S. strategy. As long as the U.S. is unwilling to make concessions, North Korea will remain in a deadlock with the U.S., and while those two countries remain at an impasse, Japan and South Korea have no choice but to rely on the U.S. The North uses its hard-line stance toward the U.S. to manufacture tension and paralyze other nations, while at the same time putting itself in a better position in terms of regional security. Meanwhile, the U.S. uses its equally hard-line stance on the North to consolidate its military presence and standing as a leader in the region. To a certain extent Pyongyang has the ability to de-escalate the situation, but the power really lies in Washington’s hands.
That is perhaps the reason why the U.S. is in no hurry to improve relations with the North. When Washington feels that it should ease tensions, it issues a few placating statements; however, when it feels that a hard-line approach is preferable, it does so with complete abandon. Even if it gets to the point where Washington wishes to improve relations with the North, the U.S. is still able to devise stratagems that will preserve its command over strategy in the region.
In sum, challenges from the North have resulted in more frequent requests for U.S. military aid from its Asian allies and cemented the position of the U.S. as a leader. The longer the North locks horns with the U.S., the more reason the U.S. has to strengthen its military presence in East Asia and the Pacific. The standoff has even encouraged a few countries that have less of a stake in events on the peninsula to use U.S. strength to maintain their desired equilibrium.
Washington's Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy is primarily comprised of three parts: rallying support, setting rules and establishing frameworks. It originally incorporated a key point — that of expending less effort to control China while shifting more of the U.S.' burdens onto its allies. The optimal means of achieving this end is obviously to manufacture tension rather than take up arms itself in direct confrontation. Events on the peninsula and other prominent issues have provided the U.S. with sufficient space and pretext to implement its strategy.
Indeed, these events are solely the product of U.S. action; however, let us shift gears for a moment and consider paths toward de-nuclearization of the peninsula. For example, we could bring the U.S. and the North closer to the negotiating table of six-party talks rather than allowing the U.S. and the North to run rampant. We will most likely be unwilling to shoulder the considerable burden of the peninsula's problems; however, as this concerns the security of a region on China's doorstep, we do temporarily bear this burden from time to time. And the best means to rid ourselves of this burden is through the application of our own strength. Regardless of what steps are taken next on the Korean Peninsula, until we free ourselves from the path that the U.S. has chosen, we will remain under the yoke of U.S. leadership.
The author is a senior editor for People's Daily.