Pivot to Asia: Here’s Obama’s Agenda for the Far East

What is the “pivot to Asia”?

A recent report published by the Chinese government about its country’s security policy reveals how worried Beijing is about the strategic repositioning of the U.S. in the region.

China accuses the U.S. of contributing to the destabilization of the region with its increased military presence. Washington, in response, confirms that its initiatives are the fruit of a “natural reallocation of resources” and that, in a certain way, they are aimed at China.

This discussion is part of the wider debate regarding the strategic policy of the Obama administration, called “pivot to Asia,” that consists of a progressive but constant redistribution of U.S. attention and presence from the Middle East to Asia.

But what does this “new” strategy actually entail? What is changing in the rapport between the two shores of the Pacific that has motivated the U.S. to change its approach?

Strong relations between Washington and Asia are nothing new. Both economic and business relationships, particularly between the U.S. and China, have grown exponentially over the past two decades. The phrase “pivot to Asia” is, therefore, nothing other than an attempt to define a phenomenon that has come into being over time. The day after his election, Obama needed to break with the past and move beyond the geopolitical policy of the Bush era, which was predominantly focused on the Middle East and the war against al-Qaida and which, consequentially, left little attention for the rest of world, Asia included. The “pivot to Asia” is the response to this need.

Up until now, however, the most relevant initiatives have not been military; rather, they have been economic. In this sense, the negotiations concerning the strengthening of the Trans-Pacific Partnership could be the first thing that is really new. They concern a free trade agreement, which Washington really wants, that includes a large number of the regional players. To show just how strategically important the U.S. believes this project to be, one of the objectives of Secretary of State John Kerry is to conclude the negotiations concerning bilateral relations.

It is likely that Washington will continue to strengthen its strategic partnerships with its historical allies — like Taiwan and Australia — and more recent ones — among others, Vietnam and Indonesia. By improving these relationships, the U.S. gains innumerable opportunities in exchange for its military protection.

It is therefore clear that China perceives these initiatives as attempts at limiting or at least disturbing its ability to maneuver in the region and its relationships with its neighbors.

Undoubtedly, the assertive and unpredictable behavior of China in the region is a primary factor for the renewed strategic interest of the U.S., which is today the only economic and military power that has the strength to combat future threats from Beijing. For this reason, the majority of the neighboring countries put pressure on Washington to keep its commitments and presence in the area.

Nevertheless, to think that the U.S. “pivot to Asia” policy is only about controlling China would be overly simplistic and would keep us from fully understanding the reasoning. The Far East covers a region that is vast, filled with people with many different cultural identities, and that already presents political and social challenges for Washington, beyond those presented by Beijing. Of primary importance are issues such as the proliferation of nuclear arms in the Korean Peninsula and the delicate equilibrium of forces jousting for control of the trade routes in the South China Sea because they concern the economic and strategic interests of the U.S. The “pivot to Asia” is the most recent and pronounced attempt to respond to these issues, and it is a clear sign that the U.S. has once again become a major player in the Eastern chess match.