Snowdengate: Hong Kong’s Precedence of Refusing America’s Extradition Requests

Published in Ming Pao
(Hong Kong) on 17 June 2013
by Simon Shen (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Winnie Yeung. Edited by Mary Young.
Ex-CIA agent Snowden’s stay in Hong Kong is stimulating different guesses as to the end of his story. If the American government officially pursues extradition, matters will become more complicated because of various legal and diplomatic issues. Some critics believe that, according to the United States-Hong Kong Extradition Treaty, Snowden, who used his computer illegally, should be extradited to the United States. But others reckon that the Hong Kong government should reject the demand from the United States on the basis of sensitive political issues and social benefits involved in the incident. Still others believe that Beijing should interfere in the affair as soon as possible, since this incident involves matters of diplomacy. But whatever we would like to conjecture, we should first study an inconspicuous case from five years ago, when the United States demanded that the Hong Kong government extradite an Iranian, Yousef Boushvash — a request that ended in vain.

An “Individual Case” of Iranians Entering Hong Kong

After 9/11, the United States established the Department of Homeland Security council to prevent weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists. This aim became one of most important anti-terrorist strategies of the United States government. The extent of their concerns rapidly spread to other states that the United States had identified as high-risk states, for example, Iran. The Department of Homeland Security often made requests to different states to extradite Iranians, claiming that these people were Iranian spies who helped transport weapons to the Iranian government or other terrorist organizations that the United States was targeting. Hong Kong has an extradition agreement with the United States. At the same time, because Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China, it maintains good relations with Iran on the surface; however, there are plentiful stories of the hassles endured by Iranians arriving or leaving Hong Kong. For example, an Iranian scholar came to Hong Kong to attend an academic conference but was detained at the airport when he was leaving until some upper-level officials clarified the “misunderstandings.”

On October 29, 2007, according to the information provided by the United States and the provisional order of arrest, an Iranian, Yousef Boushvash, was arrested in Hong Kong. One month later, the United States officially demanded his extradition because he was an Iranian spy. Between 2004 and 2007, he was alleged to have trafficked in weapons from the United States through Dubai and Bangkok, including the parts of F-14 warplanes, violating the Arms Export Control Act of the U.S. government. In addition, he was alleged to have committed crimes such as money laundering and mail fraud, crimes typically committed by spies.

Hong Kong is Used as Beijing’s ‘White Gloves’ for International Relations

Hong Kong originally was going to respond to the American government’s demands by scheduling an extradition hearing according to the legal procedures. The hearing, originally scheduled for April 14, 2008, was interrupted by the unconditional release of the Iranian on April 11, 2008, and the Hong Kong government only informed the United States government one day before the announcement. The person disappeared after his release, which means that Hong Kong did not even use its legal procedures at all. According to diplomatic sources, the Iranian government was directly communicating with Beijing, on the one hand proving that this person belonged to the Iranian government, on the other hand arguing that the United States government was setting a trap for him. Finally, Beijing signaled to the Hong Kong government that this case was of diplomatic importance, which exceeded the capacity of Hong Kong’s government. Therefore, they suggested to the Hong Kong government that it release him so that he could leave Hong Kong instead of being detained by the labyrinth of legal procedures.

What’s worth noticing is that the aforementioned explanation was never confirmed: The Beijing government has never made any open comments about the case. According to the United States-Hong Kong Extradition Treaty, Beijing will handle incidents that involve diplomatic affairs with a national defense interest, whereas in areas that do not involve national importance, neither the American nor Hong Kong government has to extradite political criminals or those involving significant public interests. But the term “political criminals” is far too vague; hence each case needs to be examined accordingly by the courts. In other words, there are three ways that Beijing influences the results of the extradition: first, via a public announcement claiming that the case is of national defense matters and hence will be handled by the government; secondly, by providing legal references to Hong Kong courts on the verdict of “political criminals”; and, lastly, by suggesting to Hong Kong that it let the parties leave Hong Kong voluntarily or even to expel him from Hong Kong. On any public occasion, the sentence, “I cannot comment on individual cases,” suffices to explain everything.

Britain Refused to Extradite Ex-Iranian Ambassador to the United States

In reality, in terms of the Iranian question, there exist quite a number of nations and areas who refuse extradition despite pre-existing extradition agreements with the United States. Also in 2008, a high-ranking Iranian air force officer was arrested in Thailand by request of the United States; his charges were also smuggling arms and weapons. Later, the Iranian government communicated with the Thai government, pointing out that this person would be severely tortured once he was extradited to the United States. In the end, preferring three-party cooperation, the Thai court quickly rejected the extradition.

The more famous incident is the case of Nosratollah Tajik, the ex-Iranian ambassador in Jordan. He was accused by the United States of weapons trading, which led to his arrest in Britain. The courts in London spent a long time handling this case and eventually refused the American government’s request. Because of the individual’s high rank, the case dragged on, troubling the courts for six long years, during which he was kept under house arrest. He was only permitted to return to Iran in December 2012. The United States is capable of negotiating with other nations on a diplomatic level — practically speaking, it cannot do anything more — but it is ultimately up to each government to decide for itself. That ex-ambassador was sent back to his home country, and the released Iranian in Hong Kong has been missing in action ever since. So how will these cases shed light on our “Snowdengate” incident?


美國前中情局特工斯諾登滯留香港,引起不同結局的聯想,一旦華府正式提出引渡,捲入法律、外交等爭議,一切只會更複雜。有評論相信,根據《港美引渡協議》,明顯非法使用電腦的斯諾登理應被引渡回國;有相信港府應研判此案涉及政治層面及社會利益,拒絕美國要求;亦有認為北京應以事涉外交為由,早日介入。但無論我們有何猜想,都應先研究五年前一個不受注意的案例:美國要求港府引渡伊朗人Yousef Boushvash,最終如何失敗。

伊朗人出入香港的「個別例子」

9/11事件後,美國成立國土安全部,防止軍火流向恐怖份子,成了美國重要反恐舉措,而打擊面亦迅速擴展到其他華府鎖定的國家,例如伊朗。國土安全部不時對各國提出引渡伊朗人的要求,指他們是伊朗政府的特工,負責偷運武器予伊朗政府,或美國眼中的其他恐怖組織。與美國簽有引渡協議的香港,雖然因為是中國特區,與伊朗表面上關係良好,但伊朗人出入境時頗費周章的故事時有所聞。例如曾有伊朗學者來港出席學術會議,出境時被機場扣留,要勞動相當高的層級才能放人,釐清「誤會」。

2007年10月29日,根據美國提供的情報和臨時拘捕令,伊朗人Yousef Boushvash在香港被捕。一個月後,美國正式提出引渡要求,指這人是伊朗特工,在2004年到2007年間,不但從美國經杜拜、曼谷等地偷運武器到伊朗,包括F-14戰機零件,違反美國的《武器出口管制法》(Arms Export ControlAct),而且犯有洗黑錢、郵件詐騙等特工常犯罪行。

香港涉外關係作為北京「白手套」

香港政府原來也打算回應美國要求,原已排期進行引渡聽證的法定程序,原訂在2008年4月14日舉行引渡聽證,卻忽然在2008年4月11日決定把這名伊朗人無條件釋放,只在前一天知會美國取消引渡。此人獲釋後不知所蹤,也就是說,香港連法定程序也不用啓動。根據外交管道透出的訊息,伊朗政府直接和北京交涉,一方面證明此人是伊朗政府的人,另一方面說他被美國設局陷害,結果北京向香港特區政府指示,此案涉及外交層面,超出香港涉外關係所能處理,建議把他釋放、讓他離港,免得被法定程序拖下去。

值得注意的是,管道歸管道,北京從沒有對此公開評論。由於《港美引渡協議》列明,在國家層面,涉及國防外交須北京處理;在不涉國家層面,港美雙方亦無須引渡政治犯、或涉及重大公眾利益者,但又不可能詳細列名何謂「政治犯」,因此相關定義,只能交由法定程序逐案審理。換句話說,北京影響引渡結果的方式有三類:公開宣示涉及國防外交,由中央處理;提供參考影響香港法院對「政治犯」的研判;或建議港方讓當事人自願離港、甚或將其驅逐離港。反正在公開場合,一句「I cannot comment on individual cases」,足以解釋一切。

英國拒絕美國引渡前伊朗大使

事實上,在伊朗問題上,和美國簽有協議而拒絕引渡的其他國家地區,並不在少數。同樣在2008年,一名伊朗高級空軍軍官在美國要求下被泰國拘捕,罪名也是偷運軍火。後來伊朗政府向曼谷交涉,提出此人被引渡到美國會被酷刑拷問伊朗軍事機密,結果相對三權合作的泰國法庭迅速判決,否決引渡。

更著名的案例是前伊朗駐約旦大使Nosratollah Tajik被美國當作軍火商,結果令他在英國被捕。倫敦法院用了長時間審理此案,最終也拒絕美國的引渡要求,由於此人層級甚高,案件膠著六年,困擾了法院六年,他也被軟禁六年,直到2012年12月才獲准回到伊朗。美國除了能夠在外交層面與相關國家討價還價,基本上無計可施,那位前大使固然被放回國,那位被香港釋放的伊朗人,更是人間蒸發至今。那麼這些案例,對「斯諾登門」又有甚麼啓示?

沈旭暉 明報 2013年6月15日
This post appeared on the front page as a direct link to the original article with the above link .

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