Edited by Kathleen Weinberger
Kerry, Show Us a Plan
Published in Walla
(Israel) on 5 July 2013
by Danny Ayalon (link to original)
On the eve of the visit that will determine the outcome of the negotiations, Danny Ayalon suggests that the U.S. secretary of state stops dealing in trivialities such as gestures and moves straight to the point: the core issues. Only this way will we find out who the real insubordinate is.
Nine U.S. presidents and 11 secretaries of state have attempted to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 1967. John Kerry is the 12th secretary of state, and it is not yet clear whether he will be able to recreate the successes of Henry Kissinger or Bill Clinton, or whether he will fail like William Rogers, Warren Christopher, Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell and others did. Kerry’s seriousness and determination are not in doubt, but it is still too early to say whether he possesses any of Kissinger’s sophistication and persuasive power.
After the first round of visits in Jerusalem and Ramallah, Kerry appears to be failing, at least so far, to motivate the sides into coming to the negotiation table. This failure is a result of drowning in the minute details of preparation for the negotiations, instead of focusing his efforts on breakthroughs on core issues. The procrastination and occupation with issues such as numbers of prisoners to be released, declarations on construction in the territories, references to Area C and other such topics will exhaust the secretary of state and result in the failure of his mission.
The Man Who Knows All the Tricks
It’s safe to say that Kerry and the experienced Department of State staff understand that the stubbornness of both sides on petty topics is part of the negotiation tactics and improving one’s position. But over-insisting on these topics indicates insubordination. Kerry’s wariness of either side’s manipulative power can be seen via his decision to bring along the senior legal adviser to the Department of State, Jonathan Schwartz. Schwartz has accompanied the procedure since the Oslo Accords, and he’s very familiar with the various tricks and arguments. He is the person who will be able to distinguish between a legitimate arising problem and a futile claim aiming to obstruct.
The discussions are currently continuing behind closed doors in order to prepare for Kerry’s next visit, likely to happen as early as next week, which will determine the outcome of the negotiations. A possible way for Kerry to break through this deadlock is by skipping the minor details and presenting a fundamental proposal to both sides, thereby returning the initiative and control into his hands rather than being dragged along by either side.
A possible proposal would be for the Palestinians to recognize Israel as the national state of the Jewish people in return for an Israeli agreement on finite borders recognizable by the sovereign independent state of Palestine. Another option would be to lay down an American plan on the table, marking a long-term interim arrangement that would include security arrangements and temporary Palestinian borders only.
Only a positive reaction from both sides to one of these proposals will justify the American efforts to promote the start of the negotiations and enable progress. The obstruction of any of these efforts by either side will reveal the true insubordinate and save a large amount of futile endeavors.
Nine U.S. presidents and 11 secretaries of state have attempted to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 1967. John Kerry is the 12th secretary of state, and it is not yet clear whether he will be able to recreate the successes of Henry Kissinger or Bill Clinton, or whether he will fail like William Rogers, Warren Christopher, Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell and others did. Kerry’s seriousness and determination are not in doubt, but it is still too early to say whether he possesses any of Kissinger’s sophistication and persuasive power.
After the first round of visits in Jerusalem and Ramallah, Kerry appears to be failing, at least so far, to motivate the sides into coming to the negotiation table. This failure is a result of drowning in the minute details of preparation for the negotiations, instead of focusing his efforts on breakthroughs on core issues. The procrastination and occupation with issues such as numbers of prisoners to be released, declarations on construction in the territories, references to Area C and other such topics will exhaust the secretary of state and result in the failure of his mission.
The Man Who Knows All the Tricks
It’s safe to say that Kerry and the experienced Department of State staff understand that the stubbornness of both sides on petty topics is part of the negotiation tactics and improving one’s position. But over-insisting on these topics indicates insubordination. Kerry’s wariness of either side’s manipulative power can be seen via his decision to bring along the senior legal adviser to the Department of State, Jonathan Schwartz. Schwartz has accompanied the procedure since the Oslo Accords, and he’s very familiar with the various tricks and arguments. He is the person who will be able to distinguish between a legitimate arising problem and a futile claim aiming to obstruct.
The discussions are currently continuing behind closed doors in order to prepare for Kerry’s next visit, likely to happen as early as next week, which will determine the outcome of the negotiations. A possible way for Kerry to break through this deadlock is by skipping the minor details and presenting a fundamental proposal to both sides, thereby returning the initiative and control into his hands rather than being dragged along by either side.
A possible proposal would be for the Palestinians to recognize Israel as the national state of the Jewish people in return for an Israeli agreement on finite borders recognizable by the sovereign independent state of Palestine. Another option would be to lay down an American plan on the table, marking a long-term interim arrangement that would include security arrangements and temporary Palestinian borders only.
Only a positive reaction from both sides to one of these proposals will justify the American efforts to promote the start of the negotiations and enable progress. The obstruction of any of these efforts by either side will reveal the true insubordinate and save a large amount of futile endeavors.