US Blocked in the Face of the Egyptian Crisis

President Obama’s impotency facing his Egyptian partners appears to be a central element that could be a manifestation of a significant turn.

As is well-known, the events in Egypt have considerable importance. In a region that could collapse into chaos because of the monstrous civil war in Syria, the return of the bloody attacks in Iraq and the threats to the Libyan and Tunisian revolutions, not to mention the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, on whose outcome nobody dares to predict a result, the gravity of the events in Egypt has many repercussions. Egypt’s future is at risk; it must choose between a return to dictatorship or, despite everything, including the blood bath, the establishment of a new democratic transition. Egypt’s future is also critical for the United States, whose strategic allies in the area not only include Saudi Arabia, but also Egypt. Europe also has stake in Egypt’s outcome, although to a lesser extent. Moreover, Egypt will influence the Arab revolutions and the development of political Islam.

We must consider in this uncertain stage of events the role and position of the United States. President Obama’s impotence in the face of his Egyptian partners, in addition to a few generals traditionally submissive to Washington, appears as a central element that could be a manifestation of a significant turn of events. It is certain that all of this has taken Obama off balance. His speech in Cairo, the first major foreign policy speech of his first term, held a solemn message to the Arab world. It was interpreted at that time as a precursor to the Arab Spring. Didn’t Barack Obama invite the towns of the region to gain freedom? This speech marked, in effect, a strategic shift and the beginning of a de facto alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. The latter were considered to be the only force capable of taking over, but, above all, in the United States they were considered the best bulwark against al-Qaida. For Washington, a society dominated by the Brotherhood, they couldn’t let themselves be tempted by the extremist sirens, especially those of al-Qaida, one of whose principal leaders is Egyptian.

The problem is that the Muslim Brotherhood has conducted themselves independently of democrats. All of their adversaries, especially in Egypt, among them their favorite target, the Copts, have come out denouncing the underhanded coup by President Morsi and his supporters, who were given control by voters. This explains why a significant proportion of Egypt has accepted, at least for the moment, the intervention of armed forces.

The situation is particularly complex. Barack Obama is poised to impose sanctions on the armored vehicles that fire onto the crowds and the extremism of the military. But, these sanctions cannot go very far because the United States’ strategic interests in Egypt are monetary. The United States subsidizes the armed forces, and they, in turn, guarantee them free and permanent access not only to Egyptian air space but also the Suez Canal. Mutatis mutandis: For the United States it is unthinkable to separate themselves from Egypt in the long term, as it is for Putin and Russia to break with their only strategic support in the region, Bashar Assad. Therefore, it is not prudent for the U.S. to abandon the Egyptian generals.

The solution, in the terms enunciated by European leaders, happens when you help the moderates on both sides, at a time when both the military and the Muslim Brotherhood are dominated by extremists. In greater or lesser measure, the military will have to accept the re-establishment of a democratic process. Additionally, it must be considered that even before these events the Muslim Brotherhood appears to have lost a lot of ground among Egyptian public opinion.

The current U.S. embargo in the region is, without a doubt, one of the phases of a progressive withdrawal linked to the retaking of their powerful independence, in addition to a new direction of diplomacy baptized by Barack Obama, “leadership from behind,” which, in fact, is a reflection of his reorientation toward confrontation with China. This situation makes the problem with the European Union’s presence increasingly clear, [an EU] that, lest we forget, together with Israel, is interested in the stability of the Mediterranean. If “nature abhors a vacuum,” one wonders what the European leaders are expected to do to fill it. For the old continent, it is a long-term strategic question that becomes ever more necessary to address and, yet at the same time, still seems as difficult to answer.