War on Terror: The War that Is Impossible To Win

The war on terror was declared by the United States after the Sept. 11 attacks. A few weeks later, the Americans overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which for several years had been a safe haven for terrorists and extremists, including al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden.

The next decade brought the occupation of Afghanistan — a costly and ineffectual attempt to install the puppet government of Hamid Karzai — and then participation in the civil war in which the U.S. “ally,” Pakistan, turns out to have had a hand. In the meantime, there is Iraq and the war to eliminate Saddam Hussein’s alleged weapons of mass destruction (the same Saddam Hussein that the Americans and the West wholeheartedly supported during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s). Soon, the big lie upon which the whole Iraq War narrative is based came to light. Its only results are additional costs and hundreds of thousands of mostly civilian deaths.

Methods of Fighting against Terrorism

The terrorists have proved to be smarter than all the armies, special forces and private military companies that chase after them. Every time, they are one step ahead. In places where statehood is poor or nonexistent, the terrorists feel like fish in the water. They are able to adapt to the local environment and gain support of the local population (or force it). The range of their activity has significantly increased — from Kashmir to the Atlantic edge of the Sahel, with particular fondness for Somalia, Yemen and the “Bermuda Triangle” between Algeria, Mali and Niger. Islamist militants managed to take control of significant tracts of Somalia and northern Mali and withdrew only under pressure from superior African and French military forces. At all times, they are being “hunted” by U.S. drones, the unmanned aircraft killers.

The drone program, aimed at eliminating potential terrorists, has been considerably expanded by the Obama administration. It was chosen as the principal method of dealing with extremists in Pakistan. The campaign reached its apogee in 2010 to 2011, when almost 200 air raids killed about 2,000 people. Most of them were civilians. Of course, many Taliban leaders, terrorists from al-Qaida and other dangerous individuals were eliminated too, but — as the proponents of drone strikes tend to forget — for every terrorist killed, there are dozens of replacements. One cannot slay them all. And what is more and equally obvious is that civilian casualties are inevitable. As in the case of “intelligent” missiles and bombs that hit the target accurately — mistakes happen. A lot of mistakes.

Using drones for targeted killing of terrorists is a topic for a separate discussion. From the moral and legal points of view, it is a very questionable practice. These actions lack the supervision of an independent court, and if there is any control, it is not apparent. Any person may become a target; no one will ask questions. Additionally, the effects of the drone strikes are highly debatable. They have not contributed to defeating or weakening the terrorist groups or networks. Yemen, the primary destination for U.S. drone strikes since 2012, has experienced an “impressive” number of raids this year. Yet the country unceasingly remains the safest haven for terrorists, especially for the al-Qaida militants of the Arabian Peninsula branch. Will we live to see the invasion and occupation of Yemen? The air strikes are not enough.

Evolution of Terrorism

In April of this year, only 37 percent of Americans thought that their country was winning the war against terrorism. This is 18 percentage points lower than two years ago, when Osama bin Laden’s death was announced. I was writing then (along with Michał Hola, an expert on security and terrorism) that the terrorist threat would not subside after the elimination of al-Qaida’s leader, that it would only evolve in different directions. Recently, we have observed the closure of the U.S. embassies in Arab countries and the growing concerns about new terrorists’ methods of hiding explosive devices (implants placed in a suicide bomber’s body in such a way that the present-day sensors cannot detect them). The still growing importance of the so-called lone wolves is worth noting, too.

The last couple of years have brought the development of what I call the tourist jihad. This is not a new phenomenon — in the ’80s, large numbers of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan came from abroad — but now it is happening on an unprecedented scale. Foreigners are (or were) a major force in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Somalia, Yemen and Mali. Among them, there are more and more Europeans and Americans, converts to Islam or descendants of Muslim immigrants, who were not necessarily deeply religious themselves. They can easily return home, where they will pose a huge threat.

Incomprehensive Strategy

The problem with terrorism is that it is a tool of political struggle. Although the objectives of the most dangerous extremists seem unrealistic (to create a pan-Arab or pan-Islamic caliphate, to eliminate non-Muslims, etc.), they do remain political goals. Moreover, some of them (like getting rid of the U.S. troops in the territories of Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, the theme of dishonoring the holy land of Mecca and Medina or drawing attention to the plight of the Palestinians and demanding a solution to their problem with Israel) are much closer to reality.

Ireland has taught us that bombs, guns, secret service operations and occupation do not solve the problems. In Ireland, the solution was dialogue. Wait, someone will say. How can you talk to terrorists? Well, it depends. Yasser Arafat was the head of an organization responsible for killing Israelis. However, this did not prevent Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin from reaching an agreement with him. In the case of bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, this is definitely not an option. Yet, there are political and social solutions that are feasible and provide an infallible method of halting the expansion of Islamic radicalism. Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia and Mali have become extremists’ havens because their state institutions were weak or nonexistent. The living conditions of the local people were very poor. There was poverty, illiteracy, an overwhelming sense of injustice and a lack of prospects. In other words, the seed fell on fertile ground. Unsolved problems can lead to the radicalization of people and this in turn stimulates the development of terrorist groups. The only answers are to strengthen the state; improve the fate of people and provide them with access to education, health care and jobs.

Therefore, the war on terror is absurd. The expression itself is ridiculous, fundamentally wrong and contains a promise that cannot be fulfilled. You cannot win the war on terror. The question is not that terror is an impersonal opponent (although this is roughly so). Terrorism is a weapon of war to which all those who feel in any way wronged will resort — or those who believe that they represent or act on behalf of the aforementioned. Even if the harm is mostly imaginary, it is difficult to burn it with fire. In the words of the 26th president of the United States, Teddy Roosevelt, “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” When you forget about one element of this strategy you fail to achieve the intended results. In the case of terrorism, it is only the stick that is being applied, and the gentle, soft speech and actions have been heavily neglected.

I do not have ready, good answers to many of the questions that this text may provoke. When I was writing it, I asked myself these questions many times. I know, however, that the current tactics — like in the case of the war on drugs — are counterproductive and cannot bring about the desired results. Rather, they are expensive and create new problems and threats. It is something worth talking about, and the above article is my voice in this debate, even though supporters of the current strategy dominate the debate.