America: The Hesitant Enforcer

The Syrian situation shows that America’s foreign policy is becoming unpredictable. The nation still sees itself as the enforcer of global order, but it is no longer capable of fulfilling that role by itself.

The decision has been postponed. After a period of hesitation, the United States won’t attack Syria in response to Syria’s use of chemical weapons. Many commentators decry America’s indecision. Some even see it as the beginning of the end of America as a global power as it has been ever since the end of World War II. But that view is a bit over the top.

The situation in Syria shows that the U.S. still sees itself as the guarantor of an international system of norms that it principally helped create. Were that not so, Obama wouldn’t have drawn his “red line” in August 2012.

The role of global policeman is consistent with the deeply rooted idea of the United States as being the “indispensable country.” In Obama’s television speech, he reiterated and emphasized American exceptionalism. The role of global cop also emphasizes American security policy interests. America, with its vastly superior arsenal of conventional weapons, is keenly interested in strengthening global norms forbidding the use and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction designed to intimidate militarily superior nations.

Despite that, the United States is currently acting half-heartedly due to various pressures. Until it gets back on an even keel, America’s allies and adversaries alike are confronted with an unpredictable U.S. foreign policy. Enemies might possibly try to exploit that situation.

There are good reasons for America’s hesitancy to engage Syria militarily. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States learned the painful lesson of how limited the possibilities are with a military intervention and what the ramifications might be. After that sobering lesson, the U.S. public, as well as its elected officials, are tired of war — not only because it carries a high cost to human life, but a high cost to the taxpayer as well.

Because of the sequester, the military will also be impacted: Over the next decade, the Pentagon will cut its planned budget by $500 billion and will have to reduce its activities accordingly. Additionally, the planned ramp-up of military operations in the Pacific Ocean area will not permit any intensive military engagement in Syria, nor in any other Near or Middle East region.

As early as the 2011 Libyan intervention, the U.S. would have preferred less of a role in the NATO operation. Only when it became apparent that the British and French were in over their heads did the U.S. decide to step up their help.

In principle, this development should be a welcome one. At first glance, it appears to give more time for diplomatic solutions such as are currently underway with Damascus. But even setting the Syrian case with its attendant difficulties aside, it will be difficult to implement the proposals. Such optimism should be welcomed with great caution.

The rulers in Iran, North Korea and elsewhere have carefully observed and analyzed the care with which the U.S. maneuvered this course. They might come to the conclusion that their own interests are more likely to be met in view of the American reluctance to get militarily involved. But then they run the risk of backing the wrong horse.

The American determination to continue being the supreme global power should not be underestimated. It could turn out to be the motivating force for Washington to engage militarily not only in Syria but elsewhere in order to demonstrate its power. That such behavior in most cases eventually proves counterproductive is another matter entirely.

One solution for the United States may be the forging of alliances with strong international powers to set clear rules for unacceptable violations of global norms and credibly enforce them. But it’s questionable whether a hasty and uncoordinated diplomatic effort such as in Syria’s case would work. Such a division of responsibility would also have to be codified within a coherent strategy. And last but not least, it would also require the willingness to accept perhaps unpopular compromises, such as with Russia on the question of missile defense systems or with China with regard to a new balance of power in the Pacific.