US and Syria: Where Is the Problem?

It has been a few days that the Obama administration is handling a string of press conferences related to possible, imminent military attacks on Bashar al-Assad’s Syria. The more time passes, the more questions arise on the type and steps of intervention. There is opposition to the American version of the targeted bombing — probably directed at annihilating every “heavy” offensive capacity — in particular, the almost certain Russian veto within the United Nations Security Council and the threat from Iran to spread the internal Syrian conflict to neighboring areas and states. Furthermore, the European Union looks more confused than ever, with individual nations not siding with anyone and having no clear intentions.

Among all this, it would seem strange that finally Italy — Italian foreign policy has remained blurry and obscure for more than two years — by way of Minister Bonino, has launched a clear signal of “intervention, conditioned on a United Nations deliberation.” This is the correct solution! Overall, the international picture looks awkward, uncomfortable, troubled and perplexed about the armed intervention. The reason why is in the strong support that the United States, along with Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have and continue to give to the Syrian opposition forces — the Syrian National Council, based in Turkey.

In fact, among these, we cannot ignore the existence of more than 16,000 Salafi jihadis of Libyan, Tunisian and Egyptian provenance. Moreover, the primary beneficiaries of a missed U.S. operation would be the jihadis — who have been able to show their “animal ferocity” and absolute lack of human respect up to now, hiding behind the nonintervention of Western forces — as in Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan, where they were driven to act on their “faith” alone — the only resort for restoring Islam to the whole region. Alas, it becomes more and more obvious that Syrian civil society — or what remains of it — must square with these fanatics, who affirm their will for the imposition of a new Islamist regime with persistent and increasing insistence.

However, it is equally clear that U.S. interventionist policy (Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya) or the alternative of “leading from behind,” implemented in the entire Mediterranean area, has piddled. Without going into a strategic analysis of its relationship with regional powers — such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Qatar — with the reflexes of the European Union and first in line, Italy has had to sustain the increased flow of refugees. It suffices to observe it in action in Egypt and Tunisia to understand the failure of U.S. security policy in the area. Once again, as always in the past, the U.S. is proposing “change” under the banner of democracy and freedom, without truly understanding who is interpreting the message, or better yet, without keeping in mind the cultural heritage and ways of life, if not the legal-institutional systems of those countries subject to intervention, which completely differ from Western cultures, especially the United States.

In particular, for the entire geostrategic “Arab” region, Egypt and Tunisia, but also Turkey in many other ways, are fully demonstrating that cultural heritage is an essential element to engage for any form of change. And so, how must we operate in Syria? Beyond the already complex presence of the jihadis, the scenario presents other complications. First and foremost, clashes between the different sides have spread across the entire national territory; on both sides, there is the threat of extending them into Jordan — Saudi Arabia’s close ally and the land with the greatest number of Salafi Syrians — and Lebanon, which Assad has kept his eye on as part of the fulfillment of Greater Syria.

It is therefore difficult to hypothesize a “peacemaker’s” intervention with a multinational contingency of “peace,” without a certain “agreement” between government forces and the opposition. Furthermore, this seems to be the most acceptable political-diplomatic solution, with the understanding that the U.N. will have to authorize an eventual intervention. Therefore, it will have to foresee the participation of the Russians and even Iran besides that of the Western forces. In fact, we cannot exclude the participation of the armed forces of Muslim countries from the peace contingency. In fact, from an ideological point of view, the civil war in Syria appears more and more like a religious war — a fact of Islam.

Consequently, even if it is not possible today to hypothesize a peaceful resolution to the conflict and leaving the contradictions to the sole Islamic factions that face them, if nothing else, then consider the Sunni-Shiite front and its constituents — the Arab League and Iran — for strong representation in the peace process. However, an even more binding condition — making the “external” forces of the civil war actually disappear — precedes the hypothesized U.N. intervention. In other words, subject to an agreement by both parties — Assad and the Syrian National Council — both the Salafi jihadis and Hezbollah must clear out the area and return to their countries of origin as soon as possible. This could be Italy’s position — if not Europe’s — to propose this first to NATO and therefore the United Nations.

Even in this case, we must still think about how to send the extreme Islamists back to their countries of origin. For Hezbollah, I do not think they will experience problems, given the powerful Iranian hand that has always governed them. For the Salafis, I believe their re-entry into the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood or Lebanese and Tunisian Salafi environment will cause some problems straight away, given that both Egypt and Tunisia have intentions to declare their counterparts “illegal” and “terrorist forces” linked to al-Qaida! This is a wonderful future problem even for Europe.