A Sinking Empire Called America

Economists use the concept of “delayed recognition” to indicate the gap between the time when a change in the economic system occurs and the ability of consumers and companies to feel its impact. This concept is also relevant to international relations. Sometimes a long-term historical perspective is required to understand that the balance of global power has changed and that yesterday’s superpower has a more modest status today. For example, even though the British Empire failed miserably from an economic standpoint and became a military protectorate of the United States after World War II, commentators and decision-makers continued to treat Britain as a world power. Only after the Suez Crisis in 1956, when the United States forced Britain and France — another sinking empire — to give up their attempts to recover their hegemonic status in Egypt and in the Middle East, did it become clear that London was no longer the capital of an all-powerful empire.

The Syrian crisis of 2013 is also likely to be remembered as a turning point in which it becomes clear that the hegemonic status the United States enjoyed in the world and in the Middle East after the end of the Cold War no longer exists and that the unipolar balance of power has gradually become multipolar. Since the end of World War II, and especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Americans have felt that they can take upon themselves the role of the world’s policeman, and Israelis, who have learned to rely on the fact that America will always protect their ally in the Middle East, are struggling to adapt to this new reality.

From here springs the tendency to repress this reality and to seek alternative explanations for the undermining of the United States’ status in the Middle East and for the weakness the U.S. has shown in dealing with the Syrian crisis. From here also spring the attempts of the Israeli right and its neoconservative allies in Washington to criticize Barack Obama for unwillingness to use military power and his willingness to agree to arrangements offered by Russia. Serious arguments have been made regarding the inconsistency in the government’s diplomatic strategy, along with baseless accusations regarding Obama’s connections with the Muslim Brotherhood. In the fantasy promoted by these critics, Obama — even though he is responsible for killing Osama bin Laden and for daily American drone offensives against intended acts of terror — should be replaced by a kind of new version of Ronald Reagan who will prove to the world, and especially to Arabs and Muslims, exactly who is boss.

But the crisis in Syria is just one stage in the process of American hegemony weakening throughout the world. The source of this weakening lies in the significant changes that have occurred in the international balance of power; key among these are the financial collapse and the economic crisis, China’s growth in military and economic power, and processes in the Middle East that have weakened the United States’ position in the region, including their military failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, the fall of pro-American regimes throughout the Arab world and the inability to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In this sense, the United States’ policy in the Middle East is not significantly different than it would have been if the Republican Mitt Romney were now sitting in the White House. Any American president would be forced to deal with the fact that the growing fiscal deficit necessitates large cuts in the military budget and take into account the response of the people and its representatives in Congress. Now they are beginning to recognize, very belatedly, the sharp change that occurred in the United States’ economic and military situation and in its position in the world. We aren’t just talking about the strong public opposition to what is described as a “surgical strike” limited to Syrian government and military facilities. Surveys reflect skepticism toward any kind of military or diplomatic involvement in the world. According to the results of one CNN poll, 60 percent of Americans wish that the United States were less involved in international conflicts, 34 percent are of the opinion that the government should be willing to use military force to deal with international problems and 72 percent believe that it is not the United States’ affair to work toward removing dictators like Assad from power.

These surveys explain why opposition to involvement in Syria is coming not just from liberal, leftist members of Congress, but also from many Republican members of Congress that reflect their electorate’s current isolationist views. At the same time, there exists among decision-makers in Washington a clear acknowledgement of the fact that the growth of China’s power necessitates the allocation of greater military resources to East Asia and that, for the United States, being dragged into additional conflicts in the region will only endanger that strategy.

Of course, none of this means that the United States is in the same situation today that Britain was in after World War II. However, the weakening of the foundations of the United States’ economic and military power has transformed the nation into one of a few major powers that must take into account the interests of other world powers, as well as the fact that its ability to serve as a steady backrest for Israel in the future will be limited due to international changes and the constraints which the American public will place on Washington.

Based on the history of debate regarding the failure of the Israeli “concept” in the Yom Kippur War, it is again important to determine whether Israel’s existing concept of the reliability of an American solution is still relevant. It is advisable to bring this under consideration now, not to wait for delayed recognition.

The author is a senior analyst in a geostrategic consulting company.