US and Saudi Arabia: A Religious Divorce
Published in El Público
(Spain) on 11 November 2013
by Nazanín Armanian (link to original)
In Islam, one of the ways for a man to permanently divorce his wife — instantly and without the need to go to court — is for the husband to say “I divorce you” three times in the presence of male Muslim witnesses. The curious thing is not that the wife cannot divorce the husband, but that if he wants to reunite with her she must first marry another man and be divorced by him. A drastic way of dissuading a husband from taking drastic action.
A similar situation (with reversed roles) is happening in the “marriage” between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, which began in 1933 when the two countries agreed to share not only bread and the marital bed, but also oil and arms.
It was Prince Bandar bin Sultan, also known as Bandar Bush, head of Saudi intelligence, who was charged with announcing the “temporary suspension of the partnership,” citing U.S. infidelities and insinuating that a third party might be able to assist in the process of marital reconciliation: China, the biggest importer of Saudi oil, whose advantage lies in its ability to meddle in foreign affairs. Prince Bandar announced a “major change” in bilateral relations, mainly affecting intelligence cooperation and arms deals.
The strategic association between the military superpower and the energy superpower, based on “protection in exchange for a guaranteed supply of cheap oil,” has faltered as discrepancies have emerged in recent years.
The Three Crises
The recent and sudden campaign by Western media to tarnish Saudi Arabia’s reputation (focusing on issues such as a woman’s right to drive — their more fundamental rights were of less interest — or the video showing a Saudi employer beating a worker) will provide some justification for the Obama administration distancing itself from the House of Saud, empowering the more modern factions of the country’s elite as the time to elect a successor to the elderly and ailing King Abdullah approaches. The country’s brutal medieval practices are problematic to its Western allies, waving the flag for human rights.
The first crisis in the couple’s relationship occurred in 1973, when the Arab oil producers cut off supplies to the West in response to their support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War. In the end, the situation worked out perfectly for the U.S.: Its monetary crisis was resolved as the dollar replaced the gold standard and became the main trading currency on the world oil market. There was a second crisis when Washington implicated Saudi citizens in the 9/11 attacks and a third in 2003 when Iraqi power was handed over to Shiites close to the enemy in Iran (this also riled Israel, leading to the regular attacks the country suffers today). Later, a string of complaints was leveled at the U.S.: for withdrawing its troops from Iraq, for allowing the fall of Hosni Mubarak, for suspending the military attack against Syria and for negotiating with Iran over its nuclear program rather than destroying it. Is the U.S. Riyadh’s ally or its enemy? Meanwhile, the Saudis are becoming ever more aware of their vulnerability, surrounded by instability and unrest: Yemen, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan and Egypt ...
Al Saud and the Obama Agenda
A lot has happened since Obama spoke with unprecedented reverence about King Abdullah in his first official presidential interview on al Arabiya television (funded by al Saud). Despite the invaluable services the Saudis provide to the U.S., such as allowing the Americans to launch attacks on Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen from Saudi territory and cooperating in the containment of Iran, Obama is not responding to Riyadh’s demands; for him, the Middle East is a quagmire where the best way to guarantee his country’s interests is to discreetly allow the terror and the terrorism, the selective and collective killing. U.S. politico-military interventions are undermining the country’s influence and contributing to an anti-American atmosphere, as well as inciting the rise of uncontrollable armed groups. Perhaps the U.S. understands that constantly fighting for Saudi and Israeli interests is damaging its health and political image, and it wants to demonstrate that it is not an accomplice to all the problems enveloping the Middle East.
Meanwhile, Obama seeks to normalize U.S. relations with Iran, contain the country’s nuclear program, use Tehran’s influence to help stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, eliminate Hezbollah, distance the country from China, Russia and Syria, reclaim the large Iranian market (currently dominated by China) for American goods and — by bringing Iran back into the Western sphere of influence — guarantee the security of Israel and the Arab world. As the U.S. moves closer to its Iranian enemy, it distances itself from its old allies, hoping to contain them in the region and proclaim a new victory. This is why it has delayed the imposition of new sanctions against Iran and may lift some existing ones. Relations with Iran will also be used to reduce the influence of Riyadh and Tel Aviv on Washington’s policies in the region.
At the same time, Washington is pushing for reforms in Saudi Arabia before the Arab Spring reaches the U.S. military base near Mecca or the battle for a successor to the king is won by the anti-American, pro-al-Qaida faction that has dominated the Saudi regime since the death of bin Laden. Social and political reform in Saudi Arabia are vital for the U.S., as instability would cause panic in the oil markets and make economic recovery impossible in the West. Obama wants reform from above, as soon as possible, and this is vehemently opposed by the Wahhabi kleptocracy, which is still living in the Middle Ages. The sheiks have allowed the Pakistani army into Saudi Arabia to contain potential popular rebellions.
Backdoor Diplomacy
Hoping to quell Saudi agitation, Washington offered Riyadh a two year seat on the U.N. Security Council, but Riyadh declined, the first country ever to spurn such an offer. This message to Obama was followed by a second: After Israel’s illegal attack on Syria on October 31, the Saudis and the Syrians both told the U.S. president, “You must not ignore us.” Riyadh’s official reason for turning down the position on the Security Council was that the council bombed the Syrians instead of “saving” them, but in reality there may have been other motives, hinted at by the House of Saud’s opaque diplomacy. The Saudis would not have dared to publicly ask Bush to “cut off the head of the [Iranian] snake,” while they themselves were shaking hands with Ahmadinejad. They would not sanction military action against two Muslim nations, Syria and Iran, nor would they condemn Israel (now an ally) for violating the rights of the Palestinians. Riyadh now talks less about Palestine and more about Syria. It prefers to act behind the scenes and continue its policy of double-dealing. The possibility of Prince Bandar’s men exploiting this to reinforce their position as the true defenders of the Arabian-Sunni homeland cannot be ruled out. Refusing the seat on the Security Council also spares the Saudis from having to answer to the U.N. Human Rights Council about discrimination against women and religious minorities and in the process deprives the U.S. of an allied vote.
Mutual Dependence and a Bomb
The desert kingdom is the second biggest oil exporter to the U.S.A. after Canada, satisfying 16 percent of U.S. demand. Saudi Arabia has investments worth $690 billion in the U.S., including Treasury bonds, and it also owns half of the Motiva oil refinery in Port Arthur (Texas), the biggest in the country. Washington, for its part, needs the continued support of its Saudi allies to ensure that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) continues to trade in dollars.
The euphoria resulting from the increasing U.S. energy self-sufficiency provided by shale gas, which moved the focus of the international oil market to Asia, may not last long. The U.S. dreams of being able to reduce the economic influence of the Middle East on U.S. politics and save, for example, the $80 billion it costs each year to maintain its Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. However, among others, problems such as groundwater contamination from the chemicals used in shale gas extraction, the seismic activity caused by the process and the steep 10 billion euros of investment required per well mean that the battle for oil will continue to be a catalyst for wars and conflicts, and that the U.S. will keep blocking other powers from coming into the Middle East and staking a claim on its riches.
While NATO and Israeli intelligence agencies were monitoring Iran’s nonexistent weapons, it turned out that their Saudi ally had given millions of dollars to Pakistan to fund the manufacture of atomic bombs. Is anyone imposing sanctions or threatening to “put all the options on the table” to eliminate these weapons of mass destruction?
The Extent of the Anger
The Saudis now hope to influence U.S. presidential policy by:
- Ensuring that the U.S. does not force changes in their corridors of power, as it did in Bahrain.
- Curbing the Syrian peace process.
- Preventing Washington from getting closer to Tehran.
To achieve this, they have brought in Pakistani instructors to train thousands of Wahhabi jihadis from the Army of Islam, which will help ease Syria’s path to perfect chaos.
The death of bin Laden favored the Saudi royal family by enabling it to take control of his organization. Will the $10 billion worth of arms sold by the White House to the Saudis end up in the hands of groups like al-Qaida? This is a question that is strangely missing from the agreements on energy supply and U.S. military installations on Islam’s most sacred ground. Can Obama win over Iran without losing Saudi Arabia and Israel? Yes. The three countries were allies for decades before the fall of the shah. Tehran will be able to coexist peacefully with Riyadh while maintaining a controlled cold war with Israel.
A similar situation (with reversed roles) is happening in the “marriage” between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, which began in 1933 when the two countries agreed to share not only bread and the marital bed, but also oil and arms.
It was Prince Bandar bin Sultan, also known as Bandar Bush, head of Saudi intelligence, who was charged with announcing the “temporary suspension of the partnership,” citing U.S. infidelities and insinuating that a third party might be able to assist in the process of marital reconciliation: China, the biggest importer of Saudi oil, whose advantage lies in its ability to meddle in foreign affairs. Prince Bandar announced a “major change” in bilateral relations, mainly affecting intelligence cooperation and arms deals.
The strategic association between the military superpower and the energy superpower, based on “protection in exchange for a guaranteed supply of cheap oil,” has faltered as discrepancies have emerged in recent years.
The Three Crises
The recent and sudden campaign by Western media to tarnish Saudi Arabia’s reputation (focusing on issues such as a woman’s right to drive — their more fundamental rights were of less interest — or the video showing a Saudi employer beating a worker) will provide some justification for the Obama administration distancing itself from the House of Saud, empowering the more modern factions of the country’s elite as the time to elect a successor to the elderly and ailing King Abdullah approaches. The country’s brutal medieval practices are problematic to its Western allies, waving the flag for human rights.
The first crisis in the couple’s relationship occurred in 1973, when the Arab oil producers cut off supplies to the West in response to their support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War. In the end, the situation worked out perfectly for the U.S.: Its monetary crisis was resolved as the dollar replaced the gold standard and became the main trading currency on the world oil market. There was a second crisis when Washington implicated Saudi citizens in the 9/11 attacks and a third in 2003 when Iraqi power was handed over to Shiites close to the enemy in Iran (this also riled Israel, leading to the regular attacks the country suffers today). Later, a string of complaints was leveled at the U.S.: for withdrawing its troops from Iraq, for allowing the fall of Hosni Mubarak, for suspending the military attack against Syria and for negotiating with Iran over its nuclear program rather than destroying it. Is the U.S. Riyadh’s ally or its enemy? Meanwhile, the Saudis are becoming ever more aware of their vulnerability, surrounded by instability and unrest: Yemen, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan and Egypt ...
Al Saud and the Obama Agenda
A lot has happened since Obama spoke with unprecedented reverence about King Abdullah in his first official presidential interview on al Arabiya television (funded by al Saud). Despite the invaluable services the Saudis provide to the U.S., such as allowing the Americans to launch attacks on Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen from Saudi territory and cooperating in the containment of Iran, Obama is not responding to Riyadh’s demands; for him, the Middle East is a quagmire where the best way to guarantee his country’s interests is to discreetly allow the terror and the terrorism, the selective and collective killing. U.S. politico-military interventions are undermining the country’s influence and contributing to an anti-American atmosphere, as well as inciting the rise of uncontrollable armed groups. Perhaps the U.S. understands that constantly fighting for Saudi and Israeli interests is damaging its health and political image, and it wants to demonstrate that it is not an accomplice to all the problems enveloping the Middle East.
Meanwhile, Obama seeks to normalize U.S. relations with Iran, contain the country’s nuclear program, use Tehran’s influence to help stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, eliminate Hezbollah, distance the country from China, Russia and Syria, reclaim the large Iranian market (currently dominated by China) for American goods and — by bringing Iran back into the Western sphere of influence — guarantee the security of Israel and the Arab world. As the U.S. moves closer to its Iranian enemy, it distances itself from its old allies, hoping to contain them in the region and proclaim a new victory. This is why it has delayed the imposition of new sanctions against Iran and may lift some existing ones. Relations with Iran will also be used to reduce the influence of Riyadh and Tel Aviv on Washington’s policies in the region.
At the same time, Washington is pushing for reforms in Saudi Arabia before the Arab Spring reaches the U.S. military base near Mecca or the battle for a successor to the king is won by the anti-American, pro-al-Qaida faction that has dominated the Saudi regime since the death of bin Laden. Social and political reform in Saudi Arabia are vital for the U.S., as instability would cause panic in the oil markets and make economic recovery impossible in the West. Obama wants reform from above, as soon as possible, and this is vehemently opposed by the Wahhabi kleptocracy, which is still living in the Middle Ages. The sheiks have allowed the Pakistani army into Saudi Arabia to contain potential popular rebellions.
Backdoor Diplomacy
Hoping to quell Saudi agitation, Washington offered Riyadh a two year seat on the U.N. Security Council, but Riyadh declined, the first country ever to spurn such an offer. This message to Obama was followed by a second: After Israel’s illegal attack on Syria on October 31, the Saudis and the Syrians both told the U.S. president, “You must not ignore us.” Riyadh’s official reason for turning down the position on the Security Council was that the council bombed the Syrians instead of “saving” them, but in reality there may have been other motives, hinted at by the House of Saud’s opaque diplomacy. The Saudis would not have dared to publicly ask Bush to “cut off the head of the [Iranian] snake,” while they themselves were shaking hands with Ahmadinejad. They would not sanction military action against two Muslim nations, Syria and Iran, nor would they condemn Israel (now an ally) for violating the rights of the Palestinians. Riyadh now talks less about Palestine and more about Syria. It prefers to act behind the scenes and continue its policy of double-dealing. The possibility of Prince Bandar’s men exploiting this to reinforce their position as the true defenders of the Arabian-Sunni homeland cannot be ruled out. Refusing the seat on the Security Council also spares the Saudis from having to answer to the U.N. Human Rights Council about discrimination against women and religious minorities and in the process deprives the U.S. of an allied vote.
Mutual Dependence and a Bomb
The desert kingdom is the second biggest oil exporter to the U.S.A. after Canada, satisfying 16 percent of U.S. demand. Saudi Arabia has investments worth $690 billion in the U.S., including Treasury bonds, and it also owns half of the Motiva oil refinery in Port Arthur (Texas), the biggest in the country. Washington, for its part, needs the continued support of its Saudi allies to ensure that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) continues to trade in dollars.
The euphoria resulting from the increasing U.S. energy self-sufficiency provided by shale gas, which moved the focus of the international oil market to Asia, may not last long. The U.S. dreams of being able to reduce the economic influence of the Middle East on U.S. politics and save, for example, the $80 billion it costs each year to maintain its Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. However, among others, problems such as groundwater contamination from the chemicals used in shale gas extraction, the seismic activity caused by the process and the steep 10 billion euros of investment required per well mean that the battle for oil will continue to be a catalyst for wars and conflicts, and that the U.S. will keep blocking other powers from coming into the Middle East and staking a claim on its riches.
While NATO and Israeli intelligence agencies were monitoring Iran’s nonexistent weapons, it turned out that their Saudi ally had given millions of dollars to Pakistan to fund the manufacture of atomic bombs. Is anyone imposing sanctions or threatening to “put all the options on the table” to eliminate these weapons of mass destruction?
The Extent of the Anger
The Saudis now hope to influence U.S. presidential policy by:
- Ensuring that the U.S. does not force changes in their corridors of power, as it did in Bahrain.
- Curbing the Syrian peace process.
- Preventing Washington from getting closer to Tehran.
To achieve this, they have brought in Pakistani instructors to train thousands of Wahhabi jihadis from the Army of Islam, which will help ease Syria’s path to perfect chaos.
The death of bin Laden favored the Saudi royal family by enabling it to take control of his organization. Will the $10 billion worth of arms sold by the White House to the Saudis end up in the hands of groups like al-Qaida? This is a question that is strangely missing from the agreements on energy supply and U.S. military installations on Islam’s most sacred ground. Can Obama win over Iran without losing Saudi Arabia and Israel? Yes. The three countries were allies for decades before the fall of the shah. Tehran will be able to coexist peacefully with Riyadh while maintaining a controlled cold war with Israel.
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