Four Obstructive Paradigms of American Thought Toward China

That cooperation between the U.S. and China is now a necessity has become common consensus on both sides. However, the sheer complexity of U.S.-China relations means that developing the relationship will not be easy; rather it will be blocked, and sometimes broken, by a variety of subjective and objective factors. Of these factors, subjective paradigms of thought have been a common thread throughout the formation, implementation and recalibration stages of foreign policy, and could be said to be more consistent and persistent than any other element. In general, there exist four deeply-rooted destructive paradigms within the U.S. that have hindered the healthy development of U.S.-China relations.

First is a notion of predestination based upon historical experience. Some U.S. academics and politicians tend to view U.S.-China relations with a sort of fatalism based on their observations of the succession of hegemony in the past, believing that emerging nations must inevitably challenge the existing hegemon and so a clash between the U.S. and China is inevitable. In other words, this is a belief that conflict between the two is of a structural nature, with no room for mediation or mitigation, as seen by John Mearsheimer’s statements that “war between China and the U.S. is difficult to avoid” and that “the conflict is likely to derive from the unstable situation with Taiwan or the Korean Peninsula.”

The aggregation of these sentiments is expressed more concretely within international relations as mistrust and hostility toward China. Taking the issue of the air defense identification zone as an example, the U.S. completely understands Japan and South Korea establishing zones, but when it comes to China the move has been interpreted as a challenge to U.S. influence in the region.

Second is a hegemonic mentality stemming from liberalism. This manifests itself in two ways within foreign affairs. On one hand, it is a belief that U.S. hegemony possesses a natural legitimacy in that other nations need the U.S., as it provides the world with a common good. As a consequence, during the course of meetings between the U.S. and China, the U.S. is often high-handed as it dons the mantle of “world police.” On the other hand, there is a constant fixation upon hegemony itself. Even as its power wanes, the U.S. still hopes to use its strategic partners in the region as surrogates to share the cost of and aid in maintaining its supremacy, such as with strengthening the alliance between the U.S. and Japan in a bid to further consolidate its position as a leader in Asia.

Third is hypersensitivity rooted in the erosion of confidence. The financial crisis of 2008 unseated the U.S. as an unrivaled economic power. Set off by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the crisis plunged the U.S. economy into a severe recession, dealing a grave blow to American self-confidence and resulting in a tendency to overreact. It is now sensitive to the slightest move from China in international affairs; many Americans, from commoners to the political elite, have exhibited an impalpable uneasiness toward China’s development. There still exists a deep sense of concern and uncertainty as to the short-term goals and long-term plans for China’s development, as well as the means by which that development will be realized. This is also why the U.S. in recent years has moved from “strategic reassurance” to pushing forth its “rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region.”

Fourth is a proclivity for self-contradiction arising from pragmatism. “[U.S.] interests above all else” is the golden rule in which strict pragmatists among the American policy-making elite place their faith; from start to finish, this has served as the primary basis upon which they manage foreign affairs. That the U.S. and China were able to bridge the ideological divide and stand together due to mutual security threats in the 1970s is a prime example. At the same time, the aspiration to a system of values in American politics of which the theories of Jefferson, Jackson and Wilson were so representative acts as an invisible hand balancing the principle of “interests above all else,” moving U.S. foreign policy like a counterpoint within a symphony. Therein lies both a utilitarian pragmatism and a stubbornness of ideology; it is these two philosophies that have determined the mercurial nature of U.S. foreign policy.

More specifically, in the realm of security, the U.S. wishes to guard against China to preserve the balance of power in Asia and the Pacific, yet also desires that China become a positive force for maintaining regional stability; economically, the U.S. has leveled a flurry of blows upon China on foreign exchange, trade and other issues, but also hopes to piggyback off of China’s strength to preserve its own prosperity; and politically, the U.S. rejects and calls into question China’s model of development, but at the same time wants China to become a “stakeholder” in every aspect of its own affairs.

Problems are most easily solved by those who cause them, and obstacles born of a certain frame of mind can only be overcome through adjustments to that mentality. Only by forming an accurate understanding of China’s development based on uncolored judgment, a return to rational thought and expanding areas of cooperation can that development be turned to the mutual benefit of both nations.

The author works at the policy research office of China UnionPay Co., Ltd.