Open Secret
Published in El Tiempo
(Colombia) on 12 January 2014
by Jaime A. Fajardo Landaeta (link to original)
There is no doubt, not even for the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia): For many years, the Colombian conflict has been characterized by the direct intervention of the United States, a superpower that is increasing its technology for interceptions, electronic espionage and the use of a variety of “war toys.”
It is an open secret that Alvaro Uribe’s government, in its eagerness to produce results, joined forces with the Central Intelligence Agency to plan the operations that ended the lives of several guerrilla leaders. The appearance on the scene of the so-called smart bombs, launched from air force airplanes with the advice and direct participation of the “gringos,” allowed the Colombian Public Force to take the initiative in the conflict.
The Santos government maintained these accords and advisory services, a secret we analysts knew, just like the FARC. Nor is it news that they have received help from various countries and some terrorist organizations in matters of advice and intelligence, or that they maintain relationships with multinationals that provide weapons and purchase cocaine: They live off war and need the conflict to perpetuate itself. But of course, the FARC have also limited their own space very much in this context.
But the guerrilla force has lost too many opportunities in the international arena to try to prolong the war. Instead, support for the process leading to a peace accord is growing overwhelming: The Santos government and the FARC itself can count on this asset in the international context, but if such an accord is not reached, the Santos government would receive significant support in terms of advisers, intelligence and military capacity to strike the insurgency. This scenario would prolong the nightmare of the past 50 years even longer.
For these reasons, the Havana dialogues must be strengthened; they should not stop at analyzing the facts of the conflict, which have allowed the government and the public force to improve their military circumstances; and, above all else, they should avoid creating opportunities for the far right to obstruct them.
The U.S. has participated directly in the Colombian conflict, and I think, at many opportunities, encouraged it and supported dark forces to feed the bloody theater of battle. What The Washington Post says is true, but we cannot get hung up on that or, worse, turn it into a pretext to obstruct the dialogue. On the contrary, ending the conflict is also an opportunity to block those interventionist practices.
But it must also be said and believed that there exists a different environment in the U.S. and in other countries to support decidedly the peace process and join Colombians on the path to reconciliation.
Note: The authorization given by the Santos government for FARC singer “Julian” to join as FARC negotiator in Havana should not surprise anybody. Who authorized in its day that “Granda” be released from prison? So it has been in many other cases typical of these processes that required the same type of decision.
It is an open secret that Alvaro Uribe’s government, in its eagerness to produce results, joined forces with the Central Intelligence Agency to plan the operations that ended the lives of several guerrilla leaders. The appearance on the scene of the so-called smart bombs, launched from air force airplanes with the advice and direct participation of the “gringos,” allowed the Colombian Public Force to take the initiative in the conflict.
The Santos government maintained these accords and advisory services, a secret we analysts knew, just like the FARC. Nor is it news that they have received help from various countries and some terrorist organizations in matters of advice and intelligence, or that they maintain relationships with multinationals that provide weapons and purchase cocaine: They live off war and need the conflict to perpetuate itself. But of course, the FARC have also limited their own space very much in this context.
But the guerrilla force has lost too many opportunities in the international arena to try to prolong the war. Instead, support for the process leading to a peace accord is growing overwhelming: The Santos government and the FARC itself can count on this asset in the international context, but if such an accord is not reached, the Santos government would receive significant support in terms of advisers, intelligence and military capacity to strike the insurgency. This scenario would prolong the nightmare of the past 50 years even longer.
For these reasons, the Havana dialogues must be strengthened; they should not stop at analyzing the facts of the conflict, which have allowed the government and the public force to improve their military circumstances; and, above all else, they should avoid creating opportunities for the far right to obstruct them.
The U.S. has participated directly in the Colombian conflict, and I think, at many opportunities, encouraged it and supported dark forces to feed the bloody theater of battle. What The Washington Post says is true, but we cannot get hung up on that or, worse, turn it into a pretext to obstruct the dialogue. On the contrary, ending the conflict is also an opportunity to block those interventionist practices.
But it must also be said and believed that there exists a different environment in the U.S. and in other countries to support decidedly the peace process and join Colombians on the path to reconciliation.
Note: The authorization given by the Santos government for FARC singer “Julian” to join as FARC negotiator in Havana should not surprise anybody. Who authorized in its day that “Granda” be released from prison? So it has been in many other cases typical of these processes that required the same type of decision.