A Tactical Retreat

After a series of high-profile failings, America is leaving the Middle East both politically and militarily. In order to maintain influence in the region, it may find itself making a pact with its arch-nemesis.

Harold Macmillan, a British prime minister who, following the Suez Crisis (1956), was responsible for dismantling the remains of the British Empire, believed that if a politician became mired in some grand undertaking whose consequences would be impossible to predict, he should simply announce his victory (even if this goes against the reality of the situation) and begin to evacuate. While his words bring to mind Machiavelli, Macmillan was never able to deal real incarnations. After the failures of the Suez Crisis, the British Empire was collapsing into a shamble, while the prime minister didn’t bother convincing himself that this was anything like a victorious return.

It would seem that Barack Obama finds himself an adherent of Macmillanite methods. In 2014, America will remove the last of its combat battalions in Afghanistan, ending a quarter century of Washington-dominated influence in the Middle East — a time when the biggest empire in the world attempted to militarily remold an entire region into one that fits its vision and interests. The fact of the matter is that these days, America has suffered a spectacular defeat in the Middle East. Despite this, the nuclear agreement with Iran, signed at the end of November, will allow the Americans, in a very Macmillan vein, to claim victory and evacuate from the entire region.

It won’t be the first time that America has employed this kind of tactic. The legend of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is still very much alive, when two Cold War adversaries came toe-to-toe and ready for a duel at noon, following the installation of missile platforms by Russia on Cuba. The version told by Americans is one in which Russia was the first to blink and stand down. However, the truth of the matter is that Americans were the ones who caused the crisis in the first place, following the installation of Jupiter rockets in Turkey — very close to the Soviet borders. Following the crisis, they had to take them down and away. Despite the reality of the situation, the White House, with a willing press, announced a victory, creating a myth of the unshakeable president John F. Kennedy surrounding the missile crisis.

The same mechanisms are still in play today with the Iran agreements. None of the experts interviewed believe that Tehran is going to drop their nuclear program. At the same time, everyone seems to agree that Obama is entirely aware of it. If Iran were to really do that, why would it have hidden its uranium-enrichment facilities in a hollowed-out mountain near Fordo for years? Moreover, America went for concessions which would have been unimaginable several years ago. In 2005, Washington did not agree to let Tehran keep 5,000 centrifuges for enriching uranium. This time around, America has agreed to 16,000 of them. Alego Ansari, the head for the Institution of Iranian studies at the University of St. Andrews, believes that Obama needed an Iranian success with little regard for the terms, saying, “This is a smokescreen to hide a shameful retreat from the region.”

1.

The start of Washington’s quarter-century long domination in the Middle East began just 34 years ago. In 1979, three events occurred in the region which shook up the status quo in the region, thus bringing Americans into the game. The first occurred in January, following the fall of the shah in Iran, which kicked off the Islamic Revolution. The regime, which had allowed Americans control of the region without having to directly intervene, fell. Two months later, Egypt became the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Finally, the end of the year saw the Red Army begin its invasion of Afghanistan.

Several weeks later, President Jimmy Carter announced a doctrine which bears his name to this day, through which every attempt by outside powers to go into the Middle East would be taken as a direct attack on American interests, and would be dealt with — militarily, should it come to pass. Thus began a series of events which drew America in whole: Iraq’s war with Iran and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. When, on Aug. 2, 1990, America moved into Iraq with a coalition of 34 countries, the Middle East saw the beginning of a new order; thus began Washington’s quarter-century.

Stephen Walt, a renowned professor from Harvard, describes the changes: Before 1990, America did not want to dominate the region through military means. It was enough to not let anyone else do the same. It built its influence through allies, while keeping garrisons of armed forces far from the Middle East itself, and only then in emergency situations. Washington believed that everything rested on equalizing local powers. To illustrate the point, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once said of the Iran-Iraq War: “It’s a shame that both sides couldn’t lose.” In the end, America supported the weaker Saddam Hussein, only to take him down a few years later when he attacked the small nation of Kuwait.

Up to the 1990s, America banked on the strategy of dual deterrence. The point was not just to maintain balance between Baghdad and Tehran by letting the two go at each other, but to stem the influence of both at the same time. With the presidency of George W. Bush, it added to its propaganda a vision of bringing democracy to the world and fighting terrorism. In order to do so, it of course required the upkeep of a huge armed force within the region, beginning first with Saudi Arabia, and following 9/11, one in Afghanistan and Iraq. Walt writes that by doing what they did in the Middle East, America went straight from autopilot to manual steering.

2.

The decision to do so removed Washington’s ability to remold itself — it couldn’t just bring in allies when it needed them, because garrisons cannot be moved as quickly as their interests. It is entirely why the era of sitting at the steering wheel has ended with a string of high-profile defeats.

In 2011, Americans relinquished full control to Iraq, announcing that democracy had been transplanted there. And following Macmillan’s advice, they withdrew.

Instead of serving as a model of reform, the Iraq of today is instead a black mark in the region. The singular nation of Iraq has practically ceased to exist. Kurds are ruling with autonomy in the north, Shiites in the south and Sunnis in the central and western regions. The very last group is being linked with Syrian Sunnis more and more often; observers argue that between the Euphrates and Tigris a new, super-national political organism is emerging.

The next victim became the over 30-year-long American-Egyptian partnership, which crumbled apart in 2013. Washington threw its hasty support behind the elected Muslim Brotherhood, but as time has shown, it seems that its temporary triumph was not as much a wave of democracy as it was a decision by the army to shift public discontent on to the Brotherhood and assume the role of a savior. Egyptian generals have remembered the American betrayal, while Washington in turn finds itself in a difficult situation from which to make an appeal for democratization. In October, America cut off military support for the Egyptian army, but the Egyptians, instead of begging for forgiveness, ordered arms from Russia.

America’s situation in Afghanistan is looking just as bad. After many months of negotiations, a group of Afghan elders has reached an agreement where up to 12,000 Americans from support battalions would remain after the year 2014. These troops are still significant; while the Afghan army is fighting with the Taliban on its own, Americans are providing transport, intelligence and training. President Hamid Karzai, however, did not want to sign the agreement; he believes that such a task should be left to his successor, who will be chosen in April. Unofficially, it comes down to removing the Americans, and as many as they can, because Karzai is convinced that his country is far too important for America and Washington to agree to everything just to sign the agreement.

Karzai should hope that he hasn’t overestimated himself. The White House has given him a warning, saying that there exists a nuclear option, should the agreement not be signed. This would mean not only the removal of all armed units, but also financial support. The last time that a foreign empire departed like that from Afghanistan — the Red Army in 1992 — the Taliban attacked the president, castrated him and then hanged him from a lamppost in central Kabul.

3.

America’s growing aversion to the Middle East isn’t just from disappointing defeats. During the first term of Barack Obama’s presidency, it began to send out signals that the region had fallen a few rungs on the ladder of American priorities. In the aftermath of World War II, when Americans took on the role of the British in the Middle East, the region was incredibly important for three reasons: It was firstly the battlefield for influence against the USSR; secondly, it wanted to assist then-weak Israel; and thirdly, the vast supply of oil.

The weight of these arguments came into question already during the presidency of George W. Bush. For Obama to steer himself by these arguments would be by and large a costly illusion. The USSR hasn’t existed for over 23 years, and while Russia basks in its diplomatic successes in dealing with chemical weapons in Syria, it just isn’t cut out to assume the role of a regional hegemony. Despite Benjamin Netanyahu’s apocalyptic rhetoric, Israel is no longer involved in a fight for its existence; indeed, in this case it could be seen much more as a potential aggressor given its military clout. Additionally, Middle Eastern oil — while still an important factor — is falling in relevance given the prognosis that within the next six years, America could be importing only 40 percent of its energy thanks to the shale revolution. Imported energy would primarily come from the western hemisphere.

Just how greatly these changes have influenced American thinking on the Middle East has been shown by an aborted intervention in Syria. Daniel Pipes, an American historian, publicist and son of Richard Pipes, believes that the White House has adopted the tactic of “letting them all kill themselves,” given a lack of options. This is because civil war in the country focuses interest on local villains, and a lack of intervention by any side guarantees that no one will emerge as a victor. It’s a strong return to looking at the Middle East from afar. After failures in Iraq and Egypt, and the one which is brewing in Afghanistan, America is packing its bags and going back to the strategy of equalizing the region from the outside.

4.

In order to realize its plan, America lacks, in the words of FDR, its own local SOBs. Neither Israel nor Saudi Arabia will take on this role — Israel because it lacks any influence within the Arab world, and Saudi Arabia more so because its own interests meet with American ones in a few too many places.

There is, however, a country within the region which has influence in each place which holds American interests — from Palestine, through Syria and Iraq, all the way through to Afghanistan. It can block geopolitical interests of China in the East, and those of Russia in the north. What’s more, this country has a lot in common with American interests, namely that of curbing the influence of the Taliban and al-Qaida. It is politically stable, and overall predictable and rational. Moreover, it has a 100-year-old constitution, and its residents still look in wonder at American-style democracy.

The country in mind is of course, Iran. However, critics of the latest nuclear agreements argue that it’s only a smokescreen to help ease American withdrawal from the Middle East in the style of Macmillan; there seems to be a lot to indicate that this is only the first step in what could already happen in 2014 between Washington and Tehran to foster greater understanding.

Ansari believes that Americans simply don’t have any more choices. First, they discarded the option of an armed coup of the Iranian regime. Then they falsely convinced themselves that the Iranians themselves were going to change their government. Now there’s nothing left but to negotiate with the ayatollahs — and the ayatollahs are entirely content to put ideology aside when it comes to the interests of their country. After all, they were able to reach an agreement with the atheist USSR to go against the Americans. Besides, everyone would benefit from agreement between Washington and Tehran. American would gain an ally which would equalize the influence of Sunnis in the region, and Iran would gain an indispensable ally to help its ailing economy.

If even Roosevelt was able to agree with Stalin to go against Hitler, and Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong to form an anti-Soviet coalition, why couldn’t Obama and the leader of Iran, Ali Khameni, agree to jointly control the Middle East? After all, when it comes to politics, sentiments don’t matter as much as interests.