About the Myth of the Conflict between Cairo and Washington

One of the myths circulated by some in the media is that there is a conflict between Cairo and Washington and that the latter is hatching a conspiracy against the current regime in Egypt.

(1)

On Jan. 27 of last year, the U.S. Department of Defense issued a statement mentioning that a phone call between Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Field Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi occurred and addressed three issues: the situation after the referendum on the new constitution; the protests on the anniversary of Jan. 25, which were pervaded by some acts of violence; and the coming steps in the transition process. The statement added that the American secretary gave Field Marshal el-Sisi his condolences for the casualties of the terrorist operations and offered the Egyptian administration his country’s assistance in confronting the terrorists.

This phone call was not the first or last of its kind. Rather, it is number 34 in the discussions between the two ministers that have continued since last July and have come to occur around once a week on average. By reading the statements that the U.S. Defense Department issued, we can see that the principal subject of these calls is the developments in the political situation inside Egypt. This contradicts the information that is being spread by the Egyptian media, which talks about an American conspiracy against Egypt. That is because it is illogical that the phone calls would continue and be organized in this manner while the American administration continues conspiring against the regime that Field Marshal el-Sisi heads.

Facing that, I claim that the Egyptian-American relationship is deeper and more complicated than portrayed by the Egyptian media, which often intends to abridge and mix up the spectacle for reasons related to domestic consumption considerations.

(2)

I retain an article published in the American magazine Time (Aug. 18, 2013) titled “Egypt No Longer Matters.” In it, author Bobby Ghosh quotes a high-ranking American general saying that Egypt was an important country in the 1960s and 1970s but is no longer important now. Alongside the threat it posed to Israel, it was the focal point of the Arab world at the time and indisputably the most important country in it. After that era the Middle East changed, but Egypt did not, so its political and cultural performance declined. As a consequence, Egypt’s usefulness to the United States as the pivot point of the Arab world declined greatly. In addition, it no longer represented a new threat to Israel.

This discussion was published after American President Barack Obama announced, in the second half of 2011, his country’s commitment to the “Asian pivot” strategy, with which it concentrates on the challenges and threats that China poses with the signs of its escalating growth, signs that nominate it to become the world’s economic superpower by 2017.

In the background of the discussion also lies the report published by the International Energy Agency at the end of 2012, which forecast that the United States would come close to reaching oil self-sufficiency in 2030. That self-sufficiency would pave the way for a fall in the Middle East’s importance on the ladder of America’s strategic interests. But the idea of the United States not needing Middle Eastern oil and concentrating on the Asian pivot is not totally settled in American thinking. Even Foreign Policy talks about its “wilting”* after it became clear that the high price of nonconventional oil could destroy its chances of replacing Gulf oil. This is supported by the fact that America’s Defense Department has adopted a new strategy in the Middle East that turns it back into a focal point alongside the Asian pivot.

This latest American move toward strengthening its security reserves in the region seem to be a precaution against the possibilities of violence and extremism sparking up in the Middle East, especially in Egypt. At least that is what two prominent American experts — Daniel Benjamin, former coordinator for counterterrorism in the U.S. State Department, and Steven Simon, former director of the Center for Middle East Studies in the United States National Security Council — expressed in an article published by The New York Times on Jan. 6, 2014.** They mention that the public war in Egypt against the Muslim Brotherhood, which has rejected violence since the 1970s, threatens to renew violence in the region and spread it through its countries, an event likely to damage Western and American interests and smash Israel’s security.

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To free Egyptian-American relations from the several myths and delusions woven around them, I will summarize the testimonies of three Egyptian experts whose voices have been lost among the exaggerations and commotion that are prevailing in the Egyptian media sector. The three are Ambassador Ihab Wahba, former assistant minister of foreign affairs for American affairs, Dr. Manar al-Shurbaji, a professor of political science specializing in American affairs, and Mr. Muhammad al-Minshawi, correspondent for the al-Shuruq newspaper in Washington. In their testimonies they mentioned the following information:

— In America’s strategy, there are two red lines governing Washington’s relationship with Cairo. The first is military cooperation, which is considered the foundation stone of America’s security conceptions in its relationships with one of the most important regions of the world. With this cooperation, the United States enjoys a special position on three matters: passage through the Suez Canal, the use of Egyptian air space and intelligence cooperation. The aid that the United States gives Egypt serves as a contribution on its part to the stability of circumstances that allow it to safeguard the aforementioned interests. The second red line, which President Obama talks about openly, is Egypt’s commitment to the peace treaty with Israel. In his speech about this issue, he said that any quiver in the peace treaty puts Israel’s security, even the United States’ security, at stake.

— From this angle, the cooperation, military facilitation and the peace treaty are considered among the fundamental principles of relations between the two countries that don’t tolerate variation or innovation, given the current balances of power.*** Everything else is considered a subsidiary matter that permits variation and innovation, including who governs Egypt and the internal policies that the governing party follows. In other words, the dues demanded by the fundamental principles in the relations between the two countries are considered necessary expenses. Everything else is a matter open to discussion by virtue of the fact that it remains a matter of embellishment, if we use the language of the scholars of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence.****

— In the subsidiary matters of embellishment, the United States sticks to its political principles and calculations and is concerned with the stability of circumstances in Egypt, not who governs it.

— It is untrue that the American administration favored Dr. Mohammad Morsi or sympathized with the Brotherhood government. All that has been said along these lines are just fantasies created by those who spoke them (an expression used by our colleague Muhammad al-Minshawi in his article published on July 1, 2013). Rather, the American administration didn’t show any sort of welcome toward the idea of Morsi meeting with the American president. Obama wasn’t keen on meeting Morsi when he visited New York in September 2012 to give Egypt’s view in front of the United Nations General Assembly. The only time President Obama did praise Dr. Morsi was after the latter’s success in attaining the ceasefire following Israel’s attack on Gaza in November 2012.

— Washington did not reduce aid and delay giving planes to the Egyptian army to take a stance against the July 3 regime. To some extent, this was an implementation of the American law that prohibits giving aid to any country in which an elected president is overthrown by a military coup.

— Washington flattered the new regime when it hesitated to consider it a military coup, waited three months before implementing its law related to cutting aid and then strove to modify the law via Congress so that it could continue sending aid to allied countries. This is what happened with other countries like Pakistan, Chile and Honduras (Manar al-Shurbaji, Egypt Today, Jan. 23, 2014).

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I realize that there are disagreements between Egypt and the United States at the present time, but they remain within the limits of the matters of embellishment and subsidiary matters. They are not in the fundamental principles at the heart of the strategic alliance. But it pleases some zealots and political jesters to portray the issue as though Egypt is challenging the American administration. By doing so, they aim to bring to mind the Nasser era and its historical symbolism. In doing so, they forget that Abdel Nasser’s battle stemmed from the principles, not the subsidiary matters. He fundamentally rejected a strategic alliance with the United States, yet that is what Egypt became entangled in during the Sadat and Mubarak eras and what still enchains Egypt today.

That which exists between Cairo and Washington now is not a true battle. Rather, it is just a disagreement over subsidiary matters that occurred within the framework of the strategic alliance between the two countries. To claim otherwise is to spread a myth that deceives the masses and tickles their emotions.

* Editor’s Note: This quote, accurately translated, could not be verified.
** Translator’s Note: To clarify, Simon’s former position was as senior director of the United States National Security Council for the Middle East and North Africa.
*** Translator’s Note: Here, the author begins using Islamic jurisprudence jargon.
**** Translator’s Note: The author is referring to a category of matters in Islamic jurisprudence. Following the Shariah law, guidelines related to these matters enhance life and society. However, society can still function should they not be followed.