Well-Considered and Firm

On the first calendar day of spring, the plot of the drama revolving around Crimea thickened to the extreme.

In the afternoon, the news poured forth as if from a torn bag: The Duma appealed to the Russian president to take measures to stabilize the situation in Crimea and protect the peninsula’s Russian population; Vladimir Putin made an appeal to the Federation Council on the use of the Russian Federation’s armed forces on Ukrainian soil “in connection with the extraordinary situation that has emerged there” and the threat to the lives of Russian citizens; the Federation Council unanimously agreed to give the Russian president the right to use the army in order to normalize the sociopolitical situation in Ukraine; the vice speaker of the Federation Council proposed recalling Russia’s ambassador from Washington since the U.S. president had “crossed a red line”…

Ambassadors, needless to say, are sometimes recalled for consultations, although in this case such a step does not say anything good about relations between the two powers. But in the context of the seething situation surrounding Crimea, the proposal to recall the ambassador resounded like the ponderous toll of a bell. Indeed, much as you might like to, you cannot call the American president’s words about how Russia would “pay dearly” for its policy peace-loving.* Things have not yet come to an open conflict, of course, but it is obvious that relations between Moscow and Washington have not been so bad since the war of 8/8/08.

“Both actions—military and parliamentary—were a direct rebuff to President Obama, who on Friday pointedly warned Russia to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity,” the New York Times promptly responded.

In actuality, the president’s National Security Adviser Susan Rice had already spoken a week ago about how it would be a “grave mistake” to send Russian troops into Ukraine, and shortly thereafter Jen Psaki, the “voice” of the State Department, stated that “any Russian intervention in Ukraine” is not in Russia’s interests. These outbursts were pretty much ignored by the Russian side—“pretty much” because the Russian Foreign Ministry nevertheless dignified their derisive commentaries with a response—but then Obama started saying the same thing. Indeed, it was after his speech that Russia’s president appealed to the Federation Council to authorize the use of Russia’s armed forces in Ukraine.

Remember how Brer Rabbit begged Brer Fox, “Do with me what you will, Brer Fox, just don’t throw me into the briar patch!”? The Americans warned us so emphatically not to move troops into Ukraine that they basically left us no choice…

But wait. Troops have not yet moved in.

By Sunday morning passions had subsided somewhat: Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin explained that the agreement the president had received from the senators does not mean that troops would move in instantly and that, more precisely, it gives Putin a free hand in the event that the situation deteriorates. The president’s Press Secretary Dmitri Peskov hastened to reassure the public, stating that a decision to recall Russia’s ambassador to the U.S. had not yet been made.

What conclusions can be drawn from Saturday’s unexpectedly dramatic escalation of the situation?

First, it is quite obvious that Russia does not want to go to war in Ukraine. Not only because any military actions taken by the Russian Federation on the territory of a neighboring republic would lead to a sharp deterioration of relations with the West, but also because a brother nation, in the literal sense of the word, lives in Ukraine. It is possible, of course, to put the Galician gang in its place, but that would inevitably lead to victims, and every victim in a conflict of Russians with Ukrainians weakens both Russia and Ukraine.

Second, Moscow’s démarche on Saturday clearly showed the West—not just Washington but to the same degree Paris, London and Berlin—that at the same time, Russia can go to war in Ukraine. Moreover, Western analysts’ initial prognoses rate the West’s ability to prevent Russia from realizing its right to defend Crimea’s Russian population and its strategic interests in the region in any way as quite low.

Peter Baker, author of an article with the distinctive title “Making Russia Pay? It’s Not So Simple,” interviewed quite a number of experts on Russian foreign policy—from Kevin Ryan, a former defense attaché in the American Embassy in Moscow, to Brookings Institute scholar Fiona Hill and professional intelligence officer James F. Jeffrey, who advised Bush during the Russian-Georgian conflict. They are all extremely pessimistic about the West’s ability to stop a hypothetical military operation by Russia in Ukraine.

The maximum that Obama can do, they feel, is deploy NATO forces on the Ukrainian-Polish border. “There’s nothing we can do to save Ukraine at this point,” believes Jeffrey. “All we can do is save the alliance [NATO].”

Third, it would be a serious mistake to think that the threat—and thus far we are talking merely about the threat!—of a Russian military operation in Ukraine is the first step on the path to the annexation of Crimea or eastern Ukraine. From a military strategy viewpoint, it is not such an unbelievable scenario. But the political consequences of such a step would likely be painful for Russia, and territory thus acquired might become not a geopolitical prize but an additional burden.

To be sure, a situation in which Crimea returns to being part of the Russian Federation cannot help but bring joy to every patriotic heart; however, from a long-term strategy point of view, it is much more important for Russia to have at its borders a normal, stable government that fulfills its obligations.

Meanwhile, Ukraine is now facing economic and financial collapse. According to the latest data, the number of refugees from Ukrainian regions to Russia’s border regions already exceeds 140,000. What will happen when Ukraine’s already moribund economy finally collapses?

It surely will collapse if government structures with which Moscow can carry on a normal dialogue are not created as soon as possible. Such a dialogue is impossible with the Galician thugs who have taken over Kiev, for obvious reasons.

The creation of such structures requires that the forces which have come to power in Kiev with the help, to put it politically correctly, of the West be removed from the political field. The West made Yanukovych sign the agreements of Feb. 21 and pledged to guarantee their implementation. But two, three days have gone by and not even the slightest memory of the agreements remains. I am not sure that the American or European directors of Ukraine’s “revolution” genuinely wanted the political course of the new government to be defined by extremists from the “Right Sector,” but the fact is they have achieved much more: The current face of the Maidan protest is scumbags like the “centurion” Parasiuk, who now decide who is and who is not worthy to occupy positions in Ukraine’s government.

Not a single one of the “guarantors” spoke out against Dmitry Yarosh, who enlisted the help of Doku Umarov, or straightened out those who voided the Feb. 21 agreements. The West’s politicians have thus effectively admitted that they do not stand by their word and are not going to take any responsibility whatsoever for the bloody mess they have stirred up in Ukraine.

What is left for Russia to do in the situation?

Only to pursue a hard line, inviting partners to a serious dialogue in which responsibility for the political decisions made by the parties involved will not be empty words.

One can assume that Russia’s demonstrated willingness to resolve the Ukrainian crisis with the involvement of military force is not a step on the path toward confrontation but an invitation to such a dialogue.

*Translator’s note: Russian media has consistently translated President Obama’s dispassionate warning that there would be “costs” for military intervention in Ukraine by Russia as the belligerent threat that Russia would “pay dearly.”