Who Is the Real Enemy of the US?

Following the continual dispute between the United States and Russia on Ukraine’s problems, the attention of the American public seems to have been drawn to Russia. However, the academic world of U.S. domestic affairs introduced a new viewpoint, different from actual international conflicts. Many American scholars suggest to not solely focus on Russia, because “China is the real enemy of the United States.”

U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel recently said that U.S. support for Ukraine “has not pulled any assets away” from Asia or any other region. The main reason for Obama’s minimal military response to the crisis in Ukraine is to avoid an escalation of conflict. Hagel stated that even if Russia decided to invade eastern Ukraine, the U.S. would not send troops in response. Although having guessed the last card that comrade Putin would play, the U.S. does not plan on changing its basic strategy of global focus on China.

Some people believe that the crisis in Ukraine foreshadows a delay in the “pivot to Asia” strategy, long promised by the Obama administration, even suggesting that the strategic focus will once again be diverted to Europe. Hagel’s tour deliberately targeted this view, and he insisted that this situation would not occur. He said that the U.S. was supporting its NATO allies in response to the conflict with Russia, but did not plan on increasing the number of troops in Europe. After the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the U.S. clamored for sending troops to support Eastern Europe, but in reality, the U.S. presence was not excessive in this region: Only 18 warplanes have been deployed to Poland and Lithuania thus far, a naval destroyer extended its patrol in the Black Sea, and approximately 300,000 boxes of field rations were distributed to the troops in Ukraine. These provisions are insignificant on the U.S. global strategic scale.

In fact, accurately and objectively identifying the circumstances of global relations is the cornerstone for any country’s foreign policies. Under these circumstances, one of the most important first steps is to ascertain the main threat. During World War II, the U.S. viewed Germany, Italy and Japan, or the Axis powers, as the main threat to the security of the United States, as well as the rest of the world. As a result, the U.S. became not only the world’s most crucial player in the war against fascism, but also the protector of world justice and peace, greatly boosting America’s global position. Postwar, the U.S. was able to establish a new international order, on one hand because of its military power and economic strength, and on the other, its moral stance and authority.

After the Cold War ended, the U.S. fell into a state of emptiness and confusion from the “lack” of a strategic competitor. To a large extent, the U.S. possessed an ingrained “enemy” complex. Consequently, the U.S. began an incessant search for enemies and redefined itself through the process. At the turn of the century, the U.S. seemed to have identified a suitable “enemy” — China.

In fact, the U.S. has always viewed China as an “outsider.” When the Cold War ended, Sino-American relations continued to remain turbulent. Between the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia during the Clinton era and the beginning of George W. Bush’s presidency, an event as drastic as the Hainan Island incident happened between the U.S. and China. American hostility toward China had always existed. Bush publicly proclaimed that China was not a strategic partner, but a strategic competitor of the United States. The American government at that time was full of optimism upon this realization, making significant changes to its strategies, with its “pivot to Asia” policy looking more imminent.

The 9/11 incident disrupted the American strategic plan. With the next eight years, the U.S. marked the beginning of a controversial era of global counterterrorism. However, we have to be clear that even if the U.S. had locked in its enemies as al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations, as well as related terrorist activities, the U.S. would continue to employ traditional nation-state and geostrategic tactics. For example, the wars launched by the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq not only eradicated the al-Qaida headquarters and those harboring them, but they also allowed American forces to penetrate and expand into Central Asia and the Middle East.

Whether intentionally or not, the U.S. used “counterterrorism” as a reason to expansively establish or lease military bases in the Caucasus and Africa. The locations of these bases were chosen with geostrategic consideration against Iraq, North Korea and other nations part of the “axis of evil” and “outposts of tyranny,” instead of a simple goal of fighting terrorism. From this perspective, it is still too early to conclude whether the Bush administration’s foreign strategy was a success or failure. However, after experiencing eight years of a global war against terrorism, one point became clear for the United States. Pinpointing a vague and abstract target like terrorism as an “enemy” was absurd and unsustainable.

Accompanying the end of the Bush administration were not only the two wars in which the U.S. was heavily involved, a damaged international image and a broken American economy, but also an important geostrategic challenge from the Russo-Georgian War in August of 2008. Interestingly, six years later, the Obama administration faces the same dilemma. Because of the issue in Ukraine, the U.S. and Russia find themselves once again in the arena. With Russia-U.S. relations “reset” during Obama’s first term, or even coming to a halt after this incident, the U.S. and Europe’s new geostrategic conflict with Russia begins to take shape.

From the current point of view, based on these two events, the U.S. seems to be taking on a relatively passive role. As a result, there are not many countermeasures available to the United States, nor will they necessarily be effective. Whether the political promises that the U.S. made to its allies could be fulfilled remains a mystery to the international community. Consequently, on March 20, 2014, Obama addressed the issue in Ukraine by emphasizing that the U.S. “will never waver. NATO nations never stand alone.” On March 26, during a meeting with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Obama once again reiterated this point.

In fact, on a larger scale and in the long run, the Obama administration seems to have affirmed that the Asia-Pacific region is the most important to American interests. Exports from Asia to the U.S. far exceed those from Europe. And while Europe has a peacekeeping NATO, Asia lacks a similar type of regional organization and continues to rely on the presence of American troops. Unlike Russia, China is a rising power full of potential. The current mission for the U.S. is to persuade the Asian leaders of its serious intention, and that the U.S. will not shift its strategic focus from the Pacific because of the crisis in Ukraine or other locations.

After the Cold War, in a global sense, the so-called enemies of the U.S. referred to three targets: China, terrorism and Russia, with terrorism referring to specific countries such as Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s regime, and Iran, widely disdained by the Americans. The U.S. adopted a conservative perception to calm its inner fears, labeling whatever entity it focused its attention on as a “competitor” or “enemy.” The bottom line is, regardless of whether Ukraine will be in turmoil again or the situation will worsen, the U.S. still cannot let go of China.