US Solving 21st Century Problems with 19th Century Methods
Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 21 April 2014
by Wu Zhenglong (link to original)
U.S. President Barack Obama is going to visit Japan, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines this week. The Asia-Pacific "re-balancing" strategy of the United States is at a crossroads.
Ever since Obama’s announcement in a lofty tone that the U.S. will return to the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. has been sparing no effort on this matter for three years. Politically, it forms alliances and builds zones that encircle China. Militarily, it deploys a vast number of troops and warships to this region and dramatically increases the occasions for joint military exercises. Diplomatically, it foments disunity and dissent between Japan and the Philippines and creates a tense atmosphere. Compared to the past, more upheavals have plagued the Asia-Pacific region.
However, America’s effort only results in the doubts and concerns of its Asian allies. They fear three things. First, they fear that the U.S. will shift its strategic focus back to Europe and the Middle East: to the Ukrainian crisis, the Syrian conflict, the Middle East peace treaty, and Iran’s nuclear talks. Second, they fear that once conflicts with China take place, the U.S. may renege on its promise to support "self-protection." They will do their best to ensure that America’s bilateral relationship with China, the second largest world economy will not be harmed. Third, they fear that as China’s influence keeps rising, some of America’s allies (Japan) will be marginalized.
On the surface, what causes the above fears is that Obama failed to fulfill his promise and missed the East Asia Summit and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit because of the U.S. government shutdown. In addition, since the Ukrainian crisis, the U.S. has come across as weak and yielding in its response to Russia’s offensive stance: Given America’s resolution and ability to protect them, this concerns its allies.
However, the reason lies deeper still. The "re-balancing" strategy is the product of the "Cold War" mentality. It will not bring peace and prosperity to the Asia-Pacific, but regional upheaval and unrest.
First of all, the starting point of its "re-balancing" strategy is to restrain China and slow down its pace of development by deploying the allies, so that the relative strength will be in favor of the United States, which will maintain its hegemonic status. This is why the Asia-Pacific region has witnessed endless conflicts and maintained a relatively low level of tension all the time. Needless to say, we cannot exclude the possibility that the U.S. is dragged into this regional conflict because it needs to fulfill its obligation as the head of the alliance.
Second, its "re-balancing" strategy is a double-sided one. That is to say, it not only has to contain China, but it also needs to create opportunities for the U.S. by taking advantage of China’s economic development. Enhancing interaction with China is a very important dimension of this strategy. Its double dimensions worry the allies, who constantly fear that America might "sell" them out. Therefore, this fear is structural and a visit or talk by Obama cannot reduce it.
Last, the U.S. needs to balance China by using the strength of its allies. Conversely, its allies need to balance the U.S. with China's help. Therefore, a strange phenomenon arises in the Asia-Pacific region: dependence on the U.S. in terms of security and on China in terms of the economy, which reflects the complicated interbalancing and counterbalancing within this region. From a long-term perspective, this situation does not favor the United States, nor regional peace and prosperity.
Judging from the facts, America’s "re-balancing" strategy in the Asia-Pacific region employs strategies from the 19th century to deal with the problems of the 21st. This is destined to fail. Does the U.S. want to bet on containing China, or does it not want to participate constructively in the region's economic development and benefit from it? It should think twice about this.
Ever since Obama’s announcement in a lofty tone that the U.S. will return to the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. has been sparing no effort on this matter for three years. Politically, it forms alliances and builds zones that encircle China. Militarily, it deploys a vast number of troops and warships to this region and dramatically increases the occasions for joint military exercises. Diplomatically, it foments disunity and dissent between Japan and the Philippines and creates a tense atmosphere. Compared to the past, more upheavals have plagued the Asia-Pacific region.
However, America’s effort only results in the doubts and concerns of its Asian allies. They fear three things. First, they fear that the U.S. will shift its strategic focus back to Europe and the Middle East: to the Ukrainian crisis, the Syrian conflict, the Middle East peace treaty, and Iran’s nuclear talks. Second, they fear that once conflicts with China take place, the U.S. may renege on its promise to support "self-protection." They will do their best to ensure that America’s bilateral relationship with China, the second largest world economy will not be harmed. Third, they fear that as China’s influence keeps rising, some of America’s allies (Japan) will be marginalized.
On the surface, what causes the above fears is that Obama failed to fulfill his promise and missed the East Asia Summit and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit because of the U.S. government shutdown. In addition, since the Ukrainian crisis, the U.S. has come across as weak and yielding in its response to Russia’s offensive stance: Given America’s resolution and ability to protect them, this concerns its allies.
However, the reason lies deeper still. The "re-balancing" strategy is the product of the "Cold War" mentality. It will not bring peace and prosperity to the Asia-Pacific, but regional upheaval and unrest.
First of all, the starting point of its "re-balancing" strategy is to restrain China and slow down its pace of development by deploying the allies, so that the relative strength will be in favor of the United States, which will maintain its hegemonic status. This is why the Asia-Pacific region has witnessed endless conflicts and maintained a relatively low level of tension all the time. Needless to say, we cannot exclude the possibility that the U.S. is dragged into this regional conflict because it needs to fulfill its obligation as the head of the alliance.
Second, its "re-balancing" strategy is a double-sided one. That is to say, it not only has to contain China, but it also needs to create opportunities for the U.S. by taking advantage of China’s economic development. Enhancing interaction with China is a very important dimension of this strategy. Its double dimensions worry the allies, who constantly fear that America might "sell" them out. Therefore, this fear is structural and a visit or talk by Obama cannot reduce it.
Last, the U.S. needs to balance China by using the strength of its allies. Conversely, its allies need to balance the U.S. with China's help. Therefore, a strange phenomenon arises in the Asia-Pacific region: dependence on the U.S. in terms of security and on China in terms of the economy, which reflects the complicated interbalancing and counterbalancing within this region. From a long-term perspective, this situation does not favor the United States, nor regional peace and prosperity.
Judging from the facts, America’s "re-balancing" strategy in the Asia-Pacific region employs strategies from the 19th century to deal with the problems of the 21st. This is destined to fail. Does the U.S. want to bet on containing China, or does it not want to participate constructively in the region's economic development and benefit from it? It should think twice about this.