The Atlantic Alliance After Crimea
Published in El Pais
(Spain) on 7 May 2014
by Mariano Aguirre (link to original)
Containing Russia without humiliating it continues to be a good formula for the U.S. and Europe.
At almost the same time that Russia was taking power in Crimea, former Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg was elected as the new general secretary of NATO. The Atlantic Alliance and its new leader will face two complex problems. First, how to respond if Russia uses violence in its policy of rebuilding a post-Soviet economic space. Second, what to do with the military operations outside of NATO's traditional area.
Russia can generate great instability if it claims the defense of the Russian minorities in countries that were members of the Warsaw Pact. NATO intervened in 1999 supporting Kosovar secessionism. Moscow has shown in Crimea that the United States and Europe are not ready to use force to support Ukraine's sovereignty. Russia is a huge market and energy supplier for Europe, which needs both. If diplomacy and sanctions are the favorite tools of Washington and its allies, NATO will have to be part of a broader strategy that combines military assistance to its allies in the East, sanctions, negotiations about supply and demand of energy and keeps dialogue channels open. Additionally, the West will have to understand the motivations that move Moscow.
The actions outside of the Treaty of Washington area (the strip that goes from North America to Europe, with some exceptions) were introduced in Afghanistan in 2003 and in Libya to overthrow Gadhafi in 2011. These missions seemed to give meaning to NATO. But serious questions weigh over the two examples. Afghanistan is fragmented and at war. The Libyan state has been swallowed up by hundreds of militias, and Gadhafi's fall sped up the destabilization of the Sahel. The allies will be dubious before investing military and economic resources in other uncertain action.
Stoltenberg comes from a country with a strong tradition in promoting political dialogue with all of the players in international conflicts. One of the fundamentals of Norwegian foreign policy is to help build a stable world via peace, development and protecting human rights. As prime minister from 2005-2013, he practiced this policy while at the same time increasing military expenditure.
His government established good relations with Russia, negotiating an agreement on the Arctic maritime borders in 2010. Norway also has excellent ties with the United States. Although their policies occasionally diverge, Oslo has opened a means of useful political dialogue for Washington. At the same time, Norway is a strong voice and great contributor at the United Nations and a committed ally in NATO. This experience with the two powers, and influence in the U.N. and the Atlantic Alliance, will be useful for Stoltenberg in his relationship with Moscow. Russia wants to be recognized as a geopolitical actor and be treated with respect — something which neither the United States nor Europe has done since the USSR disappeared. And it feels humiliated by NATO's expansion eastward.
The Russian reaction falls within a series of global changes and tendencies: First, the internal financial crises as well as the United States’ and Europe's crises of international legitimacy; second, the rise of emerging powers like Brazil, Turkey, South Africa and India; third, military confrontations are improbable between states that have close economic ties even if they lack political affinities.
These factors make up a multipolar world, distinct from the bipolar one of the Cold War, where NATO was a central actor. Barack Obama is trying to conduct his country in the transition from having been a leading country in the world to being one among several in the multipolar system of power. In NATO, where Washington no longer commands like it did in the past, the president makes balances with the aim of preserving leadership while simultaneously pressuring other members to increase defense expenses, something improbable in times of crisis.
Obama's task is not simple because his lukewarm multilateralism survives before the imperial ideology of the so-called neo-conservatives, which in its own interest confuses the United States' crisis with the president's supposed weakness. Obama is criticized for having dialogues with Iran, urging Israel to negotiate with the Palestinians, having stopped the military attack against the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, not dissuading China by force in the territorial confrontation with Japan and avoiding threatening Russia militarily.
Obama's position of dialogue is similar to the European one, but the future Republican government could support a policy of confrontation with Russia. Between Russian defiance and a possible radicalization in Washington, Europe remains in a difficult position. After having given very weak responses to the Arab Spring, will it be able to respond to Russia without believing that only NATO can offer a solution? The formula by George Kennan, the founder of the strategy of containment of the USSR in 1947, continues being valid for the United States and Europe in times that lay ahead: contain Russia without humiliating it, diminish interventionism, preserve democratic values, and fortify their own economic and social capacities.
At almost the same time that Russia was taking power in Crimea, former Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg was elected as the new general secretary of NATO. The Atlantic Alliance and its new leader will face two complex problems. First, how to respond if Russia uses violence in its policy of rebuilding a post-Soviet economic space. Second, what to do with the military operations outside of NATO's traditional area.
Russia can generate great instability if it claims the defense of the Russian minorities in countries that were members of the Warsaw Pact. NATO intervened in 1999 supporting Kosovar secessionism. Moscow has shown in Crimea that the United States and Europe are not ready to use force to support Ukraine's sovereignty. Russia is a huge market and energy supplier for Europe, which needs both. If diplomacy and sanctions are the favorite tools of Washington and its allies, NATO will have to be part of a broader strategy that combines military assistance to its allies in the East, sanctions, negotiations about supply and demand of energy and keeps dialogue channels open. Additionally, the West will have to understand the motivations that move Moscow.
The actions outside of the Treaty of Washington area (the strip that goes from North America to Europe, with some exceptions) were introduced in Afghanistan in 2003 and in Libya to overthrow Gadhafi in 2011. These missions seemed to give meaning to NATO. But serious questions weigh over the two examples. Afghanistan is fragmented and at war. The Libyan state has been swallowed up by hundreds of militias, and Gadhafi's fall sped up the destabilization of the Sahel. The allies will be dubious before investing military and economic resources in other uncertain action.
Stoltenberg comes from a country with a strong tradition in promoting political dialogue with all of the players in international conflicts. One of the fundamentals of Norwegian foreign policy is to help build a stable world via peace, development and protecting human rights. As prime minister from 2005-2013, he practiced this policy while at the same time increasing military expenditure.
His government established good relations with Russia, negotiating an agreement on the Arctic maritime borders in 2010. Norway also has excellent ties with the United States. Although their policies occasionally diverge, Oslo has opened a means of useful political dialogue for Washington. At the same time, Norway is a strong voice and great contributor at the United Nations and a committed ally in NATO. This experience with the two powers, and influence in the U.N. and the Atlantic Alliance, will be useful for Stoltenberg in his relationship with Moscow. Russia wants to be recognized as a geopolitical actor and be treated with respect — something which neither the United States nor Europe has done since the USSR disappeared. And it feels humiliated by NATO's expansion eastward.
The Russian reaction falls within a series of global changes and tendencies: First, the internal financial crises as well as the United States’ and Europe's crises of international legitimacy; second, the rise of emerging powers like Brazil, Turkey, South Africa and India; third, military confrontations are improbable between states that have close economic ties even if they lack political affinities.
These factors make up a multipolar world, distinct from the bipolar one of the Cold War, where NATO was a central actor. Barack Obama is trying to conduct his country in the transition from having been a leading country in the world to being one among several in the multipolar system of power. In NATO, where Washington no longer commands like it did in the past, the president makes balances with the aim of preserving leadership while simultaneously pressuring other members to increase defense expenses, something improbable in times of crisis.
Obama's task is not simple because his lukewarm multilateralism survives before the imperial ideology of the so-called neo-conservatives, which in its own interest confuses the United States' crisis with the president's supposed weakness. Obama is criticized for having dialogues with Iran, urging Israel to negotiate with the Palestinians, having stopped the military attack against the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, not dissuading China by force in the territorial confrontation with Japan and avoiding threatening Russia militarily.
Obama's position of dialogue is similar to the European one, but the future Republican government could support a policy of confrontation with Russia. Between Russian defiance and a possible radicalization in Washington, Europe remains in a difficult position. After having given very weak responses to the Arab Spring, will it be able to respond to Russia without believing that only NATO can offer a solution? The formula by George Kennan, the founder of the strategy of containment of the USSR in 1947, continues being valid for the United States and Europe in times that lay ahead: contain Russia without humiliating it, diminish interventionism, preserve democratic values, and fortify their own economic and social capacities.
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