The Return to Asia is America's Greatest Strategic Error

The United States’ “Return to Asia” strategy is causing serious conflicts between China and the countries that surround it. The U.S. is demonstrating “confrontational” strategic intent on all hot points related to China. It is clear from the recent bouts of rhetoric coming out of the U.S. that China is now America’s foremost strategic opponent. The American response to the Ukraine conflict, and the ambiguous messages sent by its sanctions on Russia, send a foreboding signal that China is America’s next target.

In carrying out its strategy, the U.S. is applying compression tactics to all areas of China’s growth. Firstly, it is fomenting dissent within Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet to stab at China at a national level. Secondly, it is trying to weaken China’s geopolitical and economic relations throughout Asia by supporting those countries causing dissent within China’s nearby territorial waters. Thirdly, it is trying to destroy China’s global trade advantage and suppress its socio-economic transformation by creating a multi-nation trade partnership throughout the Asia-Pacific and then refusing to let China participate. Fourthly, it will also, in all likelihood, try to confound China’s attempts to emulate American society by taking advantage of this precarious point in China’s economic development, and export its ideas of “democratic revolution” to destroy China from the inside.

But, insofar as this writer is concerned, from both a strategic overview and a tactical application standpoint, America’s “Return to Asia” policy is flawed. We can judge the validity of this assertion through examination of the following points:

First, stability is an important issue in the United States’ “Return to Asia” strategy, and it’s clear that both the U.S. and Chinese economies are interlocked in an equilibrium of mutual dependency. The global economy is dependent on China too, and it is difficult to find any single country in the world, other than China, that can undertake a mass-scale, open economic system capable of meeting the needs of the global trading system like China can. As China’s national consumer economy starts to take shape, the Chinese domestic economy will become an important market for U.S. and Asian businesses, further increasing the mutual dependencies between China and its trading partners.

Second, with China being a country that remembers well the effects of foreign expansionism, China has no interest in leading or dominating the world. China’s foreign policy has always only been concerned with maintaining the country’s core interests, while simultaneously seeking outward economic expansion. Foreign scholars have commented that, once China’s GDP surpasses that of the U.S., it will embark on an aggressive campaign of hegemonic expansion throughout its neighboring countries and America. These statements reveal the “confirmatory bias” or “intentional bias” in these countries’ line of thinking, as they themselves are dependent upon expansionism and hegemony to continue their growth.

Third, the logic behind the American “Return to Asia” strategy is, to a large degree, an attempt to rehash 19th century values and conscience and apply them to China’s 21st century economic liberation. China’s future development does not exclude democracy and freedom, and this has been proven in the government’s recent report highlighting socialism’s 18 core values. In contrast, many countries’ “color revolutions” are beginning to fade away, showing clearly people’s reactions to the shortcomings of Western-style democracies. This will certainly give birth to new forms of governmental and administrative systems in the future.

Lastly, China’s historical longevity and the unique quality of its national character demonstrate that China’s society is highly flexible and tolerant. This will provide a stable base for China’s internal reform. The Chinese government is taking seriously the underlying issues of inequality within Chinese society, and will do all it can to ensure that future structural reforms address all these problems. For now, China needs only to hold its current course steady, bide its time and keep hold of its strategic game chips for when the appropriate time arises. While waiting, we must keep on the path toward peaceful horizons and focus on building further economic relations and dependencies with our trading partners. How the U.S. continues to respond to China’s rise will have a powerful effect on the world’s future. We trust that the many wise and learned people of the United States will join in introspection over this fact.

The author is a researcher for the China People’s University National Development and Strategy Research Institute.