What America Wants from ISIL
Published in Fars News
(Iran) on 12 July 2014
by Mohsen Mohammadi (link to original)
The main policies of the White House for the Middle East have become a design for a new Middle East. In the framework of this political package, the United States is pursuing the creation of countries favorable to its values and policies, and is agreeable to the existence of Israel. The barriers to America’s Middle East policies are the existence of powerful, independent countries with distinct identities from the West. Therefore, changing these societies into favorable units with limited political geography is necessary in order to eliminate these obstacles. Besides this, weakening and collapsing the independent and anti-American coalitions in the region, meaning the resistance axis, is another necessity in creating this new Middle East.
In order for the U.S. to enact its political plan in the Middle East, it must first break up the anti-American coalition. Then, it can steer the region’s political geography in a direction dependent upon itself.
Initially, American statesmen thought that they had to have a direct presence in the region in order to enact their plan. However, the problems that arose in Afghanistan, and especially Iraq, and the consequent failure to implement their policies have caused them to change their perspective in this regard.
The U.S. reached the conclusion that it did not need to be directly involved in the implementation of this plan. Instead, it searches for proxy elements in the region to execute this project.
Since no country in the region has the potential, superiority and necessary volition for this affair, the Americans sought out an actor or actors, so that their Middle Eastern policies could be realized through them.
The use of nongovernmental players, like religious fundamentalist groups, could be a useful tool for filling this gap. Therefore, after the U.S. left Iraq, it gave serious consideration to organizing and guiding religious fundamentalist groups in the Middle East.
The first large-scale and public use of these groups for furthering America’s Middle East project was seen in the organizing and guiding of one group in an attack against Syria, one of the powerful countries in the resistance axis. The goal was to break down this country or at least weaken this member of the resistance axis, and of course, the latter goal has been realized to a great extent.
The U.S. enjoyed using a fundamentalist group to attack Syria, which was its first attempt at using a nongovernmental entity to further the execution of its Middle East plan. It hopes to continue this policy to further its project. Applying this experience and testing it in another territory, such as Iraq, another member of the resistance axis, is very attractive to the United States.
Specifically, it could be said that the United States, using the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, is pursuing its own goals in successive and related stages in Iraq, which is a member of the resistance axis and a primary political unit in the Middle East.
The first stage was accomplished by exaggerating the danger of ISIL and pressuring the al-Maliki government, specifically the Shiites. It provided the ground for forming a weak and favorable government — a government outside of the democratic process and outside the view expressed by the Iraqi people in the last election. This could cause the formation of a disjointed government, instead of an integrated government, in an effort to create a compromise government that contains as many Sunnis as possible.
America’s first objective in the current crisis in Iraq is to form a disjointed, fragmented government, comprised mostly of Sunnis. Then, the U.S. will seek to destroy the political will necessary to resist ISIL, the political will we see in the current government.
After forming a fragmented government in Iraq, the central Iraqi government’s political will could be steered toward accepting some of the demands of the banned organization ISIL. Persuading the central government to accept some of its demands will not be a problem for the United States, with a substantial Sunni presence in the cabinet and its strong influence, along with the Sunni Party’s inclination to give concessions to the banned.
Therefore, the U.S. can force the government to pass changes to the constitution and power structure in Iraq to favor ISIL. Actually, in this way, it can legitimize the requests and existence of this banned movement in Iraq. After that, this movement can be officially recognized by the central government in the areas under its influence.
In the creation of this process, on the one hand, the Iraqi central government becomes weaker and weaker because in addition to Kurdistan, there are some Sunni areas where it will also not have dominance. On the other hand, the necessary basis and tools for America’s control of the Iraqi central government in order to distance it from the resistance axis and make it more favorable to America have been provided.
However, a more dangerous goal and scenario after this stage could be the U.S. preparing to divide Iraq. I have faith that should the previous stages mentioned be realized and do not bring America’s goals for Iraq and the Middle East to fruition, the U.S. will set the stage for dividing Iraq into three sections: Shiite, Sunni and Kurd, after the stages mentioned above, and after the establishment of ISIL in Iraq.
An important point that must be noted is that the division of Iraq is dependent upon three prerequisites: the formation of a weak and fragmented government in Iraq, the establishment and formalization of the terrorist presence in the political geography of Iraq, and the lack of serious resistance from the region’s effective powers, particularly Iran and Turkey.
It seems that now America’s primary goal in Iraq, after forming a weak cabinet that is favorable to the United States, is establishing the terrorist presence and formalizing that presence in the political geography of Iraq. It still has not arrived at a final decision in regard to the division of Iraq; however, this decision has been given over to the many American statesmen. Currently, they are evaluating the internal transformations of Iraq and are especially observing the attitudes and reactions of regional powers, including Iran.
In order for the U.S. to enact its political plan in the Middle East, it must first break up the anti-American coalition. Then, it can steer the region’s political geography in a direction dependent upon itself.
Initially, American statesmen thought that they had to have a direct presence in the region in order to enact their plan. However, the problems that arose in Afghanistan, and especially Iraq, and the consequent failure to implement their policies have caused them to change their perspective in this regard.
The U.S. reached the conclusion that it did not need to be directly involved in the implementation of this plan. Instead, it searches for proxy elements in the region to execute this project.
Since no country in the region has the potential, superiority and necessary volition for this affair, the Americans sought out an actor or actors, so that their Middle Eastern policies could be realized through them.
The use of nongovernmental players, like religious fundamentalist groups, could be a useful tool for filling this gap. Therefore, after the U.S. left Iraq, it gave serious consideration to organizing and guiding religious fundamentalist groups in the Middle East.
The first large-scale and public use of these groups for furthering America’s Middle East project was seen in the organizing and guiding of one group in an attack against Syria, one of the powerful countries in the resistance axis. The goal was to break down this country or at least weaken this member of the resistance axis, and of course, the latter goal has been realized to a great extent.
The U.S. enjoyed using a fundamentalist group to attack Syria, which was its first attempt at using a nongovernmental entity to further the execution of its Middle East plan. It hopes to continue this policy to further its project. Applying this experience and testing it in another territory, such as Iraq, another member of the resistance axis, is very attractive to the United States.
Specifically, it could be said that the United States, using the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, is pursuing its own goals in successive and related stages in Iraq, which is a member of the resistance axis and a primary political unit in the Middle East.
The first stage was accomplished by exaggerating the danger of ISIL and pressuring the al-Maliki government, specifically the Shiites. It provided the ground for forming a weak and favorable government — a government outside of the democratic process and outside the view expressed by the Iraqi people in the last election. This could cause the formation of a disjointed government, instead of an integrated government, in an effort to create a compromise government that contains as many Sunnis as possible.
America’s first objective in the current crisis in Iraq is to form a disjointed, fragmented government, comprised mostly of Sunnis. Then, the U.S. will seek to destroy the political will necessary to resist ISIL, the political will we see in the current government.
After forming a fragmented government in Iraq, the central Iraqi government’s political will could be steered toward accepting some of the demands of the banned organization ISIL. Persuading the central government to accept some of its demands will not be a problem for the United States, with a substantial Sunni presence in the cabinet and its strong influence, along with the Sunni Party’s inclination to give concessions to the banned.
Therefore, the U.S. can force the government to pass changes to the constitution and power structure in Iraq to favor ISIL. Actually, in this way, it can legitimize the requests and existence of this banned movement in Iraq. After that, this movement can be officially recognized by the central government in the areas under its influence.
In the creation of this process, on the one hand, the Iraqi central government becomes weaker and weaker because in addition to Kurdistan, there are some Sunni areas where it will also not have dominance. On the other hand, the necessary basis and tools for America’s control of the Iraqi central government in order to distance it from the resistance axis and make it more favorable to America have been provided.
However, a more dangerous goal and scenario after this stage could be the U.S. preparing to divide Iraq. I have faith that should the previous stages mentioned be realized and do not bring America’s goals for Iraq and the Middle East to fruition, the U.S. will set the stage for dividing Iraq into three sections: Shiite, Sunni and Kurd, after the stages mentioned above, and after the establishment of ISIL in Iraq.
An important point that must be noted is that the division of Iraq is dependent upon three prerequisites: the formation of a weak and fragmented government in Iraq, the establishment and formalization of the terrorist presence in the political geography of Iraq, and the lack of serious resistance from the region’s effective powers, particularly Iran and Turkey.
It seems that now America’s primary goal in Iraq, after forming a weak cabinet that is favorable to the United States, is establishing the terrorist presence and formalizing that presence in the political geography of Iraq. It still has not arrived at a final decision in regard to the division of Iraq; however, this decision has been given over to the many American statesmen. Currently, they are evaluating the internal transformations of Iraq and are especially observing the attitudes and reactions of regional powers, including Iran.