Obama’s ‘Red Lines’ of Variable Geometry
Published in Le Nouvel Observateur
(France) on 9 August 2014
by Pierre Haski (link to original)
One August follows another, but they are not alike for Barack Obama, as shown by the decision to authorize American strikes against the jihadists in Iraq, made 48 hours ago.
August 2013: The use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in Syria represents the crossing of a “red line” laid down by Barack Obama as a justification for acting against the government’s army. Preparations for aerial strikes are being made amongst the United States, France and the United Kingdom. After the British defection, Barack Obama steps back, leaving France and, above all, the Syrians to fend for themselves.
August 2014: There has been a new advancement of the jihadis of the Islamic State (ISIL), who are attacking Iraqi minorities, specifically Christians, Yazidis and Kurds. Faced with the threat of seeing the jihadists break through the lines of the Peshmergas, the Kurd combatants and the humanitarian disaster that is unfolding, Barack Obama very quickly makes the decision to launch drones and airstrikes against ISIL’s positions.
The “Commander-in-Chief’s” Hesitations
What’s wrong here? Why did the indecision and, finally, the diplomatic scattering of the end of the summer of 2013 transform into a martial proclamation from the “commander-in-chief” one year later?
It is not about knowing whether it is “good” or “bad” — it is enough to see the barbarity in the behavior of the ISIL combatants, as evidenced by the testimonies of those who have escaped as well as the photos of executions — impossible to show here — that they display on social networks, to comprehend that the populations concerned would accept the aid of all who would offer it, even the devil.
It is more a question of understanding what motivates Obama and when he intervenes, as well as when he does not.
In May, Barack Obama defined his "doctrine" of intervention during an important speech before the cadets of the American military academy, West Point. It was essentially a cry for restraint, in opposition to the frenzied interventionism during America’s period as a superpower that lead to the entanglement in Iraq and Afghanistan, from which Obama is trying to extricate the U.S. — not without difficulty, as we can see.
Vital Interests of the United States
The American president called for a restraint that, according to him, is not incompatible with continued leadership, but is transformed and is more concerned with building coalitions and alliances — especially in a world that has become multipolar and, once again, dangerous.
The criterion for choosing between intervention and restraint, according to him, therefore depends on knowing whether the interests of the United States are directly at stake. Thus, in 2013, Washington decided that the vital interests of the United States were not at stake in the Syrian conflict, regardless of the degree of horror and regression that the use of chemical weaponry caused.
But in 2014, would these interests have more to do with the jihadi offensive? The American response is a result of the humanitarian disaster, the fate of minorities, and the desire to protect Kurdistan, which lately appears to be the region’s final bastion of relative stability and is resolutely turned toward the West and, in particular, the United States.
To add a layer of complexity to the reasoning, there are many who will see an example of a double standard in America’s passivity (and more generally, that of the West) in the face of the disproportionate bombings of the Gaza Strip by Israel, which is not likely to reconcile the Middle East with the United States.
But based on the parallel between non-intervention in Syria and the recent strikes in Iraq, the limits of the first world power’s strategic coherence are plain to see. This is because the menace identified today as putting American interests at stake has grown and prospered due to America’s inaction — in Syria.
The jihadis, who were marginal during the beginning of the Syrian uprising and largely isolated at the same time in Iraq, have fed off of the Syrian impasse, during which the non-jihadi resistance still recognized by the West has not succeeded in its efforts to win.
The End-of-War Failure
It is difficult to rewrite history and to know what would have happened if the famous French-American strikes announced last year had actually happened. Still, the Syrian war has enabled the Iraqi offensive and the current attempts at destabilization in Lebanon.
More than Obama’s determination, it is rather his failure that is sanctioning the events in Iraq. This is the difficulty of truly defining a doctrine when going backward, driven by the laudable desire to disengage, but without successfully managing the ends of perennial wars, either in Afghanistan or in Iraq.
For Christians, Yazidis and Kurds, the American strikes may bring a necessary respite and put a stop to the jihadi advance — and that’s a lot. However, they certainly do not constitute a response to the political, religious and identity crisis of the region.
August 2013: The use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in Syria represents the crossing of a “red line” laid down by Barack Obama as a justification for acting against the government’s army. Preparations for aerial strikes are being made amongst the United States, France and the United Kingdom. After the British defection, Barack Obama steps back, leaving France and, above all, the Syrians to fend for themselves.
August 2014: There has been a new advancement of the jihadis of the Islamic State (ISIL), who are attacking Iraqi minorities, specifically Christians, Yazidis and Kurds. Faced with the threat of seeing the jihadists break through the lines of the Peshmergas, the Kurd combatants and the humanitarian disaster that is unfolding, Barack Obama very quickly makes the decision to launch drones and airstrikes against ISIL’s positions.
The “Commander-in-Chief’s” Hesitations
What’s wrong here? Why did the indecision and, finally, the diplomatic scattering of the end of the summer of 2013 transform into a martial proclamation from the “commander-in-chief” one year later?
It is not about knowing whether it is “good” or “bad” — it is enough to see the barbarity in the behavior of the ISIL combatants, as evidenced by the testimonies of those who have escaped as well as the photos of executions — impossible to show here — that they display on social networks, to comprehend that the populations concerned would accept the aid of all who would offer it, even the devil.
It is more a question of understanding what motivates Obama and when he intervenes, as well as when he does not.
In May, Barack Obama defined his "doctrine" of intervention during an important speech before the cadets of the American military academy, West Point. It was essentially a cry for restraint, in opposition to the frenzied interventionism during America’s period as a superpower that lead to the entanglement in Iraq and Afghanistan, from which Obama is trying to extricate the U.S. — not without difficulty, as we can see.
Vital Interests of the United States
The American president called for a restraint that, according to him, is not incompatible with continued leadership, but is transformed and is more concerned with building coalitions and alliances — especially in a world that has become multipolar and, once again, dangerous.
The criterion for choosing between intervention and restraint, according to him, therefore depends on knowing whether the interests of the United States are directly at stake. Thus, in 2013, Washington decided that the vital interests of the United States were not at stake in the Syrian conflict, regardless of the degree of horror and regression that the use of chemical weaponry caused.
But in 2014, would these interests have more to do with the jihadi offensive? The American response is a result of the humanitarian disaster, the fate of minorities, and the desire to protect Kurdistan, which lately appears to be the region’s final bastion of relative stability and is resolutely turned toward the West and, in particular, the United States.
To add a layer of complexity to the reasoning, there are many who will see an example of a double standard in America’s passivity (and more generally, that of the West) in the face of the disproportionate bombings of the Gaza Strip by Israel, which is not likely to reconcile the Middle East with the United States.
But based on the parallel between non-intervention in Syria and the recent strikes in Iraq, the limits of the first world power’s strategic coherence are plain to see. This is because the menace identified today as putting American interests at stake has grown and prospered due to America’s inaction — in Syria.
The jihadis, who were marginal during the beginning of the Syrian uprising and largely isolated at the same time in Iraq, have fed off of the Syrian impasse, during which the non-jihadi resistance still recognized by the West has not succeeded in its efforts to win.
The End-of-War Failure
It is difficult to rewrite history and to know what would have happened if the famous French-American strikes announced last year had actually happened. Still, the Syrian war has enabled the Iraqi offensive and the current attempts at destabilization in Lebanon.
More than Obama’s determination, it is rather his failure that is sanctioning the events in Iraq. This is the difficulty of truly defining a doctrine when going backward, driven by the laudable desire to disengage, but without successfully managing the ends of perennial wars, either in Afghanistan or in Iraq.
For Christians, Yazidis and Kurds, the American strikes may bring a necessary respite and put a stop to the jihadi advance — and that’s a lot. However, they certainly do not constitute a response to the political, religious and identity crisis of the region.