Obama vs The Islamic State: A Problem of Strategy
Published in El Universal
(Mexico) on 13 September 2014
by Mauricio Meschoulam (link to original)
Due to the complexity of the issue, #IConfess (#yoconfieso), I don’t really know where to begin. But I promise to give it a go. Obama’s strategy for combatting the Islamic State entails a campaign of airstrikes delivered by the United States and its allies and supported by forces on the ground. These ground forces do not include U.S. troops but are instead predominantly made up of local militia groups. However, since the Islamic State is operational in two different countries and controls territory in both, there is a need for "allied" forces on the ground on both sides of the Syrian-Iraqi border. And this is where the problems begin.
The Islamic State as we know it today did not arise out of a single conflict, but of many, some of which originate in Iraq, whereas others are rooted in Syria. They include, amongst others, political, sectarian and ethnic conflicts. As such, the circumstances cannot be reduced to the existence of two rival factions, or to a government versus a unified rebel force. It’s not even possible to speak of a situation in which all sides magically "unite" against a common enemy.
In the case of Syria, the conflict involves at least the following players (my apologies for the simplification): a) on one side, there’s the Assad regime, supported and financed by Iran and Russia, and aided on the ground by Hezbollah and the Libyan Shia militia; b) fighting against Assad, there is firstly the Free Syrian Army, which isn’t actually an army. The Free Syrian Army is really just a number of militia groups who share a common cause in their struggle against the Assad regime. However, these forces are not united under a single command and their links to the exiled Syrian opposition are extremely weak. In theory, they represent the "secular" contingent of the situation, but they have allied themselves with some of the Islamic militia groups mentioned below. The Free Syrian Army, like many of the actors described here, has accrued a large list of atrocities committed against civilians, acts which have been documented by the U.N. and NGOs; c) then, there are the local Islamic groups; d) there’s also the al-Nusra front, the Islamic jihadi group with ties to al-Qaida; and e) then, of course, there’s the Islamic State, which originally formed part of al-Qaida, but ended up breaking away from it. The sum of these militia groups, comprising what’s known as the "rebellion," have fought not only against Assad, but also amongst themselves, and have received backing, financing and arms — whether directly or indirectly — from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey, as well as logistical support from Washington.
Now, however, Obama has announced that the strategy for fighting the Islamic State in Syria will involve supporting, arming and training the "moderate" rebel militia, for example the Free Syrian Army, just one of the actors mentioned above. Assuming this were viable, it would involve preparing an army that isn’t actually an army to not only fight the Islamic State — a force with more than 20,000 militants and one which has demonstrated great competence in the field — but also to campaign on multiple fronts against Assad and against the other militia groups, including the Syrian branch of al-Qaida. As if this weren’t enough, Obama’s strategy, envisioned to defeat the Islamic State by fortifying the anti-Iran axis (both locally and internationally), also enters into direct conflict with what is going in Iraq, the other country where the Islamic State is operational.
It has transpired that the recent success of Washington’s airstrikes in Iraq owe to advances on the ground made by local Shia militia groups armed and supported by Iran. Naturally, the U.S. government does not recognize the existence of any U.S. coordination with these militia groups or with Iran. The problem is that in Iraq, both Sunnis and Kurds are strongly opposed to the strengthening of Shia militia groups, who are responsible for much of the violence and bloodshed that has taken place in the country over the past decade.
In other words, Obama intends to "degrade and destroy" the Islamic State — Assad’s enemy — by reinforcing the Free Syrian Army — Assad’s other enemy — so that this army that’s not actually an army will wage war against the Islamic State, against Assad, against al-Qaida, and against all other players simultaneously. He intends to achieve this by utilizing, without recognizing, the help of Iran — Assad’s ally, whom Obama seeks to overthrow in Syria — whilst at the same time making use of financial and logistical support from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and others — Iran’s enemies — all of whom are "brothers" united by a common goal, assuming this brotherhood will remain intact over the years it will take to "degrade and destroy" the Islamic State.
So either the White House has failed to consider a number of the aforementioned factors, or there’s something that’s not being said. This something could include the assent to a secret allegiance between Washington and Tehran, a move which, as already suspected, is making parties like Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf monarchies, Israel, and more than one Republican, extremely nervous.
At the beginning of 2014, an international peace conference on Syria was held under the auspices of the U.N. Today it is clearer than ever before that all parties involved gave in too quickly. Nevertheless, these are the sorts of initiatives that ought to be revived. Not because they are straightforward or the magic solution to everything described above, but because they would constitute a genuine move towards starting to unravel a web that is not going to be disentangled through unviable coalitions and wishful thinking.
The Islamic State as we know it today did not arise out of a single conflict, but of many, some of which originate in Iraq, whereas others are rooted in Syria. They include, amongst others, political, sectarian and ethnic conflicts. As such, the circumstances cannot be reduced to the existence of two rival factions, or to a government versus a unified rebel force. It’s not even possible to speak of a situation in which all sides magically "unite" against a common enemy.
In the case of Syria, the conflict involves at least the following players (my apologies for the simplification): a) on one side, there’s the Assad regime, supported and financed by Iran and Russia, and aided on the ground by Hezbollah and the Libyan Shia militia; b) fighting against Assad, there is firstly the Free Syrian Army, which isn’t actually an army. The Free Syrian Army is really just a number of militia groups who share a common cause in their struggle against the Assad regime. However, these forces are not united under a single command and their links to the exiled Syrian opposition are extremely weak. In theory, they represent the "secular" contingent of the situation, but they have allied themselves with some of the Islamic militia groups mentioned below. The Free Syrian Army, like many of the actors described here, has accrued a large list of atrocities committed against civilians, acts which have been documented by the U.N. and NGOs; c) then, there are the local Islamic groups; d) there’s also the al-Nusra front, the Islamic jihadi group with ties to al-Qaida; and e) then, of course, there’s the Islamic State, which originally formed part of al-Qaida, but ended up breaking away from it. The sum of these militia groups, comprising what’s known as the "rebellion," have fought not only against Assad, but also amongst themselves, and have received backing, financing and arms — whether directly or indirectly — from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey, as well as logistical support from Washington.
Now, however, Obama has announced that the strategy for fighting the Islamic State in Syria will involve supporting, arming and training the "moderate" rebel militia, for example the Free Syrian Army, just one of the actors mentioned above. Assuming this were viable, it would involve preparing an army that isn’t actually an army to not only fight the Islamic State — a force with more than 20,000 militants and one which has demonstrated great competence in the field — but also to campaign on multiple fronts against Assad and against the other militia groups, including the Syrian branch of al-Qaida. As if this weren’t enough, Obama’s strategy, envisioned to defeat the Islamic State by fortifying the anti-Iran axis (both locally and internationally), also enters into direct conflict with what is going in Iraq, the other country where the Islamic State is operational.
It has transpired that the recent success of Washington’s airstrikes in Iraq owe to advances on the ground made by local Shia militia groups armed and supported by Iran. Naturally, the U.S. government does not recognize the existence of any U.S. coordination with these militia groups or with Iran. The problem is that in Iraq, both Sunnis and Kurds are strongly opposed to the strengthening of Shia militia groups, who are responsible for much of the violence and bloodshed that has taken place in the country over the past decade.
In other words, Obama intends to "degrade and destroy" the Islamic State — Assad’s enemy — by reinforcing the Free Syrian Army — Assad’s other enemy — so that this army that’s not actually an army will wage war against the Islamic State, against Assad, against al-Qaida, and against all other players simultaneously. He intends to achieve this by utilizing, without recognizing, the help of Iran — Assad’s ally, whom Obama seeks to overthrow in Syria — whilst at the same time making use of financial and logistical support from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and others — Iran’s enemies — all of whom are "brothers" united by a common goal, assuming this brotherhood will remain intact over the years it will take to "degrade and destroy" the Islamic State.
So either the White House has failed to consider a number of the aforementioned factors, or there’s something that’s not being said. This something could include the assent to a secret allegiance between Washington and Tehran, a move which, as already suspected, is making parties like Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf monarchies, Israel, and more than one Republican, extremely nervous.
At the beginning of 2014, an international peace conference on Syria was held under the auspices of the U.N. Today it is clearer than ever before that all parties involved gave in too quickly. Nevertheless, these are the sorts of initiatives that ought to be revived. Not because they are straightforward or the magic solution to everything described above, but because they would constitute a genuine move towards starting to unravel a web that is not going to be disentangled through unviable coalitions and wishful thinking.
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