Islamic State: Obama Can Win Battles, but the War Will Last Years
Published in Le Nouvel Observateur
(France) on 11 September 2014
by Jean-Claude Allard (link to original)
On May 28, 2014, at the commencement ceremony at the West Point military academy, President Obama gave a crucial speech explaining his strategy for imposing American will: "The question ... is not whether America will lead, but how we will lead."
For him, it has to do with distinguishing the vital interests that military force will be used without restriction to defending in the interests of general order that would not pose a direct menace to the country but would get in the way of its leadership.
The announcement of his strategy against Islamic State is very much in line with his earlier comments. What remains to be seen is if the conditions are fulfilled so that the strategy is as victorious as in Ukraine.
Russia was Perfectly Suited for the New American Strategy
Ukraine lent itself perfectly to bringing down Russia, designated as one of the future enemies: "Three different baskets of risks could conspire to increase the changes of an outbreak of interstate conflict: changing calculations of key players — particularly China, India and Russia."
The network of interests developed by Chinese economic and financial power and its discretion in international relations protect it. With India, a more remote risk, the United States favors, for the moment, the growth of intersecting economic dependence.
Which leaves Russia, which is actively looking to escape the influence of the United States: a critical opposition to American policy — Middle East, Libya, etc.; an attempt at an organization of a multilateral political, economic and financial world — the organization of BRICS summits, the creation of a world bank, the abandonment of the dollar as a bargaining chip, a national system of payment ... ; in addition, the progression of economic links with western Europe, which ran the risk of making this vast entity a formidable economic competitor.
The economic characteristics of Russia, the potential troublemaker to eliminate, are perfectly suited to the implementation of a new strategy, by way of the crisis in Ukraine.
In Ukraine, Putin Won the Battle, but He Lost the War
Ukraine is certainly a complex subject, which can be characterized, however, for the strategist, after a detailed analysis, by three key points: bad governance, sociological antagonism and geography.
Geographically, Ukraine is the "gateway" to Russia through its broad reach: It serves as a passage for a Russian pipeline to Europe, and it allows Russia to lease the use of the only quality port on the warm seas that it could benefit from. It was, therefore, clear that that is where Russia's center of gravity was found.
Bad governance and the sociological split, which fed off each other, leading the country to the edge of being a failed state, was enough to let it slide downhill: government refusing to recognize the dreams of a large part of its population, termination of the port of Sevastopol’s rental contract, abandonment to the militias of the monopoly on the use of force, which, as a consequence, backslides into repression.
Russia was lured into the trap, not without trouble, incidentally, but the ends justified the means. In May, Obama was already able to congratulate himself: "Our ability to shape world opinion helped isolate Russia right away." In September 2014, Russia, in forcing President Poroshenko into an agreement, seemed to win a tactical victory, but the strategic victory went to the United States: An economic, financial and technological barrier was set up around Russia by a Europe that had sacrificed itself without a murmur, and NATO is invigorated and “in-hand.”*
The alliance of the Heartland and the Rimland was avoided. The Russian image and ambition of becoming an economic and political power are compromised for the long term.
Can We Win the War with Islamic State?
In his Sept. 10, 2014 report, President Obama stressed that he would not change his strategy: "To use force against anyone who threatens America's core interests, but to mobilize partners wherever possible to address broader challenges to international order." But the fight will have a different intensity for several reasons.
As there is asymmetric warfare, there are from this point forward "asymmetric" strategies; that is to say, ones that do not follow any rules and are absolutely elusive. While the Americans knew how to make Putin react, they don't know how to manipulate men for whom the cerebral world has no connection to their everyday world.
The coalition will never be as disciplined as the European coalition that they have gotten together. The rise in power of Islamic State is the result of earlier risky moves; everyone knows it in his region and no one wants today to go against what he supported yesterday. All the more so since for big factions within the public opinion in many countries, Islamic State, or at the very least its caliphate project, doesn't give rise to clear censure.
This War Could Spread to Other Places
In his military version, the strategy is the one used 13 years ago in Afghanistan: The anti-Taliban forces fought on the ground, with, at their sides, special intelligence forces, the help of planning and the targeting of airstrikes. This combination allowed Kabul to be taken in a few months.
Here, even if the airstrikes don't pose an insurmountable problem, the crew in the field is more motley: To the south, a Sunni-Shiite coming together that, without an Iranian blessing, will be likely to splinter at the first hard blow. To the east, Kurds who are aiming for the defense of their country, have independence in their sights and who will not go beyond the desired territory. To the north, an improbably free Syrian opposition, totally sensitive to all influences and from whose ranks come the squads of Islamic State.
Battles will be won, but the war will last years, and, above all, it will spread to other places. From the Atlantic to the Pacific, Islamism has succeeded in a just few years in implementing, in a spontaneous way, the theory of "foco,"** by improving the principle: Don't enter into direct conflict with the state, but take root where the state is weak or has truly failed.
A good strategy will also have to rapidly grasp the issue as a whole, including the mechanisms of this asymmetric strategy, identifying the next victims and protecting the states that could still serve as a shield.
It will also have to learn a lesson from past failures. On this point, reading the declaration of the heads of state after the NATO summit is not very convincing.
*Editor's note: Equestrian term of art meaning that the horse is attentive to the orders that its rider gives to it through the reins.
**Editor's note: Strategic vision of Che Guevara, who wanted to create “one, two, many Vietnams” to fight against the United States.
For him, it has to do with distinguishing the vital interests that military force will be used without restriction to defending in the interests of general order that would not pose a direct menace to the country but would get in the way of its leadership.
The announcement of his strategy against Islamic State is very much in line with his earlier comments. What remains to be seen is if the conditions are fulfilled so that the strategy is as victorious as in Ukraine.
Russia was Perfectly Suited for the New American Strategy
Ukraine lent itself perfectly to bringing down Russia, designated as one of the future enemies: "Three different baskets of risks could conspire to increase the changes of an outbreak of interstate conflict: changing calculations of key players — particularly China, India and Russia."
The network of interests developed by Chinese economic and financial power and its discretion in international relations protect it. With India, a more remote risk, the United States favors, for the moment, the growth of intersecting economic dependence.
Which leaves Russia, which is actively looking to escape the influence of the United States: a critical opposition to American policy — Middle East, Libya, etc.; an attempt at an organization of a multilateral political, economic and financial world — the organization of BRICS summits, the creation of a world bank, the abandonment of the dollar as a bargaining chip, a national system of payment ... ; in addition, the progression of economic links with western Europe, which ran the risk of making this vast entity a formidable economic competitor.
The economic characteristics of Russia, the potential troublemaker to eliminate, are perfectly suited to the implementation of a new strategy, by way of the crisis in Ukraine.
In Ukraine, Putin Won the Battle, but He Lost the War
Ukraine is certainly a complex subject, which can be characterized, however, for the strategist, after a detailed analysis, by three key points: bad governance, sociological antagonism and geography.
Geographically, Ukraine is the "gateway" to Russia through its broad reach: It serves as a passage for a Russian pipeline to Europe, and it allows Russia to lease the use of the only quality port on the warm seas that it could benefit from. It was, therefore, clear that that is where Russia's center of gravity was found.
Bad governance and the sociological split, which fed off each other, leading the country to the edge of being a failed state, was enough to let it slide downhill: government refusing to recognize the dreams of a large part of its population, termination of the port of Sevastopol’s rental contract, abandonment to the militias of the monopoly on the use of force, which, as a consequence, backslides into repression.
Russia was lured into the trap, not without trouble, incidentally, but the ends justified the means. In May, Obama was already able to congratulate himself: "Our ability to shape world opinion helped isolate Russia right away." In September 2014, Russia, in forcing President Poroshenko into an agreement, seemed to win a tactical victory, but the strategic victory went to the United States: An economic, financial and technological barrier was set up around Russia by a Europe that had sacrificed itself without a murmur, and NATO is invigorated and “in-hand.”*
The alliance of the Heartland and the Rimland was avoided. The Russian image and ambition of becoming an economic and political power are compromised for the long term.
Can We Win the War with Islamic State?
In his Sept. 10, 2014 report, President Obama stressed that he would not change his strategy: "To use force against anyone who threatens America's core interests, but to mobilize partners wherever possible to address broader challenges to international order." But the fight will have a different intensity for several reasons.
As there is asymmetric warfare, there are from this point forward "asymmetric" strategies; that is to say, ones that do not follow any rules and are absolutely elusive. While the Americans knew how to make Putin react, they don't know how to manipulate men for whom the cerebral world has no connection to their everyday world.
The coalition will never be as disciplined as the European coalition that they have gotten together. The rise in power of Islamic State is the result of earlier risky moves; everyone knows it in his region and no one wants today to go against what he supported yesterday. All the more so since for big factions within the public opinion in many countries, Islamic State, or at the very least its caliphate project, doesn't give rise to clear censure.
This War Could Spread to Other Places
In his military version, the strategy is the one used 13 years ago in Afghanistan: The anti-Taliban forces fought on the ground, with, at their sides, special intelligence forces, the help of planning and the targeting of airstrikes. This combination allowed Kabul to be taken in a few months.
Here, even if the airstrikes don't pose an insurmountable problem, the crew in the field is more motley: To the south, a Sunni-Shiite coming together that, without an Iranian blessing, will be likely to splinter at the first hard blow. To the east, Kurds who are aiming for the defense of their country, have independence in their sights and who will not go beyond the desired territory. To the north, an improbably free Syrian opposition, totally sensitive to all influences and from whose ranks come the squads of Islamic State.
Battles will be won, but the war will last years, and, above all, it will spread to other places. From the Atlantic to the Pacific, Islamism has succeeded in a just few years in implementing, in a spontaneous way, the theory of "foco,"** by improving the principle: Don't enter into direct conflict with the state, but take root where the state is weak or has truly failed.
A good strategy will also have to rapidly grasp the issue as a whole, including the mechanisms of this asymmetric strategy, identifying the next victims and protecting the states that could still serve as a shield.
It will also have to learn a lesson from past failures. On this point, reading the declaration of the heads of state after the NATO summit is not very convincing.
*Editor's note: Equestrian term of art meaning that the horse is attentive to the orders that its rider gives to it through the reins.
**Editor's note: Strategic vision of Che Guevara, who wanted to create “one, two, many Vietnams” to fight against the United States.
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