Interpreter or Arbiter: Our Role Between China and the US

It is easy to say that fate of the Korean Peninsula will be influenced by the U.S. and China, but that doesn’t mean it will be easy to predict how China-U.S. relations will affect us. It may as well become another source of strife and conflict, or it may serve as the pathway to peace and reunification.

Now, the U.S. and China are placing us in a difficult situation between Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. We are neither sure about the effectiveness of THAAD, nor do we have confidence in the AIIB, which the U.S. is not keen on due to China’s financial backwardness. Yet, we have decided to join the AIIB out of our national interest. Now, THAAD becomes our most urgent issue to deal with.

Neither deploying THAAD nor joining the AIIB is a simple military or economic issue. It is something entangled with the U.S. and China’s power struggles, and it certainly will lead to changes in geopolitical situations that will affect the Korean Peninsula. Compared with the previous administrations, the Park Geun-hye administration has been great at managing the relationship between South Korea, the USA and China so far. No doubt, they will be pulling their hair out right now to manage these delicate trilateral relations.

It is a fate that any country caught between superpowers shares. Before the unification, Germany faced a similar situation. With the Soviet Union deploying the SS-20 Long-range Nuclear Missile (INF) in East Germany, West Germany’s public opinions split into two. Then-Chancellor Schmidt of the Social Democratic Party, which was a moderate left-wing party at the time, allowed the deployment of the USA’s long-range nuclear missiles in West Germany despite the public’s opposition. At the same time, he chose to draw out the negotiation with the Soviet Union for the proliferation of strategic missiles. This was the beginning of “NATO’s Double-Track decisions,” which later became the foundation of Reagan and Gorbachev’s long-range missile negotiation.

Chancellor Kohl, who succeeded Schmidt during the U.S.-U.S.S.R. missile negotiation, remarked on July 3, 1983, one day before his visit to Moscow, that he “will not just be an interpreter between the leaders of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.” The implication that he was not visiting Moscow just to convey messages speaks to us in a way we cannot ignore.

We, too, have tried to escape the role of messenger during the Roh Moo-hyun administration. But with such misinterpreted views of international politics, it bore no fruits. During the Cold War, the U.S. had no choice but to protect West Germany from the Soviet Union despite their stubborn and sometimes uncooperative behaviors. It was not out of benevolence, but out of the USA’s own national interest. But we could not expect such “ironic fortunes” because détente was already happening. In response to our uncooperativeness, the U.S. openly responded with the threat of the withdrawal of their military forces, rather than protecting us. What followed was the fear that we might end up like Egypt, which tried to play both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and became the “lost child” of the Middle East. This was soon followed by the rise of interpreter diplomacy, supported by the Lee Myung-bak administration and his agendas to strengthen the U.S.-South Korea alliance.

Interpreter diplomacy succeeded in strengthening the alliance with USA, but at the cost of limiting our diplomatic options on the world stage. It was not a wise move, especially considering the fact that China’s importance is rising quickly in terms of unification or the economy. Therefore, the “smart” management of the trilateral relationship between South Korea, the U.S. and China became the political homework for us.

Admittedly, the Park Geun-hye administration received rather good grades when it comes to the smart management of the trilateral relations. But now this “smart management” is being tested, more intensely than ever, since both THAAD and AIIB are considered the power struggles between the traditional superpower, the USA, and the rising superpower, China. Beijing is considering THAAD as a threat to itself, rather than to Pyongyang, and Washington is interpreting the formation of the AIIB as a challenge to the international financial systems it leads. Take one step in wrong direction, and we will be seen as choosing between the U.S. and China. Already, the U.S.-Japan alliance is showing concerns over our lenience toward the Chinese.

What we truly want is peace in Korean Peninsula, unification and development.* We never wanted to choose between the U.S. and China, and we never will. Thus, our top priority becomes stopping another Cold War between the U.S. and China.

Then, how should we accomplish this? Unfortunately, the role of arbiter in this power struggle between the U.S. and China doesn’t seem like something we can take on. But neither can we remain an interpreter who simply conveys messages. Our goal is to create positive working relationships with both the U.S. and China, without taking either one’s side. As Kissinger pointed out, we need measures that enable trilateral relations of “ambiguity.”

We stand at the front line of power struggles between the U.S. and China. How do we make the U.S. and China cooperate without clashing on the Korean Peninsular? Our wits are being tested.