A Strategy for Dealing with the Islamic State
Published in Harian Analisa
(Indonesia) on 8 June 2015
by (link to original)
The effectiveness of a global war, especially the role of the United States and its allies in facing the militant group calling itself the Islamic State, is once again being questioned. In recent weeks the Islamic State group has continued to expand its territory despite the routine airstrikes targeting the terror group by the U.S. and its allies. The Islamic State group’s ability to keep expanding its territory is clear evidence that airstrikes and other U.S. military strategies have failed in the war against it.
Aircraft belonging to the U.S. and its allies — the U.K., Australia and a number of other Western European and Arabian countries — have bombarded the Islamic State militants’ positions in Iraq and Syria almost daily. With U.S. aircraft and its cutting-edge technologies, and aided by satellite remote-sensing capabilities, practically all the Islamic State group’s properties have been targeted. On top of relentlessly attacking the Islamic State group from the air, the U.S. and its allies have also provided military assistance to Iraqi and Syrian fighters, from weapons and military training to intelligence data. Considering the magnitude of the airstrikes and military assistance, the Islamic State group should have been on its knees, or at least it should have been losing ground.
But that has not been the case. The Islamic State group has continued to expand its territory as if it has had no opposition. A number of cities in Iraq and Syria, including several strategically important cities like Ramadi and Hasakah, have fallen in recent weeks. A number of other cities, including Aleppo, the base of Western-backed Syrian rebels, are also in danger of being captured by the Islamic State group. What is happening is clearly evidence of the global strategy’s failure, especially that of the main actors, the U.S. and its allies, in dealing with the Islamic State group. Something is wrong and demands the world rethinks its strategy.
This failure clearly stems from the reluctance of Western countries to deploy ground troops to face the Islamic State group fighters. Western countries are only willing to fight the Islamic State group from the air. In their calculations, the onslaught of airstrikes would destroy the Islamic State group military infrastructure, or at least weaken it. This is not hard to understand because the bombs dropped by Western aircrafts are incredible; they have the power to destroy buildings, tanks and anything else that they target.
But it seems that the Islamic State group has successfully implemented a tactic to reduce the effectiveness of airstrikes. It is said that the Islamic State group fighters circulate among civilians to make it difficult for U.S. aircrafts to target them. An attack by the U.S. on a nonmilitary target, especially if accompanied by a high number of civilian deaths, is a big “victory” for the Islamic State group. The militant group will use civilian casualties as propaganda to incite hatred against the West in local residents.
It also seems that the Islamic State group has managed to camouflage its military vehicles to the point they are undetectable by passing U.S. aircraft. It is impossible for the Islamic State group to expand its territory without the use of heavy combat vehicles. Clearly, such vehicles would be seen and become easy targets for U.S. aircraft if they weren’t camouflaged.
Failures also happened on the ground as they happened in the air. Iraqi soldiers and Syrian fighters, who received Western help, were easily brought to their knees by the Islamic State group fighters. The lack of proper coordination between the West and the combatants became the source of the failure of the ground war.
For political reasons, the U.S. and its allies have collaborated only with factions that are “in line” with the West. Never mind that the factions involved in this war are precisely “enemies” of the West. In Syria, for example, instead of supporting Assad’s government in Damascus, the U.S. supported a small group of anti-Assad rebels. Likewise, in Iraq, the U.S. only halfheartedly helped Iraqi militias because most of them are also Shiite militias affiliated with Iran, an enemy of the U.S.
With such political obstacles, it is not surprising that coordination between the West and the factions that are fighting the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria is terrible. This poor coordination has been well-exploited by the Islamic State group.
Aircraft belonging to the U.S. and its allies — the U.K., Australia and a number of other Western European and Arabian countries — have bombarded the Islamic State militants’ positions in Iraq and Syria almost daily. With U.S. aircraft and its cutting-edge technologies, and aided by satellite remote-sensing capabilities, practically all the Islamic State group’s properties have been targeted. On top of relentlessly attacking the Islamic State group from the air, the U.S. and its allies have also provided military assistance to Iraqi and Syrian fighters, from weapons and military training to intelligence data. Considering the magnitude of the airstrikes and military assistance, the Islamic State group should have been on its knees, or at least it should have been losing ground.
But that has not been the case. The Islamic State group has continued to expand its territory as if it has had no opposition. A number of cities in Iraq and Syria, including several strategically important cities like Ramadi and Hasakah, have fallen in recent weeks. A number of other cities, including Aleppo, the base of Western-backed Syrian rebels, are also in danger of being captured by the Islamic State group. What is happening is clearly evidence of the global strategy’s failure, especially that of the main actors, the U.S. and its allies, in dealing with the Islamic State group. Something is wrong and demands the world rethinks its strategy.
This failure clearly stems from the reluctance of Western countries to deploy ground troops to face the Islamic State group fighters. Western countries are only willing to fight the Islamic State group from the air. In their calculations, the onslaught of airstrikes would destroy the Islamic State group military infrastructure, or at least weaken it. This is not hard to understand because the bombs dropped by Western aircrafts are incredible; they have the power to destroy buildings, tanks and anything else that they target.
But it seems that the Islamic State group has successfully implemented a tactic to reduce the effectiveness of airstrikes. It is said that the Islamic State group fighters circulate among civilians to make it difficult for U.S. aircrafts to target them. An attack by the U.S. on a nonmilitary target, especially if accompanied by a high number of civilian deaths, is a big “victory” for the Islamic State group. The militant group will use civilian casualties as propaganda to incite hatred against the West in local residents.
It also seems that the Islamic State group has managed to camouflage its military vehicles to the point they are undetectable by passing U.S. aircraft. It is impossible for the Islamic State group to expand its territory without the use of heavy combat vehicles. Clearly, such vehicles would be seen and become easy targets for U.S. aircraft if they weren’t camouflaged.
Failures also happened on the ground as they happened in the air. Iraqi soldiers and Syrian fighters, who received Western help, were easily brought to their knees by the Islamic State group fighters. The lack of proper coordination between the West and the combatants became the source of the failure of the ground war.
For political reasons, the U.S. and its allies have collaborated only with factions that are “in line” with the West. Never mind that the factions involved in this war are precisely “enemies” of the West. In Syria, for example, instead of supporting Assad’s government in Damascus, the U.S. supported a small group of anti-Assad rebels. Likewise, in Iraq, the U.S. only halfheartedly helped Iraqi militias because most of them are also Shiite militias affiliated with Iran, an enemy of the U.S.
With such political obstacles, it is not surprising that coordination between the West and the factions that are fighting the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria is terrible. This poor coordination has been well-exploited by the Islamic State group.