Cuba and the US: Real Diplomacy as a First Step

The re-opening of diplomatic ties between Havana and Washington is nothing more than a purely historic anecdote, because the end of the embargo will be the final destination of this process.

Diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba were blocked in 1960 when America prohibited exports to the Castro regime, which then obligated [Castro] to seek support from the Soviet Union to retain power in exchange for [Cuba’s] pivotal position during the Cold War.

Re-opening of diplomatic ties has nothing more than purely anecdotal, historical interest.

Shuttle diplomacy has [been in effect] for some time on various fronts — Miami, Washington, New York and Havana, even Guantanamo — with strained collaboration in the battle against terrorism both inside and outside the lines of the U.N. But, in some way, it does heal the wounds of the Cold War.

The question of lifting the embargo will drag on a little longer; due to the votes required in the U.S. Congress, it will find itself under scrutiny and fighting hard for [those] votes.

The existing harmony between both governments is proof that the Department of State would remove Cuba from the list of hostile regimes, or “rogue states,” a peculiar classification that assumed the country in question either had ties to international terrorism or supported it directly; a [list] that is nowadays reduced to Iran, Sudan and Syria.

This was, without a doubt, the boldest move, and was one that allowed the island to rid itself of a series of economic and financial sanctions that had been causing a lot of grief for their diplomatic activities — some as simple as paying the salaries of their employees in Washington.

On the one hand, the re-opening implies that U.S. intent to isolate Cuba on the commercial front as much as on the diplomatic front has been a total failure. It has not been able to unseat the Castro family and has brought more harm than good to the Cuban people.

Internally speaking, to Americans, the re-establishment of relations could be seen as a way to win over electoral support of the Hispanic minority, who are largely Democrats, and regain hegemony with an indulgently fair action when the Bolivar revolution loses steam.

The death of President Hugo Chavez opened a communication channel between the two countries. For Cuba, the fall of oil prices made its dependency on low-cost Venezuelan oil more precarious, making it necessary to look for new ways [to support itself], which came in the form of U.S. tourist dollars.

On the domestic front, the Castro regime had to sell a “new success” to its people: that in spite of the economic reforms that allowed greater private business activity, they hadn’t reached satisfactory results.

The end of the embargo will be the final destination in this process, with individual tickets for two international agreements about diplomatic and consular relations which are still far from being completed, mostly due to the Castro regime’s fear of losing control of its people.

Both presidents are primarily worried about leading a gradual process, [one] that doesn’t cause dissatisfaction that brings with it a hasty departure from power without defined democratic structures [in place]. The post-communist process in Eastern Europe is not an exemplary model, as it continues to cause nightmares in Brussels that no diplomatic channel is capable of alleviating.