America’s Sickle and the Kremlin’s Balls

It seemed as though we'd broken through the isolation. It seemed as if the gamble with Syria had ended in victory. It seemed as though the Americans were about to back down on Ukraine in exchange for Russian participation in the war against the Caliphate. It seemed as though "everything with Putin was groovy.”

Secretary of State John Kerry strolled down the Arbat, bought some souvenirs, had some commemorative photos taken, gave friendly speeches, and hinted that the sanctions against Russia might soon be lifted.

And all this was literally just a few days after Vice President Joseph Biden gave an emotional speech in the Ukrainian Parliament, in which we heard probably the strongest language any American official of such high rank has ever allowed himself.

"Today Russia is occupying sovereign Ukrainian territory. Let me be crystal clear: The United States does not, will not, never will recognize Russia’s attempt to annex the Crimea. [...] And as Russia continues to send its thugs, its troops, its mercenaries across the border, Russian tanks and missiles still fill the Donbass. Separatist forces are organized, commanded and directed by Moscow – by Moscow! So the United States will continue to stand with Ukraine against Russian aggression."

What's more, right after this Kerry returned to Moscow, where he transparently hinted, without so much as a word about Crimea, that the sanctions would be relaxed if Russia adhered to the Minsk Agreements. And then he added additional words about how the world will become a better place when Russia and the U.S. start working together. As for Syria, he said that America wouldn't insist on a necessary regime change in Damascus. Put simply, he expressed some agreement, albeit not complete, with the Russian position that Assad must stay in power, at least for some time.

In the Kremlin, they jumped for joy and claimed victory. And suddenly the bitter news came pouring like cold water over the celebration: the U.S. is bringing new sanctions against Russia.

Judging by the sore official reaction from Moscow (that the U.S. is acting like "zombies," that the sanctions are "illogical," "hostile" and "destructive") for the Kremlin, this was like a sickle to the groin.

Now everyone's head is hurting. How can these two trends in Washington's policy toward Moscow, including the Ukraine problem, be reconciled?

For example, how can we rationalize the peculiarity, that shortly after the Maidan, Vice President Biden came to Kiev four times, while his boss Barack Obama hasn't gone there once in his seven-year presidency. Once he invited the Ukrainian President Petro Poroszenko to Washington. That short and lukewarm meeting in the White House stood in sharp contrast to the exuberant welcome Poroszenko received from the U.S. Congress.

They say that attempts were made to persuade Obama to come to Kiev this past autumn, with the hope of putting to rest the suspicions that have been brewing in Ukrainians' hearts for a long time: will the American president give them up in exchange for Russia's help with (or withdrawal from) matters concerning Syria?

But Obama could not be talked into it.

He couldn't be talked into giving the Ukrainian army so-called "lethal" weapons, that is, weapons capable of creating enemy casualties. But Washington reached a consensus on this: a bipartisan majority in both the houses of Congress voted "yea." Vice President Biden voted "yea." Secretary of Defense Ash Carter voted "yea." Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford: "Yea." U.S. European Command and NATO Command General Philip Breedlove: "Yea." Even the tourist who bought Russian matryoshkas on the Arbat, Secretary of State Kerry, voted "yea.”

The only one opposed is Obama, but the final say is his and his alone. And he has stubbornly refused. There won't be any lethal weapons, full stop.

Experts on Washington's backroom politics explain this by citing Obama's electoral victory as a peacekeeping candidate who, promising to end the two wars the U.S. had been waging thousands of miles from its own coasts in Iraq and Afghanistan, would be the one to bring American soldiers home. It didn't quite turn out that way.

The U.S. pulled out of Iraq, but after that, chaos erupted. The Islamic State appeared out of nowhere, turning into a real threat to the security of both the U.S. and its European allies. Now there is a high probability that the U.S. will have to get embroiled in yet more military action, including ground troop activity, in Syria. The Americans will probably not succeed in completely withdrawing from Afghanistan; otherwise, power in that country could fall into the hands of the Taliban yet again.

Obama, who doesn't even care much for foreign policy, is getting even more annoyed with this situation, and he's stalling on decisions that are contrary to his worldview. Moreover, he has supposedly acquired astounding levels of stubbornness, sometimes flatly refusing to listen to the opinions of his high-ranking advisers.

What's next? Some say that we shouldn't read too much meaning into all the amicability that Kerry explicitly demonstrated during his visit to Moscow. He was just playing the role of the good cop, they say.

Others are fuming: Kerry clearly went too far in Moscow and was all but begging for help on the Middle East affairs on which Obama is going in the opposite direction (even with Iran everything is not going as well as the White House lets on). They all remember the secretary of state's last visit to Russia this past spring. That time he conversed with Putin for a few hours in Sochi and said that he'd "had the privilege" of meeting with the Russian president.

It was exactly this unexpected "privilege" that confused some people most of all. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State David Kramer, one of the most thoughtful experts on Russia and Ukraine in Washington, wrote the other day that Putin simply charmed Kerry and put him under an evil spell.

According to Kramer, who voiced this opinion before the secretary of state's last visit to Russia, Kerry should not have gone to Moscow after Lavrov's recent statement, in which he said: "As long as Obama's deputy Joe Biden goes around Europe recommending continued sanctions against us without taking into account how Kiev is behaving under Western pressure, we will not be able to reach any understanding."

But Kerry went off to Russia, and even seemed to reach a mutual understanding. The Kremlin officials were rejoicing; in Washington, the champions of Russia's total isolation were calling Kerry a traitor. And now suddenly you have these new sanctions!

I personally think this is what's going on: Washington has yet to work out a long-term strategy concerning Russia, or more precisely, concerning Putin's regime in its new version, which started to form after the annexation of Crimea and is still changing every day. In this situation, the Americans are using a carrot-and-stick approach. On one hand, they're demonstrating that they don't want Russia to be isolated and are ready to cooperate, for example, in Syria. On the other hand, they won't back down on other issues, like Ukraine.

I'm sure of this much: the U.S., unlike the European powers, does not decisively want to chase Putin into a corner, although it could (the U.S. also is not – at least for now! – elevating those personal questions, which the media is hounding the Russian president with, to an official register). Why not? Because they're afraid of more unpredictable actions and a more unpredictable Putin. But the U.S. will not back down on its main positions, for example the demand that Russia restore full control of the expansive disputed territory near the Russian-Ukrainian border to the Ukrainian government. (Incidentally, this is precisely the demand that will probably turn out to be the reef upon which the Minsk Agreements crash and sink into oblivion.)

All of this reminds us of the Cold War. On one hand, the U.S. led successful negotiations with the USSR about the restriction of strategically offensive weapons and anti-missile defense systems; they even sent the Apollo-Soyuz spacecraft into orbit. On the other hand, the U.S. continued its policy of containment and made hostile policy decisions like the corrections to the Jackson-Vanik Trade Amendment about refusing to give the USSR preferential treatment in trade because of human rights violations in the Soviet Union.

Today the Americans, as I see it, are working out yet another problem. They understand that there might again arise in Putin's mind the feeling that he is the smartest, cleverest and strongest, and that he will win out against everyone. He didn't get a good impression of Obama during their first meeting; "a typical weakling," he thought. To keep those thoughts from his head, the U.S. has to impose new sanctions.

Admittedly, the situation is difficult. Before us we have the year of the "lame duck," the final year of Obama's presidency, when the weight and influence of any White House commander-in-chief, no matter how popular or successful he's been, always starts to dwindle.

Here we recall 2008, the year when George Bush had his turn as the "lame duck." Many thought he was a weak president, but nothing could be further from the truth. Bush responded very decisively after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. He sent troops first to Afghanistan, then Iraq, and won both wars. He knocked out the Kabul of the Taliban and overthrew Saddam Hussein. But after that, he was almost plagued by bad luck. He almost lost the election to that same John Kerry. He didn't show good leadership during Hurricane Katrina. The initial victories in Iraq and Afghanistan turned into a series of losses. At the North Atlantic Treaty Summit in 2008, Bush failed to achieve his goal of providing Ukraine and Georgia with a plan toward NATO membership. Prominent members France and Germany dug in their heels, not without pressure from Russia.

At the end of the day, Putin, who sensed the weakness of the American president, decided to take advantage of this and launch a blitzkrieg against Georgia.

There is the danger that something like this might happen again in 2016. Putin might start to believe that Obama has also weakened in his final year, and he may be tempted to initiate a series of military adventures. It could be Ukraine; it could be Georgia, Transnistria, the Baltics. It could be somewhere in the former Soviet Union or along Russia's borders.

This temptation could become even greater, since in the coming year the United States’ European allies will be occupied with completely different priorities: the refugee problem; the "Grexit" (the danger of Greece's departure from the Eurozone); the expected referendum in Great Britain about the country's long-term commitment to the EU.

Next year [in 2016] America itself will be completely absorbed in the presidential election, during which questions of domestic policy always push foreign affairs to the side. Even if they make it to the top list of critical pre-election issues, like they are now — for the first time in ages! — the question will still be about what exactly should be done with Russia.

The policies of the United States' main allies in Europe, Germany and France, will also depend increasingly on the lead-up to national elections, which will take place in 2017.

Putin could also be driven to drastic steps by the fact that practically any possible successor to the White House will take a harsher position against Russia and in support of Ukraine, will show a significantly bolder interest in foreign affairs, and will fight to recover America's status as a global leader, which was deeply shaken during Obama's years.

Therefore, the temptation is great: the time to test the strength of the West is now or never. The next 13 months will likely be distressing for everyone.

* Translator’s note: The phrase "vse putyem," meaning "everything's alright/great," has a humorous resemblance to Putin's last name. As a result the pun has become something of a political slogan, not unlike Bernie Sanders' "Feel the Bern." It can be found on T-shirts throughout Russia.