The Main Argument for a Ceasefire in Syria
Published in Vedomosti
(Russia) on 24 February 2016
by Pavel Aptekar (link to original)
A ceasefire accord appears to be the result of an agreement between the United States and Russia.
The Feb. 27 agreement for a temporary ceasefire in Syria is not just another interim chapter in the history of the civil war. The observance or breach of the ceasefire will demonstrate its sponsors’ ability to influence their allies in Syria.
Russia has a very high stake in the ceasefire. Vladimir Putin presented himself as a sponsor of the new agreement, addressing the public (in a live broadcast by the Russia 24 channel), which is quite rare. It is important for Moscow to affirm its aspirations to fill the role of the second world power, as well as the readiness of the U.S. to conduct negotiations on Russian terms, notes international relations expert Vladimir Frolov. The point at issue is the Kremlin’s beloved historical reconstruction of a world divided between two superpowers, in which Syria remains in the Russian sphere of influence.
The main hope that the agreement will be observed by Syria and its ally, Russia, is perhaps based on the fact that the Kremlin has obtained the equal partnership with Washington it had desired and will hold on to.
While preparing the ceasefire, Russia consulted with the foreign participants of the Syrian conflict. Prior to the Russian-American statement on Syria, Putin spoke on the phone with the monarchs of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu conducted negotiations in Iran.
Cementing the successes in Damascus and refusing to crush the opposition, which has been brought to the negotiating table, may prevent the escalation of war and the interference of new stakeholders. However, the ceasefire may prove to be a mere illusion of victory and demonstrate that the superpowers are not capable of controlling their allies, notes Orientalist Leonid Isayev. Continued operations may engender new mutual recriminations in the near future. The manageability of key participants is also questionable. On Monday, Bashar Assad declared that parliamentary elections have been scheduled for April 13, although the Geneva agreements state that those elections must be conducted under the new constitution.
In this scenario, where it isn’t clear if the Kremlin is the leader or the follower in its relationship with Assad, it is increasingly difficult for Russia to justify to the United States and the West the need to continue negotiations under the previous format. In the event the ceasefire is observed as a result of pressure from the superpowers, Frolov believes that Assad will have to postpone the elections and begin negotiations on a transitional government and a new governmental structure for Syria, under which the provinces will receive increased political and economic powers, whereas the president’s authority will be curbed.
The Feb. 27 agreement for a temporary ceasefire in Syria is not just another interim chapter in the history of the civil war. The observance or breach of the ceasefire will demonstrate its sponsors’ ability to influence their allies in Syria.
Russia has a very high stake in the ceasefire. Vladimir Putin presented himself as a sponsor of the new agreement, addressing the public (in a live broadcast by the Russia 24 channel), which is quite rare. It is important for Moscow to affirm its aspirations to fill the role of the second world power, as well as the readiness of the U.S. to conduct negotiations on Russian terms, notes international relations expert Vladimir Frolov. The point at issue is the Kremlin’s beloved historical reconstruction of a world divided between two superpowers, in which Syria remains in the Russian sphere of influence.
The main hope that the agreement will be observed by Syria and its ally, Russia, is perhaps based on the fact that the Kremlin has obtained the equal partnership with Washington it had desired and will hold on to.
While preparing the ceasefire, Russia consulted with the foreign participants of the Syrian conflict. Prior to the Russian-American statement on Syria, Putin spoke on the phone with the monarchs of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu conducted negotiations in Iran.
Cementing the successes in Damascus and refusing to crush the opposition, which has been brought to the negotiating table, may prevent the escalation of war and the interference of new stakeholders. However, the ceasefire may prove to be a mere illusion of victory and demonstrate that the superpowers are not capable of controlling their allies, notes Orientalist Leonid Isayev. Continued operations may engender new mutual recriminations in the near future. The manageability of key participants is also questionable. On Monday, Bashar Assad declared that parliamentary elections have been scheduled for April 13, although the Geneva agreements state that those elections must be conducted under the new constitution.
In this scenario, where it isn’t clear if the Kremlin is the leader or the follower in its relationship with Assad, it is increasingly difficult for Russia to justify to the United States and the West the need to continue negotiations under the previous format. In the event the ceasefire is observed as a result of pressure from the superpowers, Frolov believes that Assad will have to postpone the elections and begin negotiations on a transitional government and a new governmental structure for Syria, under which the provinces will receive increased political and economic powers, whereas the president’s authority will be curbed.