Fact and Fiction Behind the US’s Game with North Korea

Amid the dramatic changes on the Korean Peninsula last year, many people thought that the emergence of US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was a providential opportunity. That idea was grounded in the belief that Trump is different from the US presidents that have preceded him, and that Kim is also completely different from his father and grandfather. On top of that, 10 years of conservative administrations in South Korea had ended with the election of Moon Jae-in as president, leading people to think that this was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for the Korean Peninsula, bringing together the right people, at the right time, in the right place.

But since the second North Korea-US summit in Hanoi, the Korean Peninsula seems to be riding the rollercoaster once again. Perhaps these aren’t the right people, at the right time, in the right place, after all. Assumptions made about Kim and Trump are being called into question, and there are even concerns about whether the situation can be salvaged.

After the first North Korea-US summit in Singapore, many people were worried that the devil was in the details. But those concerns were resolved, in a way, by the failure of the Hanoi summit. The problem wasn’t in the details, but in the big picture: the two sides hadn’t moved beyond their hostile relationship. Kim said that the US had brought a completely impractical plan to the negotiating table and wasn’t ready to solve the issue, while Trump said that North Korea wasn’t ready to denuclearize. In the end, the Hanoi summit gave North Korea and the US a chance to confirm that neither side is ready.

What’s clear is that not even the US thought that North Korea would accept an all-in-one deal, as White House National Security Advisor John Bolton himself admitted. So why did the US make the offer in the first place?

If the devil is in the details, a compromise can be found through dialogue. But if the two sides are at cross-purposes in their larger strategy, they’re unlikely to reach a compromise. If the US is attempting to approach North Korean nuclear weapons on a strategic level because it’s not ready to build a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and if North Korea’s strategy is to hold on to the nuclear weapons it has already developed, the two sides are working at cross-purposes. So although the two sides’ confirmation of their differences at Hanoi has been heralded as progress, that might actually end up sapping the momentum for dialogue on both sides. That’s probably why it has been difficult to reach a breakthrough in the recent impasse. That’s probably also why South Korea finds itself in the most awkward position.

Amid the recent difficulties, North Korea has been once again calling for “self-reliance.” It’s pressuring the US with missile launches. It’s adopting a strategy of bad manners in inter-Korean relations. It’s advancing its relationship with Russia, a step that evokes the North’s past alignment with Russia and China. Kim came to power by promising North Koreans they wouldn’t have to tighten their belts again and that they would enjoy the prosperity of socialism. But if he once again orients his state policy on the “self-sufficiency” of past decades, North Koreans may find themselves tightening their belts again. That can’t be the “new path” of which Kim has spoken, but it might be the path intended by US strategy.

After mercilessly cracking the whip during the Hanoi summit, the US appears determined to keep North Korea locked in the sanctions narrative for good. While the US has used the North’s nuclear program to secure legitimacy, the crux of the problem could be that narrative interlocks with US strategy. While Trump holds out the carrot when he speaks of North Korea’s great potential, North Koreans may be inclined to see the US as offering a solution to a problem of its own making.

The North Korean nuclear program results from the clash between the US’ strategy in Northeast Asia and North Korea’s survival strategy. Even today, that clash is provoking conflict. If the US believes in the necessity of a Cold War order on the Korean Peninsula and among its Northeast Asian alliances and insists on corresponding troop presences in South Korea and Japan for its strategy in East Asia, then its current approach to the North Korean nuclear issue can certainly be regarded as strategic. Creating a sanctions narrative by placing maximum pressure on North Korea and trapping Northeast Asia inside that narrative is probably advantageous for US strategy in its confrontation with China.

Now that we’ve met the devil in the big picture, the US and North Korea must come up with a roadmap leading from the dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program to the construction of a peace regime. The two sides must show each other that they’re prepared, as they weren’t in the Hanoi summit. The Korean Peninsula has started to come unglued once again. We mustn’t lose sight of our original purpose. If even the Moon administration loses the plot, the current situation could unravel