Who Wants a War with Iran?

Published in El País
(Spain) on 4 January 2020
by Luz Gómez García (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Millie Browning. Edited by Elizabeth Cosgriff.

There are various regimes and leaders of different societies who, for different reasons, are thankful for the death of Gen. Qassem Soleimani.

Few rules are more certain in Middle Eastern politics than the question of who benefits from an attack. With the assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani, an unscrupulous strategist who brought together otherwise opposing armies, there are various regimes and leaders of different societies who, for different reasons, are thankful for his death.

Donald Trump is the first opportunist in this escalation of the never-ending conflict with Iran, as he is currently on the brink of impeachment* and beginning his reelection year. The attack against Soleimani, a radical response to the pro-Iranian militia’s siege of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad a few days prior, has changed the focus of American opinion about Trump, a president who has been viewed as reluctant to enter the international arena.

The presumptive Saudi Arabian heir, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, for whom 2019 was his worst year, is also very much aware of this escalation of the conflict between his great ally (the U.S.) and his worst enemy (Iran). Two of his additional conflicts with Iran – the Yemen war and the boycott of Qatar – have lately become complicated, and domestically, his economic and pseudo-moral openness has failed to hide the brutal political repression within his country. Now, he is able to assert himself far better both domestically and internationally as the great ally of the United States.

Without a doubt, the assassination of Soleimani is a declaration of war that Iran cannot avoid. Its policy of raising or lowering the voltage of confrontation with the U.S. has finally been jump-started by the Trump administration, with Trump who was alive during the colossal humiliation of the U.S. Embassy hostage-taking in Tehran, the Iranian capital in 1979. Iranian leaders, with Ali Khamenei at the head of the increasingly internally challenged regime, will have a hard time finding a solution that will not ignite a new conflict with Iraq. However, winning this new subsidiary war will be much more complicated than doing so in Syria or Yemen.

Despite Khamenei’s provocative proclamations and the demand for revenge during Iran's period of national mourning, Iran will have to weigh its options. And it is not a minor matter that, although in Iraq Shiite leaders are preparing to close ranks and regroup their militias, along with Soleimani, the murder of Abu Mahdi al Mohandis, who was his right-hand man in Iraq, has left a void in leadership that will not be easy to fill, especially if war is to be fought on Iraqi soil. Muqtada al-Sadr, the astute leader of the Sadrist Movement and the Mahdi army, is already offering himself as a successor and has harangued his supporters in Parliament and on the street to shine a spotlight on U.S. troops. However, it remains to be seen if this situation resonates as it did during the war against U.S. military occupation. This is doubtful because the younger generations of Iraqis have powerfully mobilized en masse in recent months calling for the end of the sectarian regime, the only regime that they have ever known.

A war with Iran also does not hurt Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current president of Turkey, or Bashar Assad, the president of Syria. The war gives the Turkish president the opportunity to maintain control of popular legitimacy among Sunnis. For the Assad, although Soleimani and his army were decisive in the massacre of the revolution, post-war reorganization will be easier for him, while Iran deals with other conflicts.

And what about Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is a great friend of the Trump family? His longing for war with Iran (which is shared across Israel, where for many, their primary enemy is Iran, not Palestine) will help him in the lead-up to a new election while he faces damaging allegations of corruption. Israeli army generals, with close connections to the Kurdish peshmerga, are not opposed to this distraction after the recent International Criminal Court decision to initiate an investigation for war crimes in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Once again, there is the question of Russia. The tension in the region does not fit in with Vladimir Putin’s belief that the war in Syria is about to conveniently settle down. Perhaps Putin is the only one able to calm heightened emotions in the Middle East. In any case, the big losers in the situation are the Iraqis, who, after several months of popular revolt against an intolerant and corrupt regime run by Iran and the United States, continue to witness the kidnapping of their country and its future.

*Editor’s note: Donald Trump was impeached on Dec. 18, 2019 and was awaiting trial in the Senate at the time this article was written.


Pocas reglas hay más seguras en la política de Oriente Próximo que la de preguntarse a quién beneficia un atentado. Con el asesinato del general Qasem Soleimani, un estratega sin escrúpulos que aglutinaba a milicias de otro modo enfrentadas, varios son los regímenes y líderes de distinto pelaje que se frotan las manos. Por distintos motivos.


Trump es el primer interesado en esta escalada del eterno conflicto con Irán, justo ahora que está a las puertas del impeachment y comienza el año de su reelección. El atentado contra Soleimani, una respuesta radical al asedio, hace unos días, de las milicias proiraníes a la Embajada de EE UU en Bagdad, ha de cambiar por fuerza el enfoque de la opinión estadounidense sobre Trump, un presidente visto hasta la fecha como reacio a bajar a la arena internacional.

También al heredero saudí, Mohamed bin Salmán, que ha vivido sus horas más bajas en 2019, le sale a cuenta esta escalada del conflicto entre su gran aliado (Estados Unidos) y su peor enemigo (Irán). Dos de sus enfrentamientos subsidiarios con Irán —la guerra de Yemen y el boicot a Qatar— se le habían complicado últimamente, y en lo doméstico, la apertura económica y seudomoral no lograba ocultar la brutal represión política. Ahora, podrá hacerse valer mejor dentro y fuera como el gran aliado de Estados Unidos.

Porque sin duda el asesinato de Soleimani es una declaración de guerra que difícilmente podrá esquivar Irán. Su política de subir o bajar el voltaje del enfrentamiento con EE UU ha acabado por saltar los plomos de la Administración de Donald Trump, un hombre de una generación que vivió como una humillación colosal la toma de rehenes de la Embajada de Estados Unidos en Teherán en 1979. Los dirigentes iraníes, con Jamenei a la cabeza de un régimen cada día más cuestionado internamente, tienen difícil encontrar una respuesta que no encienda una nueva contienda en Irak. Pero ganar esta nueva guerra subsidiaria es mucho más complicado que hacerlo en Siria o Yemen.

A pesar de las proclamas incendiarias de Jamenei y del duelo nacional clamando venganza, tendrán que sopesarlo bien. Y no es un motivo menor que, aunque en Irak los dirigentes chiíes se aprestan a cerrar filas y reagrupar a sus milicias, el asesinato junto a Soleimani de Abu Mahdi al Mohandes, su brazo derecho en Irak, ha dejado un vacío de liderazgo que no será fácil de llenar si la guerra se quiere librar en suelo iraquí. Muqtada al Sadr, el astuto líder del partido Corriente Sadrista y del Ejército del Mahdi, ya se ofrece como sucesor y ha arengado a los suyos, en el Parlamento y en la calle, a poner a las tropas de EE UU en el punto de mira. Pero está por ver si tiene el eco que tenía en tiempos de la guerra contra la ocupación militar estadounidense. Es dudoso, pues no en balde las nuevas generaciones de iraquíes se han movilizado masivamente en los últimos meses pidiendo el fin del régimen sectarista, el único que han conocido.

Una guerra con Irán tampoco les viene mal a Erdogan y a El Asad. Al presidente turco, porque le da ocasión de subirse a su atalaya de valedor de la legitimidad popular suní. Al sirio, porque, aunque Soleimani y sus milicias fueron decisivos en la masacre de la revolución, la reordenación posbélica será más fácil con Irán entretenido en otros frentes.

Y qué decir de Netanyahu, gran amigo de la familia Trump. Que se cumplan sus ansias de guerra con Irán (muy extendidas en Israel, donde para muchos el enemigo número uno no es Palestina, sino Irán) le da un buen empujón en la nueva cita electoral, sobre la que planean las acusaciones de corrupción contra él. A los generales del Ejército israelí, con lazos bien trabados con los peshmergas kurdos, tampoco les viene mal esta distracción tras la reciente decisión de la Corte Penal Internacional de iniciar una investigación por crímenes de guerra en los territorios ocupados palestinos.

La duda cae, una vez más, del lado de Rusia. No parece que cuadre con sus cálculos aumentar la tensión en la región cuando está a punto de saldar convenientemente la guerra en Siria. Quizá sea Putin el único capaz de calmar los ánimos de unos y otros; desde luego, la maquinaria la tiene bien engrasada. En cualquier caso, los grandes perdedores son los iraquíes, que, tras varios meses de revueltas populares contra un régimen sectario y corrupto manejado por Irán y EE UU, ven de nuevo cómo su país y su futuro son secuestrados.
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