Niu Xinchun: Beware of US Building New Berlin Wall

Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 13 June 2020
by Niu Xinchun (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Tyler Ruzicka. Edited by Jamye Sharp.
On June 12, 1987, U.S. President Ronald Reagan made a speech at the Brandenburg Gate on the border between East and West Berlin calling to tear down the Berlin Wall. This speech was later seen as a key turning point in the conclusion of the Cold War. Afterward, the wall between the East and West was torn down and the globe gradually melded together into a unified, disaggregated and cooperative marketplace. Peace and progress became the theme of international politics in the Post-Cold War era. Today, however, against all expectations, there is an uproar of calls to sever ties between nations, the footsteps of a new cold war grow ever closer, and a new Berlin Wall between the U.S. and China is on the verge of emerging.

The state of U.S-China relations today is not a historical inevitability, but a combination of factors that have created a perfect storm. After the 2008 financial crisis, as the gap in strength between China and the U.S. continued to shrink, ideological conflicts between the two deepened, and Western confidence was dampened by repeated setbacks, American elites' pathos and anticipation of disaster unexpectedly combined with grassroots, populist, and anti-foreign sentiments at a particular moment in time leading to a sudden skyrocketing of competition between powers. These factors encompass fact, fiction and the manipulation of party politics. To deconstruct that perfect storm we have to distinguish what is inevitable, long-term and irreversible; from what is incidental, short-term and mutable. Troublingly, recently both U.S. and Chinese media have been flooded with emotional language and that perfect storm seems to be growing.

There is an absence of serious, rational debate. Instead, there is a widespread circulation of viewpoints, with deceptively clear and simple logic that makes them seem true, but that are in fact erroneous. First, there is the theory that U.S-China conflict is inevitable; it holds that China's strength has grown to the point that conflict between the rising power and the presiding power is inevitable, and this is the U.S.'s last opportunity to keep China in check. Second, there is the end of the American century theory; it claims the U.S. was already struggling internally and externally, and the novel coronavirus, the riots, the economic recession or the challenge from China was just the straw that broke the camel's back. Third, the theory of the collapse of Western ideology; amid troubles like the financial crisis, the rise of populism and COVID-19, the West has demonstrated a subpar performance, showing that its systemic problems are beyond repair. Fourth, the theory that there is a consensus of American policy toward China; this claims that the U.S. has already formed a bipartisan, whole-of-government, new cold war-style strategy to hold China in check. Fifth, the theory that China will replace the U.S.; it claims that China has constructed a comprehensive global strategy to supersede the U.S., with the One Belt One Road initiative as the economic component, Confucius Institutes as the cultural component, Made in China 2025 as the science and technology component, and the Thousand Talents Plan as the human resources component. Sixth, the theory that isolationism is beneficial; it says that in the long run, cutting ties between nations means ending dependence on foreign countries, promoting the return of American industry, and speeding up China's independent innovation. Seventh, the theory that U.S. policy toward China has failed; this claims that in the last 40 years, the U.S. hasn't changed China's systems or patterns of behavior, and now it's becoming flustered and frustrated. Clearly these viewpoints are far removed from reality. They add fuel to the fire, objectively further deteriorating U.S.-China relations.

It's true that the gap between the U.S. and China continues to close, and it's also true that international power shifts make it easy for conflicts between powers to occur; however, the dose makes the poison. Whether the balance of power between the U.S. and China has reached that critical tipping point is a question that remains unanswered, as is whether or not the two countries' ideologies have become completely incompatible. What's more, even if that critical point has been reached, conflict is not guaranteed. These questions require serious and careful academic study and debate, carried out by professionals. To use them at will as logical premises is very dangerous.

The United States' relative influence is declining, but we are still far from the end of the American century. In 2019, the U.S. gross domestic product made up a 25% share of the global economy, which was a return to its percent share from 1980. In that same period of time, the EU’s percent share of the world economy fell from 35% to 21%, Japan's from 10% to 6%, and Russia's from 3% to 2%, while China's percent share rose from 2% to 16%. In the past 40 years, China has risen quickly, but the U.S. hasn't declined, and other countries have lost influence; thus the essential change in the international power structure. Since World War II, as the American economy has experienced periodic ups and downs, every so often the theory of the American decline makes a comeback, but so far it hasn't become a reality.

The Western system and Western ideology have indeed encountered many problems, but the possibility of them dying out or being replaced is small. It's much more likely that they will be weakened, altered, fractured or reborn. Western thought and the Western system began during the Renaissance and the age of the bourgeois revolution; it was consolidated after World War II, and further developed following the Cold War. Unfortunately, it's difficult to conclude that we are now at a turning point. This is an extensive, long-lived system in a state of constant innovation. It won't withdraw from the historical stage so easily. What's more, as of now there is no substitute in sight for the liberal international order. Claims about "NATO's brain death," the "Western decline," and the "end of the American century" are more like warnings rather than prophecies. More than a century ago, the book "The Decline of the West" was even popular for a while.

So far, whether we're discussing American policy toward China or Chinese policy toward the U.S., neither has been set in stone and there is much room for change in the future. In the U.S., although hostility toward China has grown in government, business and academia, there is still far from consensus on how to handle China. Liberal internationalists still insist that the U.S. should collaborate with Western allies to strengthen the liberal international system and use its institutions to constrain and remold China. Populists demand that the U.S. break off relations with China and return to a state of isolationism. Neoconservatives advocate for a new cold war and establishing China as a global adversary, thereby mobilizing American forces domestically and internationally and reviving the grand ambitions of American hegemony. In China, we must adhere to a consistent strategy, starting from the worst and striving toward the best. State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized in two press meetings that China has no intention of changing the U.S., much less replacing it, and that both the U.S. and China would benefit from cooperation and be hurt by conflict, a clear insight gained through decades of experience.

How the competitive relationship between China and the U.S. evolves in the future will be the biggest variable in the international structure of power. There is no plan that has been tested in practice and no plan that could earn universal consensus. Most of all, there is no solution that defeats the enemy in one move. The most likely situation is that both sides add as many alternative plans as possible, using all kinds of tools and constantly making adjustments in trial and error. This is a difficult and risky process of structural transformation. Now more than ever we need to be professional, patient and cool-headed, and avoid talking big or making empty promises. And if the new Berlin Wall ever emerges, it will inevitably result in a big blow to the U.S. and China's strength and worldwide disaster. The U.S., China and the rest of the world should all be highly vigilant and take immediate action, doing the utmost to prevent U.S.-China relations from free-falling.

The author is the director of the Institute of Middle East Studies of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.


牛新春: 警惕美国新建一堵“柏林墙”

1987年6月12日,美国总统里根在德国东西柏林交界的勃兰登堡门前发表演说,呼吁“推倒柏林墙”,这次演说后来被视为结束冷战的重要关节点。此后,东西两大阵营之间的“墙”拆掉了,全球逐渐融合为统一的、分工协作的大市场,和平与发展成为后冷战时代国际政治的主题。令人意想不到的是,今天 “脱钩”论甚嚣尘上,新“冷战”的脚步声越来越近,中美之间的“柏林墙”呼之欲出。

中美关系走到今天,不是历史的必然,而是各种因素聚合形成的“螺旋风暴”。2008年金融危机后,在中美实力差距持续缩小,意识形态矛盾不断加深,西方自信心屡屡受挫大背景下,美国精英的忧患意识、悲情战术与草根民粹的排外情绪,在特定时间点意外结合,建构出大国竞争骤然升级的场景。这其中有事实,更有虚幻的想象,还有党派政治的操弄。解构“螺旋风暴”,需要区别哪些是必然的、长期的、不可逆的,哪些是偶然、短期的、可以改变的。令人不安的是,近来中美两国媒体上充斥着情绪化言语,“螺旋风暴”似乎越卷越大。

理性、严肃的辩论缺席,逻辑简单、鲜明但似是而非的观点广泛流传。其一,中美冲突必然论,中国实力发展到现在,必然发生崛起大国与守成大国之间的冲突,这是美国遏制中国的最后一次机会。其二,美国世纪终结论,美国已经内外交困,新冠疫情或骚乱或经济衰退或中国挑战就是最后一根稻草。其三,西方意识形态崩溃论,金融危机、民粹主义、新冠疫情等危机中,西方表现欠佳,反映出其制度性危机不可挽救。其四,美国对华政策共识论,美国已经形成两党一致的、全政府的、全面遏制中国的“新冷战”战略。其五,中国取代美国论,中国构筑了全面取代美国的全球战略,“一带一路”是经济部分,孔子学院是文化部分,“中国制造2025”是科技部分,千人计划是人才部分。其六,“脱钩”有利论,从长远看“脱钩”可以摆脱对外依赖,促进美国产业回归,加速中国自主创新。其七,美国对华政策失败论,过去40年美国没有改变中国的制度、行为模式,现在开始气急败坏了。显而易见,这些观点脱离现实,客观上给中美关系的恶化火上浇油。


中美实力差距持续缩小是客观事实,国际权力转移也确实容易引起大国冲突,但是“抛开剂量谈危害都是耍流氓”。中美实力对比是否已经达到权力转移的临界点,中美意识态对立是否到了完全不能相容的程度,是个很大的问号。更何况,即使中美实力对比真的到了临界点,也并非一定会冲突。这些问题需要专业人士展开认真细致的学术研究、辩论,随意将其作为逻辑前提非常危险。

美国的相对影响力在下降,但是远远未达到美国世纪终结的地步。1980-2019年期间,美国GDP占全球的比重从25%回到25%,同期欧盟从35%降到21%,日本从10%到6%,俄罗斯从3%到2%,中国则从2%上升到16%。过去近40年,中国快速崛起、美国没有衰落、其他大国影响下降,是国际权力格局的本质变化。第二次世界大战以来,伴随着美国经济周期起伏,每隔一段时期“美国衰落论”就会重出江湖,迄今尚未变成现实。

西方意识形态、制度确实遇到很多问题,但是消亡或被取代的可能性较小,削弱、改造、分裂、再生的可能性较大。从思想、制度源头看,西方始于文艺复兴、资产阶级革命时期,第二次世界大战后得到巩固,冷战后进一步发展,恐怕难以断定现在就是一个转折点。这是一个内容庞大、源远流长、不断革新的体系,不会轻易退出历史舞台。更何况,目前还看不到自由国际制度的替代品。“北约脑死亡”“西方衰落”“美国世纪终结”更多是警言,而非预言。早在100多年前,《西方衰落》一书就曾流行一时。

迄今为止,无论是美国对华政策还是中国对美政策,都没有最后定型,未来仍有很大转换空间。在美国,尽管政、商、学各界对华敌意上升,但是在如何对付中国的问题上远远没有共识。自由国际主义者仍坚持,美国应协同西方盟友,强化自由国际体系,用制度“遏制”、改造中国;民粹主义者要求美国同中国“脱钩”,回归孤立主义;新保守主义者鼓吹“新冷战”,把中国树成全球性对手,以此动员美国国内外力量,重振美国霸权雄心。在中国,仍然保持战略定力,从最坏处着手、往最好处努力。国务委员兼外交部长王毅在两会记者会上强调,中国无意改变美国,更不想取代美国,中美合则两利,斗则俱伤,这是从几十年来各种经验教训中得出的最精辟概括。

中美竞争关系未来如何演变将是国际权力格局最大的变数。没有一种方案经受过实践检验,也没有一种方案能获得完全共识,更没有一个一招制敌解决方案。最可能的情况是,双方都尽可能增加备选方案,各种工具混杂使用,在试错中不断调整。这是一个困难的、充满风险的转型过程,越是这个时候越需要专业、耐心和冷静,越不能放空炮、讲大话。而一旦出现新“柏林墙”,结果必然是中美双方大伤元气,也是全球灾难。中美双方、世界各国都应高度警惕,立刻行动起来,尽最大可能阻止中美关系“自由落体”式的下坠。(作者是中国现代国际关系研究院中东所所长)
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