Biden Can’t Do Much about Changing Middle East

Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 21 December 2020
by Ding Long (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Liza Roberts. Edited by Helaine Schweitzer.
President-elect Joe Biden takes office in one month and will face an unrecognizable and paradoxical Middle East. Over the past four years, the Donald Trump administration has set its diplomatic starting line in the Middle East, choosing Saudi Arabia as his first foreign visit, withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal and launching the new Middle East peace plan, which facilitated the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and four Arab countries, including the United Arab Emirates. These so-called achievements of Middle East diplomacy are regarded as Trump’s most important diplomatic legacy. Although there is not much time left in his term, the Trump administration continues to publicly promote diplomatic developments in the Middle East. The purpose of such fanfare is nothing more than an effort to solidify existing achievement, while at the same time making U.S. relations with Iran more fraught so that Biden will have a more difficult time navigating in the future. This diplomatic legacy will shackle the Biden administration’s Middle East diplomatic efforts.

At the macro level, the U.S. has employed a strategy of reducing investment in the Middle East while maintaining control since the Barack Obama administration. However, at the operational level, the Trump administration has effectively brought American diplomatic traditions into play, attempting to reshape the Middle East through new alliances. The underlying logic of the Trump administration’s Middle East diplomacy is to lead in establishing an anti-Iran alliance that includes Arab countries and Israel. This alliance involves three main arguments. First, a friend is still a friend. That is to say, stabilizing relations with traditional allies in the Middle East, continuously surpassing the bottom line and sparing no effort to support Israel will allow Israel’s geopolitical environment to make unprecedented improvement. Regarding issues such as Yemen, the U.S. cannot be too harsh on its Arab allies. Second, enemies are still enemies. Withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal indicated a continued policy of applying maximum pressure on Iran. Third, the enemy of U.S. enemies is a friend, which encourages the collaboration of allies who share a common enemy.

As a participant and witness to the Iran nuclear deal, Biden has signaled that he plans to revive part of the Obama administration’s legacy in the Middle East. This includes limitless support for allies, an attempt to turn enemies into allies and crafting the balance of power in the Middle East between various factions so that the U.S. can act as an offshore influence. The goals and tactics of these endeavors are different, but the Trump administration’s diplomatic legacy in the Middle East will decidedly be a burden for the Biden administration. If the Trump administration can reshape allied relations in the Middle East while it also contains Iran, then Biden’s attempts to strengthen relations with allies and mitigate U.S.-Iranian conflict will contradict each other, and thus further hinder Biden’s strategy in the Middle East.

First of all, Middle Eastern diplomacy is not a top priority for the Biden administration. Biden will enter the White House as the “anti-pandemic president”; foreign diplomatic issues are not on the agenda for now. He will deliberately avoid the Middle East, where his predecessor was deeply entrenched for four years, and instead develop an alternate center of diplomatic focus. It is predicted that the Biden administration’s diplomatic priority will be a return to multilateralism and restoration of alliances, particularly those with traditional Western allies in Europe, among other countries. The challenges in the Middle East cannot be solved in the short term, and the new administration cannot expend too much effort on them.

Secondly, new alliances in the Middle East are a diplomatic achievement that the Biden administration has no reason to reject. The Trump administration has facilitated the normalization of relations between Israel and many Arab countries, and it is expected that relations between even more Arab or Islamic countries and Israel will be normalized as well. This give the U.S. a strong opportunity to create a Middle East version of a little NATO. With regard to Trump’s diplomatic legacy, Biden can only accept it in full because it will help the U.S. maintain control in the Middle East. After all, when it comes to supporting relations between Israel and Arab allies, there is no fundamental difference between the two political parties in the U.S., who only differ in terms of how enthusiastic they are about the policy and the ways to conduct it. However, the new geopolitical structure in the Middle East is unfavorable to Iran, which will restrain the Biden administration and make it subject to criticism. Biden will not dare ease relations lightly with Iran for fear of undermining the newly established Middle East alliance structure. At the same time, the Biden administration’s promotion of democratization and human rights diplomacy in the Middle East may suffer in an effort to avoid additional conflict.

Third, the domestic ability of the U.S. and Iran to support easier relations between the two countries has been significantly weakened. Anti-Iranian forces in the U.S. have always been strong, and these have been encouraged by Trump’s tough policies. Biden’s attempt to fully return to the Iran nuclear deal will certainly encounter resistance. The U.S. withdrawal from the deal and extreme pressure on Iran has disgraced Iranian reformists who advocate for easing relations with the West and has increased the power of Iranian hard-liners. There is almost no possibility of Iran resuming former unconditional nuclear negotiations when it has suffered such losses. Although the U.S. broke from the agreement first, Iran has broken the terms of the nuclear deal by building numerous centrifuges and increasing the output of enriched uranium. It will be a difficult process to bring Iran back into the framework of the Iran nuclear deal.

Because of these many constraints, the Biden administration will hardly be able to do much in the Middle East. First, the situation in the Middle East changes rapidly and the contributions of Biden’s predecessor are everywhere. It is expected that the Biden administration will temporarily set aside Middle Eastern diplomacy, imitating most U.S. presidents in waiting until a second term to start work on issues in the region.

Second, the Biden administration will ease tensions between the U.S. and Iran. U.S. sanctions on Iran have not been effective and have objectively helped Iranian hard-liners. Iran has also used various methods to break through these sanctions. It is worth noting that secretary of state nominee Antony Blinken has said he will implement certain terms of the Iran nuclear deal rather than restoring the agreement in its entirety. This demonstrates that the Biden administration has already reduced its focus on the Iranian nuclear issue. In the future, the Biden administration may work with European allies to restore contact with Iran and renew discussions on implementing policies that differ from those of the Trump administration. The Biden administration is expected to use a carrot and stick style of diplomacy — that is, reducing sanctions in areas like combating the pandemic and improving the economic situation, while at the same time maintaining strong pressure on the military and with respect to security issues. This model is known as “freezing (sanctions) for freezing (nuclear activities),” and is the most likely path forward for the Iranian nuclear issue and U.S.-Iran relations. In light of the fact that Iran has intensified the matter of ballistic missile development and expanding its influence in the Arab world, it will be difficult for the Biden administration to avoid dealing with the issue. In the future, it is likely that the U.S. will try to negotiate another agreement outside the framework of the existing Iranian nuclear deal.

Third, some Arab countries near the Persian Gulf that previously bet on Trump winning the election need to quickly establish mutual trust with the Biden administration. Accepting U.S. intervention in order to alleviate the crisis of Qatar’s severance of diplomatic relations may be Trump’s gift to Biden.

In sum, after four years of the Trump administration, the face of the Middle East has undergone tremendous change, and the relationship between America’s friends and enemies in the Middle East has been solidified. This will severely limit the Biden administration’s room to maneuver and make it difficult to accomplish anything of major importance.


美国候任总统拜登一个月后就将入主白宫,届时他面对的将是一个面目全非并且充满悖论的中东。过去四年,特朗普政府将外交起跑线和冲刺点都放在中东,从选择沙特作为外访首站到退出伊朗核协议,再到推出“新中东和平计划”,促成阿联酋等四个阿拉伯国家与以色列建交,这些所谓的中东外交成果被其视为最重要的外交遗产。虽然任期已经所剩无多,特朗普政府仍在紧锣密鼓地开展中东外交,目的无非是巩固已有成果,同时“挖坑埋雷”让美伊关系变得更糟糕,使拜登未来难以逆转。这份外交遗产将成为拜登政府中东外交的桎梏。

在宏观层面,奥巴马政府以来美国在中东减少投入同时维持掌控力的战略一直得到延续。但在操作层面,特朗普政府把“拉一个打一个”的美国中东外交传统发挥得淋漓尽致,企图用新的盟友关系重塑中东。特朗普政府中东外交的底层逻辑是主导建立包括阿拉伯国家与以色列的反伊朗联盟,其中包含三大逻辑:

一是“朋友还是朋友”,即巩固与中东传统盟友的关系,接连突破多条底线,不遗余力地支持以色列,使以色列的地缘政治环境获得空前改善;在也门等问题上,美国对阿拉伯盟友并未过分苛责。二是“敌人还是敌人”,即退出伊核协议,对伊朗实施“极限施压”政策。三是“敌人的敌人是朋友”,即整合拥有共同敌人的盟友。


而作为伊核协议达成的参与者和见证者,拜登释放出的信号是他将部分复兴奥巴马政府的中东遗产,即支持盟友不可无底线,并尝试化敌为友,塑造中东各阵营间的均势,便于美国实施离岸平衡。目标和手法不同,决定特朗普政府的中东外交遗产之于拜登政府可能成为包袱。如果说特朗普政府重塑中东盟友关系与遏制伊朗可以互洽,那么拜登既加强盟友关系又缓和美伊关系就是相互抵牾,这将掣肘其在中东施政。

首先,中东外交不是拜登政府的优先事项。拜登将作为“抗疫总统”入主白宫,外交问题暂时提不上日程。他会有意避开前任“深耕”四年的中东,另辟蹊径寻找新的外交重心。预计拜登政府外交优先事项是向多边主义回摆,重塑联盟,特别是修复与欧洲等传统西方盟友的关系。中东难题非短期内所能解决,新政府不会在中东问题上花费过多心力。

其次,中东新联盟是拜登政府没有理由拒绝的外交成果。特朗普政府促成多个阿拉伯国家与以色列关系正常化,预计还会有阿拉伯国家或其他伊斯兰国家与以色列关系正常化,这赋予美国图谋建立的中东版“小北约”以强大势能。对于这份外交遗产拜登只能照单全收,因为它有利于美国掌控中东。毕竟在支持以色列和阿拉伯盟友方面,美国两党只是力度和方式不同,并无本质分歧。然而,中东新地缘政治格局对伊朗十分不利,也将束缚拜登政府的手脚,使其动辄得咎,不敢轻易缓和对伊关系,以免破坏中东新联盟组建进程。同时,拜登政府在中东推行民主化和人权外交也会投鼠忌器。

第三,美国和伊朗国内支持两国关系缓和的力量明显减弱。美国国内反伊朗势力原本便很强大,又受到特朗普强硬政策鼓舞。拜登寻求完全回归伊核协议必然遭遇巨大阻力。美国退出伊核协议并对伊朗“极限施压”,使主张缓和与西方关系的伊朗改革派灰头土脸,强硬派势力显著上升,吃过亏的伊朗无条件重启核问题谈判几乎不可能。虽然美国毁约在先,但伊朗毕竟在离心机数量、浓缩铀产量等方面已突破伊核协议规定。让伊朗重回伊核协议框架将经历艰难的过程。

诸多掣肘之下,拜登政府在中东难有较大作为。其一,中东局势骤变,加之前任四处“埋雷”。预计拜登政府将暂时搁置中东外交,而效仿大多数美国总统,谋求第二任期成功后再在中东问题上发力。

其二,拜登政府会缓和美伊紧张关系。美国制裁伊朗效果不彰,客观上还帮了伊朗强硬派的忙。伊朗也已运用多种手段突破制裁。值得注意的是,美国候任国务卿布林肯表示将执行伊核协议条款,而不是完全回归伊核协议,这显示拜登政府在伊核问题上已降低调门。未来拜登政府或将与欧洲盟友一道,恢复与伊朗接触,重新探讨对伊朗实施有别于特朗普政府的政策,预计可能是“胡萝卜加大棒”式,即在抗疫、民生等领域减轻制裁力度,同时维持在军事和安全领域的高压。这种被称为“冻结(制裁)换冻结(核活动)”模式,是伊核问题和美伊关系最有可能的走向。鉴于伊朗弹道导弹问题、在阿拉伯世界拓展影响力等问题已被炒热,拜登政府很难回避。未来美国试图在伊核协议框架外就其另开谈判的可能性较大。

其三,一度“押宝”特朗普胜选的一些海湾阿拉伯国家,需要尽快建立与拜登政府的互信。接受美国调解缓解卡塔尔断交危机,将可能是它们送给拜登的礼物。

总之,经过特朗普政府的四年,中东面貌发生巨大变化,美国在中东的敌友关系被固化。这使拜登政府的运作空间被严重挤压,很难有大的建树。
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