Domestic and International Realities Biden Will Face

Published in UDN
(Taiwan) on 17 January 2021
by Su Chi (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Pinyu Hwang. Edited by Helaine Schweitzer.
It has been difficult for Joe Biden to assume office, and it will only be even more difficult after he is sworn in, because he will be taking over a nation afflicted by a serious epidemic, social division, income inequality and declining international authority. His administration will most likely focus on domestic problems before it addresses international issues; domestic first, international second.

First there is the pandemic, an issue that is beyond urgent. When Biden nominated Lloyd Austin as the first Black secretary of defense in U.S. history, Biden made the recommendation based on Austin’s ability to successfully distribute the new COVID-19 vaccine to the military, judging from the "crucial role [Austin played] in bringing 150,000 American troops home from the theater of war" in Iraq a decade ago. Biden also chose Austin first as an effort to relate to the military and their families after 20 years of war, then to reflect racial diversity in the country, and finally, in the interest of national security. Biden's priorities could not be any clearer.

Second, Trump's landslide defeat, coupled with the insurrection at the Capitol 200 years, shows how extremely serious social and political division is in the United States is. In the past, members of the House and Senate often voted across party lines, but now they generally adhere to strict party discipline. Yet, 10 Republican representatives in the House voted to impeach Trump, which immediately became big news, of course.

To make matters worse, the Democratic Party's internal situation is also very complicated. Biden stood out in the primary election primarily because he is like a "big tent" under which anyone can find a place for themselves. However, the struggle for power and interests within the Democratic Party is bound to resurface after he takes office. It will be an extremely difficult challenge for Biden to balance the forces within his party while fighting and compromising with Republicans.

Third, there is income inequality. Today, the net worth of the top 50 richest people in the United States is equal to the wealth of half the nation. The 500 largest companies pay only 11% tax on average; 91 of them, including the well known Amazon, Starbucks, Netflix, etc., pay zero or less than zero tax. With the exception of a few Democratic senators, no politician from either party has dared to challenge these rich and powerful corporations, and blames foreign countries such as China and Mexico for the anger of the poor.

For Biden, this chronic disease which has gone untreated for decades, has suddenly become an an emergency, and has three serious consequences. One, income inequality provides the most fertile ground for Trump's populism. If it is not addressed somehow, a second Trump will surely emerge. Second, in order to build on its currently vulnerable majority, the Democratic Party must win over the working class that once stood steadfastly with the Democratic Party but which has now become die-hard Trump supporters. It will be possible to win back their hearts only by redistributing wealth. Third, the spread of COVID-19 does not distinguish between the rich and the poor. As long as there are large numbers of poor people who must work in contact with people, or who are unwilling to seek medical attention for lack of health care or savings, it will be difficult for the measures the U.S. takes to fight the pandemic to be effective.

Therefore, problems caused by the inequality between the rich and the poor pose a very real threat. Yet to mitigate that threat, Biden will need to challenge a great many vested interests, making it anything but easy.

We now turn our attention to foreign relations. Judging from Biden's character, experience and the Cabinet appointments he has announced so far, it should not be a problem for the U.S. to repair some of its damaged alliances, its ties to international organizations, and its international prestige. The biggest problem for the U.S. tackle, and the one most critical to Taiwan, will probably be the continued decline of American military power.

When the U.S. military was at its peak in the 1960s, it rested on the principle of winning "two and a half wars" (one against the Soviet Union, one against the Chinese Communists and North Korea, and "half a war" in developing nations). In the 1970s and 1980s, it turned into "one and a half wars." After George W. Bush, the aim became winning "two regional wars" simultaneously (one in the Middle East and one against North Korea). It was only in 2018 that serious thought was given to focusing on a master confrontation against the Chinese Communist Party and Russia. This refocus is still only in its early stages, and all of the relevant armament, deployment and training are still stuck in regional counterterrorism operations. As a result, the U.S. military may appear to be strong, but when it encounters mainland China, which has been preparing for such a master confrontation for 20 years and has a home field advantage, the U.S. military's weakness, with its "willing spirit but lack of strength," is fully exposed.

Unfortunately, many people in Taiwan only see the America’s "willing spirit" on the surface (such as the recently declassified U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy report) and are complacent, but they deliberately ignore the brutal reality of America’s "lack of strength." In recent years, I have read all the relevant studies from the United States and consulted with as many American officials, former officials and experts as possible, but I have not seen a single book or article that expresses confidence in being able to protect Taiwan. It is no wonder that Donald Trump has been playing the Taiwan card for four years, but when faced with a critical moment or a key project, he consistently folded.

In view of this, the Tsai Ing-wen government, which has fashioned the United States as its only supporter, must be more careful in the future. Even if the Biden administration is wary of Beijing, it must first take care of the health, unity and economy of its own people before it can think about how to respond to Beijing. The Tsai government must not engage in wishful thinking, or it will put itself and Taiwan in greater danger.

The author is the chairman of Taipei Forum.


拜登上台難,上台以後恐更難,因為他將接收一個疫情嚴峻、社會分裂、貧富不均、國際主導力下降的國家。他最可能的施政重心應是內重於外,先內後外。

首先,疫情。這是已經燒到拜登眉毛的大事。他任命美國史上第一位黑人國防部長奧斯丁(Lloyd Austin)時,提出的第一個推薦理由竟是「基於他十年前主導從伊拉克撤出十五萬美軍的成功經驗,他一定能順利在軍中分配新冠疫苗」,其次是撫慰征戰廿年官兵與家屬的心情,再就是反映國內種族多元現況,最後理由才是保衛國家。拜登優先順序再清楚不過。

第二,川普的高票落選,加上兩百年來第一次的國會暴亂,顯示美國社會及政治分裂的程度已極嚴重。過去參眾議員經常跨黨投票,現在卻普遍嚴守黨紀。日前十位共和黨眾議員支持彈劾川普當然立刻成了大新聞。

更糟的是,民主黨內部也非常複雜。拜登能在初選脫穎而出,主因就是他像「大帳蓬」,任何人都可以在裡面找到一席之地。但執政後民主黨內的權力與利益爭奪必將再起。拜登如何擺平黨內勢力,同時與共和黨既鬥爭又妥協,將是極艱難的挑戰。

第三是貧富不均。今天美國前五十大富豪的總資產竟與全國一半人的財富相當。最大五百家公司竟然平均只繳十一%的稅;其中九十一家,包括我們熟悉的亞馬遜、星巴克、Netflix等,稅是「零或小於零」。除了少數民主黨參議員,兩黨政客沒人敢挑戰這群富豪及大公司,只能把窮人的憤怒導向中國大陸與墨西哥等外國。

對拜登來說,這個拖延幾十年的慢性病已突變為具有三個嚴重後果的急症。一,它是川普民粹主義最肥沃的土壤。如不設法糾正,第二個川普必會冒出頭。二,民主黨要強化它目前的脆弱多數,必須爭取過去長年與民主黨站在一起,而現在卻成了死忠川粉的工人階級。只有透過財富重分配才有可能挽回他們的心。三,新冠病毒的傳播不分貧富。只要社會有大批窮人必須外出工作並與人接觸,或因沒有保險或儲蓄而不願就醫,美國的防疫成效就難徹底。

所以貧富不均有極高的現實性。然而想減輕它,拜登需要挑戰太多既得利益,談何容易。

再看國外。從拜登的性格、經歷、及已公布的任命來看,美國恢復部分損傷的盟友關係、部分國際組織聯繫、及部分國際聲望,應該不是問題。最大的問題,恰也對台灣最關鍵的,應是美國軍力的持續衰退。

六○年代美國軍力最高峰時,建軍準則是同時打贏「兩個半戰爭」(一個對蘇聯,一個對中共或北韓,半個打第三世界)。七○及八○年代改成「一個半戰爭」。小布希以後再改成同時打贏「兩個區域戰爭」(一在中東,一對北韓)。二○一八年起才認真思考要轉成針對中共或俄國的「高手對決」。這個轉變才剛起步,整個軍備、部署、訓練至今依然停留在區域的反恐作戰,所以美軍看似壯盛,但碰到苦練「高手對決」已廿年又有主場優勢的中國大陸,美軍「心有餘而力不足」的弱點就完全暴露。

可惜台灣部分民眾只看到美國「心有餘」的表面(如近日提前解密的美國印太報告)而沾沾自喜,卻刻意忽略「力不足」的殘酷事實。筆者近年遍閱美國相關研究並盡可能詢問美國官員、前官員、及專家,竟不曾見到一書一文一人對「保台」表示信心。難怪川普的「台灣牌」敲鑼打鼓了四年,但碰到關鍵時刻或關鍵項目卻總踩煞車。

有鑒於此,以美國為唯一靠山的蔡政府今後必須加倍小心。拜登政府即使對北京抱有戒心,也必須先顧好自己國人的健康、團結與經濟,才能去想如何因應。蔡政府切勿一廂情願,否則必將陷自己及台灣於更大的險境。

(作者為台北論壇董事長)
This post appeared on the front page as a direct link to the original article with the above link .

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