The Eagle and the Dragon

The imprint of his predecessor leaves a mark on Joe Biden’s presidency in many ways: the irreducible effects of Trumpism on the Republican Party and its army of zombies, which entrenches Congress in an exacerbated polarization; the irremediable confinement of politics in a rhetorical framework shifted to the right; the legacy of a significant disengagement from the international system; and the prevalence of domestic politics in foreign policy, where public opinion reverberates to the siren songs of economic nationalism. Because of his toxic improvisation and narrow vision, the former president managed to shape the world, which he loudly denounced at the time, of fantasies. A world where the foundation of the United States is eroding, a world where confidence in the Pax Americana is evanescent, a world where allies are opportunistic and ephemeral. Thus, the Biden government is constrained in a web of decisions that it must undo, dismantle and demolish in order to rebuild.

Or maybe not quite.

With 29 presidential executive orders, eight proclamations and nine memoranda in less than a month, it is clear that Biden has entered the Oval Office on four-wheel drive. The will to dismantle the Trumpian architecture is even more methodical than that of his predecessor vis-à-vis Barack Obama. But things are perhaps less clear cut than they first appear. The same applies to the relationship between the American eagle and the Chinese dragon.

Before calling his Chinese counterpart for the first time last Wednesday, Biden first visited the Pentagon, where he announced the creation of a task force on China. He had previously confirmed the existence of a position in defense created by his predecessor and dedicated to the country (deputy assistant secretary of defense for China) by appointing Michael Chase. Moreover, the USS Theodore Roosevelt and the USS Nimitz sailed in the South China Sea to demonstrate the U.S. Navy’s ability to “operate in difficult environments” — even though Admiral Philip Davidson, Commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, stated during his confirmation hearing before Congress that the United States would no longer be able to win a war against China in this area. Nevertheless, the message is clear, as was the invitation of Taiwan’s representative to the United States to the new president’s inauguration ceremony. U.S. strategic posture and foreign policy toward China is aligned with the message of the previous Republican administration. It is part of a balance of power.

Indeed, in his first telephone interview with President Xi Jinping, Biden spoke of unfair trade practices, human rights violations in mainland China and Xinjiang, repression in Hong Kong and the intimidation of Taiwan. Following this call, the president tweeted that he would “work with China when it benefits the American people.” Once again, Biden does not really distinguish himself from Donald Trump.

But the former president’s bellicose approach was neither subtle nor totally effective. Moreover, a report authored by the Peterson Institute for International Economics states that the trade war, the imposition of customs tariffs and the collapse of the Phase One China-U.S. trade agreement have actually done great harm to the American economy, which has slowed down relative to other economic blocs in their relations with China.

In this world defined by Trump’s legacy, the eagle’s relationship with the dragon must be reimagined.

On the one hand, this government is using the levers and tools of its predecessor to challenge Beijing, which Linda Thomas-Greenfield, appointed by Biden as ambassador to the United Nations, described during her Senate confirmation hearing as a “strategic adversary.” From this perspective, the president will continue to sanction dumping practices on the U.S. market or illegal subsidies to Chinese production.

On the other hand, by abandoning the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump left the field open for Xi. With the conclusion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (between 10 ASEAN members and five other states from the Pacific region), China has achieved a substantial geopolitical gain. It is now a stakeholder in the world’s largest free trade agreement, where it is the only heavyweight, while the United States has already watched that ship sail.

As for the democratic bloc that Biden called for during his campaign that was theoretically supposed to unify against the Chinese dragon, the idea is already collapsing. The European Union now wants to be able to conclude its agreements (including with Beijing) without Washington’s blessing. China is therefore a necessary, inevitable and unavoidable partner. All the more so since certain global issues, such as climate change, will not be able to proceed without China’s tacit, if not explicit, agreement. It is no longer possible to ignore China’s role in major U.N. institutions (where Beijing now occupies key positions and a considerable place — heading four of the 19 U.N. agencies and winning a seat on the U.N. Human Rights Council last year). This is why Biden’s new “czar” (an informal title to designate the highest position in the United States on a given issue) on Indo-Pacific strategy is, in fact, the architect of Obama’s Asian pivot: it is about restoring the dynamics of the opposing partner.

There may be a change in tone. The will to drive a foreign policy that is stable, predictable, reliable for allies, determined for others, and imposing for enemies. And this change in style may lead the current government to gain some ground. But the bottom line remains. Because the global balance has changed substantially in four years, Biden’s Chinese policy is, in the end, much more aligned with that of his predecessor than it would appear at first glance.