Necessary Conditions for a Successful US-China Alaska Meeting

Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 11 March 2021
by (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Jaime Cantwell. Edited by Margaret McIntyre.
China and the U.S. have confirmed a high-level strategic dialogue between top Chinese diplomat Yang Jiechi, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan next week. This will be the first senior-level meeting between the two countries since Yang met with then U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in June 2020. Hence, the meeting has drawn great attention since it was first revealed to the outside world.

Some observers in the U.S. have analyzed that Washington has fully communicated with its allies and consolidated its alliance system, and therefore the U.S. would be interacting with Beijing from a position of strength. The U.S. has even released such a message: It hopes that China will create change on issues that concern the U.S.; otherwise, the dialogue will not have tangible outcomes and following dialogues will be meaningless.

It must be pointed out that both sides' intent is indispensable for this meeting to be held. China has emphasized its long-term commitment to strengthening China-U.S. engagements, and such an attitude has formed a convergence with the U.S.'s current needs to construct its China policy, leading to the Alaska meeting.

The U.S. should abandon the mentality that it has a particular advantage in this dialogue. Mutual respect will be more conducive to reaching fruitful outcomes in the meeting.

The U.S. has continuously emphasized the strength of its alliance system, but it has exaggerated this factor. China doesn't have disputes with U.S. allies so serious that they have to resort to severe conflicts to reach a settlement. The differences between China and U.S. allies are determined by the world's diversity, and both sides are willing and able to manage these differences. Allies of Washington are more motivated to cooperate with Beijing than to contain China alongside the U.S. As a result, if the U.S. wants to frighten China with its alliance system, it will be unsuccessful.

To ask China to change its policies pertaining to Xinjiang governance and stabilizing Hong Kong amounts to interference in China's internal affairs and cannot be accepted by Chinese society as a whole. Any exchange of ideas at any time over these issues is only a form of communication to help the U.S. understand the truth and stop misunderstandings and misjudgment.

China and the U.S. are both major powers. Trying to change each other, especially through pressure, is dangerous. It is reasonable that China and the U.S. should accept their differences. The purpose of engagement should be to manage these differences, seek common interests and promote cooperation when possible for both sides. Through these efforts, the two countries should create a framework for China-U.S. relations that features coexistence and non-confrontation, allows for time to smooth over differences between the two countries, eases conflicts and ensures that China-U.S. competition is conducted in a peaceful manner.

Discussing mutual strategic interests can be difficult at a time when some Americans still have a zero-sum mentality, but competing in a peaceful and regulated way is probably the biggest common denominator between China and the U.S. It cannot be the future of China-U.S. relations that one side dominates communication and sets the questions, while the other answers.

We feel that the U.S. still does not understand China, and it has misread the nature of China's system and goal of rejuvenation. The U.S. has given what is happening in China and frictions with its neighbors over border issues a high and illusory external directive. In addition, the traditional culture and the historical experience of the U.S. do not support the vision of "win-win" competition among great powers. Washington is too accustomed to giving orders; it should get used to listening, not refuse to try to solve fundamental problems in a compromising and mutually beneficial way.


中美双方共同证实,中国外事高官杨洁篪和王毅将与美国国务卿布林肯、国安顾问沙利文下周在阿拉斯加举行高层战略对话。这是去年6月杨洁篪与蓬佩奥会晤后两国高层的首次面对面接触,因此从消息最初往外透露开始就受到很高的关注。

美方有人分析说,华盛顿已经与盟国进行了充分沟通,巩固了盟友体系,因此这次是从实力地位开展的接触。美方还传递出这样的信息:强烈希望中方在美方关切的问题上做出改变,否则这次对话不会有结果,或者搞后续对话将没有意义。

我们想说,这次高层战略对话得以举行,显然双方都有意愿,决非剃头挑子一头热。中美加强接触是中方的长期态度,它与美方当下的对华政策建构需求形成了交汇,促成了阿拉斯加之约。

我们认为,美方需要放弃他们带着特殊优势走向这次对话的心理,相互尊重的平常心将更有助于对话取得成果。

美方一直强调他们盟友体系的力量,但这个因素被严重夸大了。中方与美国的很多盟友并不存在需要诉诸严重冲突的分歧,我们与他们之间的分歧是世界多样性本身决定的,大家有意愿也有能力对它们加以管控。我们还相信,那些盟友与中国合作的动力远大于他们跟从美国共同遏制中国的动力,因此美方如果有人想用盟友体系吓唬中国,不会有收获的。

要中国改变治理新疆和稳定香港的政策,这实属干涉中国内政,整个中国社会不可能接受。中美在任何时候如果就这些问题进行交流,只能是沟通,中国帮美国了解实情,减少误解和误判。

中美都是大国,致力于改变对方,尤其是以压促变,这种想法是危险的。中美应当接受彼此存在分歧是合理的,双方接触的目的应当是管控分歧,寻找共同利益,推动双方可以也应该进行的合作。两国应通过这些努力营造中美共存、不对抗的关系框架,让时间来磨合两国分歧,缓释双方的冲突,确保中美的竞争以和平方式进行。

当一些美国人仍有严重零和思维的时候,讲战略上的共同利益会有点吃力,但是让中美以和平、讲规则的方式开展竞争,这大概算得上是两国之间的最大公约数。由一方来主导中美交流,一方出题,另一方按给定的条件答题,这不可能是现实和今后中美关系的场景。

我们的感觉是,美国还是不了解中国,误读了中国体制和中国复兴的性质,将中国正在发生的一切和我们因边境问题产生的与邻国摩擦赋予了很高想象出来的对外指向性。另外,美国文化和他们的历史经验则支持不了华盛顿对大国竞争“双赢”的想象。华盛顿太习惯发号施令了,他们应习惯倾听,不拒绝尝试以妥协互利的方式解决一些根本问题。
This post appeared on the front page as a direct link to the original article with the above link .

Hot this week

Topics

Poland: Meloni in the White House. Has Trump Forgotten Poland?*

Germany: US Companies in Tariff Crisis: Planning Impossible, Price Increases Necessary

Japan: US Administration Losing Credibility 3 Months into Policy of Threats

Mauritius: Could Trump Be Leading the World into Recession?

India: World in Flux: India Must See Bigger Trade Picture

Palestine: US vs. Ansarallah: Will Trump Launch a Ground War in Yemen for Israel?

Ukraine: Trump Faces Uneasy Choices on Russia’s War as His ‘Compromise Strategy’ Is Failing

Related Articles

Germany: US Companies in Tariff Crisis: Planning Impossible, Price Increases Necessary

Japan: US Administration Losing Credibility 3 Months into Policy of Threats

Ukraine: Trump Faces Uneasy Choices on Russia’s War as His ‘Compromise Strategy’ Is Failing

Hong Kong: Can US Tariffs Targeting Hong Kong’s ‘Very Survival’ Really Choke the Life out of It?

India: Greenland: How To Handle America That Wants Everything